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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE GENESIS OF MAX WEBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE NATURE OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

by

© HEWA KALUHALA MULLAGE SOMAWANTHA

A THESIS

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EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1987

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TO MY PARENTS

ABSTRACT

The vast amount of secondary interpretations of Weber's writings are based on the assumption that he was a "methodologist" who tried to develop a systematic methodological framework for the social sciences. In recent years, however, some social scientists who examined Weber's contemporary intellectual background in Germany opposed this view and argued that he was not a methodologist. They maintained that Weber's methodological ideas were originally developed by the neo-Kantian philosophers in response to the methodological crisis in Europe. Therefore, they emphasized that Weber's writings on methodological issues cannot be fully understood without examining the philosophical writings of the neo-Kantian School. However, so far very few sociological studies have tried to compile detailed accounts of Weber's methodological writings in the context of his contemporary intellectual background. Therefore, the current understanding of Weber's writings is based on inaccurate interpretations; many students of sociology are unaware of the influence of such philosophers as Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband and Georg Simmel on Weber's writings. As a result, they fail to understand Weber's views on the methodological and theoretical problems of the social sciences.

In this study, Max Weber's methodological writings are examined in the context of his contemporary intellectual background in Germany. The late 19th century methodological crisis (Methodenstreit) in Europe is the historical departure point to the analysis of Weber's writings. A wide range of philosophical and historical accounts in connection with the methodological crisis are analyzed in order to provide a clear understanding of the historical background of Weber's methodological writings. The influence of the neo-Kantian School on Weber's writings becomes evident in his criticisms of positivism and the Historical School of Economics. In this context, Weber's position with regard to methodological issues is interpreted as an attempt to synthesize the philosophical writings of his predecessors. For example, the notion of Verstehen (understanding of subjective meaning), Wertbeziehung (value relevance in social inquiry) and ideal types were originally developed by the neo-Kantian philosophers. Thus, contrary to the existing view that Weber was a

methodologist, this study maintains that he was a historical sociologist and his writings on methodological issues are basically a result of his effort to cope with certain specific epistemological problems in the social sciences. In his effort to clarify these problems, Weber relied heavily on the philosophical writings of the neo-Kantian School. Therefore, it is argued that Weber's methodological writings do not provide a systematic methodological framework for the social sciences, nor did Weber expect to do so either. Thus, it is incorrect to reconstruct his methodological arguments in order to develop a systematic methodological paradigm for the social sciences. Such attempts in the past have resulted in misinterpretations of Weber's work. Therefore, it is more useful to understand Weber's writings in the context of his contemporary intellectual background.

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I. INTRODUCTION

PRELUDE

Nearly three decades ago, Friedrich Tenbruck[1] (1959:573-630) pointed out that most of the secondary interpretations of Max Weber's methodology in the social sciences are based on three assumptions: first of all, it is believed that Weber's methodological essays were intended to develop a systematic methodology for the social sciences. Second, there is a general tendency to treat Weber's methodological and theoretical essays as a result of his own creative maturity that had blossomed during the early years of this century. Third, it is believed that Weber's methodological and theoretical ideas are purely his own and that there is no relationship to his contemporary scholarship in Germany. Tenbruck argues that such assumptions have obscured the basic tenets of Weber's thesis, and have vitiated the validity of many secondary interpretations. Therefore, Tenbruck points out that in order to comprehend Weber's methodological ideas more meaningfully, such superficial assumptions must be abandoned and interpretations must be made in the light of his contemporary intellectual background. He argues that Weber was not a specialized methodologist who intended to develop a systematic methodology for the social sciences. Tenbruck (1959:582) emphasizes that Weber's methodological writings are not a logic of science developed from an originally methodological viewpoint; the problems he dealt with are not methodological, but derived from the concrete problem situations in his own field. Methodology here refers to the philosophical foundation of the social sciences (i.e., epistemology), but not to the research methods of the empirical sciences.

Tenbruck's profound analysis has some significant implications in the subsequent scholarly research on Max Weber's methodological writings. During the last two decades,

[1]This long and detailed essay is available in German: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 11. 1959:573-630. Brief excerptions from this can be found in a number of methodological essays in English by Tenbruck: "Formal Sociology", 77-96, in Georg Simmel (ed.) Lewis A. Coser. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1965; F.H. Tenbruck, 1974 "Max Weber and the Sociology of Science: A Case Reopened", Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 3 (June):312-320.

there have been a number of major studies, which tried to examine Weber's sociological oeuvre in the light of his contemporary German scholarship (Ringer, 1969; Bruun, 1972; Burger, 1976). The relative influence of Rickert and Simmel, and more recently the nature of Simmel's influence, have been the focus of some prominent studies on Max Weber's methodology (Rogers, 1969; Bruun, 1972; Burger, 1976). The assessment of Simmel's influence began with Tenbruck, who argued that Rickert's contribution to Weber's methodology was the concept of Wertbeziehung, and already by 1904, when the Protestant Ethic, and Objectivity first appeared, Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes could have provided Weber with the ideal type approach, much of the content of the spirit of capitalism, and more besides (Tenbruck, 1959:573-630). One recent commentator (Helle, 1983) believes that Simmel's influence on Weber becomes evident in the earlier writings of Weber, whereas Rickert's influence seems to dominate his later works on methodology.[2] According to Hans Bruun (1972:49-50), Weber's theory of truth came from Simmel's Moralwissenschaft of 1892, and for Maurice Weyembergh (cited from Torrance, 1974:127-165), the same work is the most likely source of Weber's assumption that fact and value are logically heterogeneous, and of the corresponding doctrine of Wertfreiheit, a major point over which Weber differed from Rickert.

Following Tenbruck's fascinating analysis, Thomas Burger (1976:7) argued that in the wake of methodological crisis (Methodenstreit), Weber found an already well-organized theoretical methodology for the social sciences in the work of the neo-Kantians. Burger emphasized the influence of Heinrich Rickert, whose major works seem to be the foundation of Weber's methodological writings. He points out that "many of the problems encountered in the previous interpretations of Weber's methodology were directly the result of an a priori underestimation of Rickert's influence and the consequent failure to analyse it in detail". This

[2]Simmel's influence on Max Weber has been acknowledged by Weber himself. Weber cited Simmel in his methodological writings: "The most developed logical account of a theory of 'Verstehen' may be found in the second edition of Simmel's The Problems of the Philosophy of History (Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie: 1905),... Simmel should first of all receive all the credit for establishing within the wide range of possible contents of the Verstehen" (Weber, [1922] 1951:92-93).

is mainly because of the "common tendency to see in Weber the 'Founding Father' of methodology in the social sciences".

Although Burger's argument leaves the impression that Rickert was the major philosophical source of Weber's methodological ideas, for the most part, Weber drew upon a number of philosophers,[3] whose specific contribution to Weber's methodology is still not well examined. Weber himself made it clear in his introductory footnote in the essay on Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis:

> Our works are designed on the ideas of such modern intellectuals as Windelband, Simmel and especially Heinrich Rickert whose work has an immediate relevance to our attempts (Weber, [1922] 1951:146).

In 1902, Weber wrote to his wife, Marianne Weber, that "I have just finished Rickert. He is very good. To a large extent I find in his book what I have thought myself, although logically in untreated form" (Weber, [1926] 1975:260). Weber is referring here to Rickert's major work Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung ([1902] 1921), which is believed to be the philosophical foundation of Weber's methodological writings. In his preface to the third edition of the Grenzen, which was dedicated to Weber, Rickert described his intellectual relationship to Weber as follows:

> Weber initially doubted the possibility of working out a positive theory of historical science, but was convinced by part 2 of the Grenzen that I (Rickert) was correct in characterizing history as an "Individualisierende Kulturwissenschaft" working on the basis of theoretical value relation and the immediate insight of the fruitful character of science (Rickert, [1902] 1921:xxii-xxiv).

While many authors seem to agree that the original ideas of Weber's methodological writings stemmed from the work of neo-Kantians, they do not have a unified view of the exact nature of the influence of the neo-Kantians on Weber. For Tenbruck, Simmel's influence was a positive example enabling Weber to supersede the limitations of Rickert's teaching. But Weyembergh and Bruun, whose detailed discussions of the relationship between

---

[3]In volume one of Economy and Society ([1922] 1978:3-4), Weber clearly stated that he has taken considerable methodological explanations from Rickert's Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, Karl Jaspers' Allgemeine Psychopathologie, Friedrich Gottl's Herrschaft des Wortes, Georg Simmel's Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, Ferdinand Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, and Rudolf Stammler's Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung.

Rickert and Weber is usefully supplemented by the use of archival evidence, take a more reserved view of Weber's debt to Simmel. However, they both believe that Simmel's influence is a part of the diffuse neo-Kantian-cum-neo-idealist philosophical background which provided Weber with a good starting point, but attribute Weber's forward thrust mainly to Weber himself, and to his thoughtful involvement in empirical research. This difference is closely related to a more basic divergence over the value of Weber's methodological writings themselves. Bruun, taking a more philosophical point of view, sees these as constituting a coherent and progressive corpus of ideas, continually relevant and largely valid. Tenbruck, on the other hand, thought that the Objectivity marked the peak of Weber's creative thinking of methodology, giving him the breakthrough he needed to pursue substantive sociological studies. The later works on methods, according to Tenbruck, were more elaborations, applications and codifications. But at the same time, the position reached in the Objectivity was no more-and no less-than a complex and synthetic, personal solution to a series of discrete problems which the particular changing intellectual conditions of the time threw in his path, as an economic and cultural historian evolving toward sociology. Thus Tenbruck, writing as a sociologist, could conclude that Weber's methodology, taken as a whole, has essentially nothing to say (Tenbruck, 1959:625; Torrance, 1974:130).

The conclusion that must be drawn from the preceding discussion is that Max Weber's philosophy of the social sciences is based on the ideas of contemporary intellectuals. Although Weber was not a "philosopher" as such, he had a superior grasp of the methodological problems that he had to face in his own research. Therefore, Weber's methodological writings are basically his efforts to cope with certain specific epistemological problems of the social sciences. In his efforts to overcome such problems, Weber was not entirely on his own, as much of the fundamental methodological problems of the social sciences had already been discussed by many others. There is no doubt that Weber was familiar with those works and had close academic contacts with those scholars. Hence, in his own research, Weber extensively used the same methodological concepts and interpretations that appeared to be

useful in the social scientific analysis. It is incorrect, however, to argue that Weber was totally uncritical of the theoretical and methodological propositions of his predecessors. He was not preoccupied at all with establishing a fundamental demarcation between the natural and the cultural sciences, and certainly not an ontological one between their respective subject matters. Unlike the other principal neo-Kantians of his time, Weber did not attempt to grapple with existing Kantian principles in order to find a solution to the apparently intractable problem of the so-called cultural sciences, that is, some rationale of using other methods of analysis than those of the natural science. Weber was not caught in the middle of the typical neo-Kantian dilemma of maintaining an ontological distinction--the Kantian dualism--while at the same time devising methods of analysis for the cultural sciences having the same claim to establish truth as those of the natural sciences.

Weber's own methodological approach to sociology is rather pragmatic and logically linked with the "theory of causality". Weber was aligned with his contemporary neo-Kantians on two fundamental grounds: (1) in denying that history was rational, i.e., the notion of universal and deterministic law was applicable to historical reality; and (2) the historical reality, prior to any attempt at synthesizing it, was already meaningful to its participants from a theoretically infinite multiplicity of standpoints, and therefore posed an epistemological problem of interpretation in historical research. But, in spirit at least, one may say that Weber was more Kantian than the neo-Kantians, even though he rejected the Kantian thesis of an ontological separation of Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, (from which principal neo-Kantians initiated their own inquiry), because he conceived historical reality in identical terms to those which Kant himself recognized with respect to natural reality. History is a cultural manifold just as nature is a sensuous manifold. The problem in both cases is by what criteria can those respective manifolds be known. Therefore, this is not just a matter of differences in respective, methods, such as the need for a method of interpretive understanding or the utility of general concepts in historical research, but of epistemological problems of obtaining knowledge.

For sure, Max Weber's philosophy of the social sciences is by no means a systematic and well defined conceptual scheme of his own.[4] It is ironic to think that Weber was a "methodologist", who worked with an intention to develop a systematic methodology for the social sciences. Hence, what we find in Weber's methodological writings, as in many cryptic statements, are complex syntheses of a whole range of ideas brought from others and blended with Weber's own views. To derive proper meanings and interpretations from these complex syntheses of ideas, one must first of all recognize the incipient roots of these ideas and their divergences in the course of long dispute over methodological issues among many intellectuals. It is impossible to understand Weber's ideas without a thorough analysis of the historical development of social sciences. Therefore, for a better understanding of Weber's philosophy of the social sciences, one must examine Weber's ideas in the context of his contemporary intellectual background.

THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to examine Max Weber's philosophy of the social sciences in the context of his contemporary intellectual background. Weber's ideas in the philosophy of the social sciences were originally developed by the neo-Kantian philosophers in response to the Methodenstreit (the methodological crisis), which took place in Europe during the late 19th century. Therefore, a full exploration of the origin and the development of Weber's methodological ideas would necessarily involve examination of the philosophical writings of Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Georg Simmel and Emil Lask as well as assessment of the fundamental issues of the Methodenstreit. In the broadest terms, Weber's methodological writings can be explained as an attempt to synthesize the best aspects of the ideas of his predecessors. Weber tried to derive meaningful interpretations from the philosophical writings

[4]As Guy Oakes (1977:39) points out, Weber's metatheoretical works are fragmentary and unfinished. Weber himself would not contest this judgment. For Weber, this is not a defect peculiar to his own work. It is not a defect of any sort because Weber believed that the construction of a definitive and exhaustive system of concepts is not a possible theoretical goal of the socio-cultural sciences.

of the neo-Kantians in an attempt to provide methodological explanations to particular substantive problems of the socio-cultural sciences. Hence, Weber's position in the methodological controversy was profoundly influenced by the neo-Kantian philosophy. His writings on methodological issues marked the peak of the Methodenstreit, which cannot be fully understood apart from its philosophical ancestry. Therefore, in this study, the Methodenstreit is the historical departure point to the analysis of Weber's methodological writings.

Until recently, in most of the secondary interpretations of Weber's writings, Weber was portrayed as a "methodologist". His substantive sociological studies were described as an attempt to ascertain the validity of his own methodological concepts. A common example is Weber's thesis of the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism--the application of the ideal type method (Sprinzak, 1972:294-320; Collins, 1986). Ehud Sprinzak (1972:310) argued that "since Weber's explicit methodology has not been developed apart from his empirical studies but in close relation with them, it is not difficult to discover within it the roots of the arguments that have been presented formerly in abstract fashion". Sprinzak proposed to identify the roots of Weber's methodological writings in his own empirical research. For many social scientists Weber's methodological mastery is evident in his substantive sociological research (Jordan, 1938:221-231; Kolko, 1959:21-36). The irony of this type of interpretation is that not only do they identify Weber as a "methodologist", but they also believe that it is possible to discover the roots of Weber's methodological ideas in his own empirical research. They seem to have ignored the influence of the neo-Kantian philosophy on Weber's methodological writings. Moreover, some others (e.g. Jordan, 1938; Henrich, 1952) tried to systematize Weber's scattered arguments in an attempt to provide proper methodological framework for the social sciences. For example, Heinrich Jordan (1938:222) blamed Alexander von Schelting for being hesitant to "proceed quite radically enough to achieve full transparency with regard to Max Weber's philosophical foundations". Such an attempt to provide systematic interpretations of Weber's methodological writings has an adverse effect on

Weber's writings. The neo-Kantian position of Weber's methodological writings has been distorted by making inconsistent theoretical claims that Weber himself opposed in his own writings. Weber's emphasis on the causal explanation of phenomena and his denial of the possibility of generalized theories in the social sciences have been misinterpreted by some commentators in an attempt to develop a systematic methodological framework for the social sciences. Following the neo-Kantian philosophers, Weber distinguished the social sciences from natural science on the basis of their subject matter and the theoretical goals of these sciences. He argued that the causal interpretations of social phenomena are completely different from that of causal laws in natural science. Therefore, the causal interpretation in social inquiry, according to Weber, does not imply a possibility of developing generalized theories in the socio-cultural sciences. On the contrary, some commentators (e.g. Parsons, 1936,1937,1965; Jordan, 1938; Runciman, 1972) believe that causal explanation is simply not possible unless the particular facts are related by means of a generalized theoretical scheme. Therefore, Talcott Parsons argues that it is fully consistent with Weber's own thesis to develop generalized theories in the social sciences as in the case of natural science.

The misunderstanding of Weber's methodological ideas among some social scientists is partly due to the absence of full-scale socio-historical inquiry into the methodological writings of Weber, particularly the intellectual relationship between Weber and the neo-Kantian philosophers. Still many students of sociology are unaware of the significant contribution made by the neo-Kantian philosophers toward Weber's methodological writings. One reason for this is the apparent reluctance of many sociologists to deal with the philosophical matters, which they believe irrelevant to sociology. Thus, they carefully avoid discussing the old philosophical debate--a history of "wasted energies that could have been used for other useful purposes" (Schumpeter, 1954:814). At the same time, contrary to these negative appraisals, sociologists and the philosophers of science believe that the problems encountered in sociology cannot be properly solved by mere empirical observations (e.g. Zaret, 1980; Hekman, 1983; Wardell and Turner, 1986). There is an attempt to develop a new meta-theoretical paradigm

for the social sciences; a staggering number of books and essays concerning the methodology of the social sciences have appeared in recent years. The contention over methodological issues is much greater today than ever. The reticence of sociologists toward philosophical matters has not resulted in consensus on the issues under consideration. Instead, the resolution seems more distant. What is evident in the current disputes is that the 19th century Methodenstreit is not yet fully resolved. Social scientists have still not completely discarded the positivist ideals of science and as much as the current discussions indicate they are not willing to do so either. As Susan Hekman (1983) argues, if the positivist ideals of science are discarded altogether, the social sciences can cease apologizing for their "unscientific" status. They can cease, in other words, waiting for their Newton. Therefore, at this point of the discussion it is important to argue that the contemporary methodological problems in the social sciences are directly related to the classical debate on methods. To understand the nature of the current methodological disputes in the social sciences the inqury must begin from the 19th century Methodenstreit.

A very fundamental reorientation has taken place in the approach to Max Weber's methodology during the last few years. Sociologists are now trying to recognize Weber's methodological writings as an important juncture of the history of social sciences, rather than the origin of the methodology itself. Yet, only a few studies have compiled an exhaustive account of this intellectual process (Hughes, 1958; Iggers, 1968; Ringer, 1969; Bruun, 1972). A great deal of historical accounts in these works have suffered from a lack of sociological flavour. Moreover, they discuss a wide range of intellectual activities in Germany during the late 19th century and the early 20th century, but make no specific reference to the Methodenstreit. For example, Hans Bruun's monumental work on Max Weber's methodology is a valuable source of certain methodological issues, but he purposely avoided discussing philosophical accounts because his book is mainly for the students of political science (Bruun, 1972:11). A number of studies on various aspects of Weber's methodological writings have discussed the influence of the neo-Kantian philosophy on Max Weber (e.g. Eldridge, 1971;

Sahay, 1971; Outhwaite, 1975; Burger, 1976; Collins, 1986). However, there is no significant analysis of Weber's contemporary intellectual background because they focus their attention on a few selected methodological problems of Weber's writings. Some studies have briefly mentioned Weber's neo-Kantian position, and avoided discussing complex philosophical issues. Therefore, in general, most of these studies are no more than conventional discussions of Weber's methodological writings. The longstanding dispute over methodological issues has been left out in their studies. In the present study, a wide range of philosophical and historical accounts in connection with the Methodenstreit would be analyzed in order to provide a clear-cut understanding of the historical background of Weber's methodological writings. Therefore, at the outset various philosophical traditions in Germany and elsewhere in Europe would be presented in an integrated fashion so that the origin and the development of the methodological controversy can be easily understood. Then Weber's reaction to the arguments of his predecessors will be discussed in a form of dialogue, in which Weber's neo-Kantian position becomes evident. In this way, Weber would be seen as a historical sociologist who employed the methodological concepts of neo-Kantian philosophers in his sociological interpretations. This is the prime postulate of the present study which differs from the existing discussions on Max Weber's methodology in the social sciences.

METHODS AND SOURCES OF THE STUDY

This study is based mainly on original and secondary materials in German and English. Most of the German materials were gathered from the Institut für Soziologie, Universität München during the 1984/85 academic year. All the interpretations are documented by supplementing them with quotations and numerous references. The quotations from Max Weber in the secondary sources are checked against the originals, and alterations are made wherever I feel necessary. Such changes are, however, acknowledged. Also, when the references are made to English translations, the original German publication dates are provided within square brackets so that the reader can easily trace the original materials.

Among many secondary materials, both in German and English, only Alexander von Schelting's monumental work Max Webers Wissenschaftlehre 1934, can be considered as the most consistent analysis of Weber's methodological writings. Another useful source in this connection is Dieter Henrich's Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers 1952, which seems to provide a systematic analysis of Weber's methodology, although he sometimes modified the original ideas of Weber in terms of Henrich's own theoretical position. The common problem with most of the secondary materials is that they have made a considerable effort to systematize Weber's ideas by interpreting them in different ways. As Tenbruck (1959:574-576) points out "such deliberate systematizations ignored the historical conditions of Weber's methodological writings, and consequently vitiated their analysis".

In the literature on the philosophy of the social sciences, three broad types of approach to Max Weber's methodology seem to dominate:

1. The genetic approach (Rogers, 1969; Bruun, 1972; Burger, 1976; Benton, 1977; Roth and Schluchter, 1979), which emphasizes Weber's contemporary intellectual background, examines the sources, periodisation and evolution of Weber's ideas on methodology, and the influence to which he responded in the course of Weber's methodological writings.
2. The analytic approach (Henrich, 1952; Parsons, 1965; Rossi, 1965; Eldridge, 1971; Rex, 1971), seeks to interpret or reconstruct the meaning of the systematic structure of Weber's methodological ideas as a more or less timeless whole, making critical use of immanent criteria and emphasizing problems of consistency and coherence.
3. The explanatory approach (Schelting, 1934; Baumgarten, 1964; Mommsen, 1965, 1974; Turner and Factor, 1984), tries to account for Weber's ideas by their external causation such as historical, psychological or sociological.

However, it should be noted that this classification is an abstract one, and many researchers often use more than one approach in their analysis. The selection of a particular approach to the analysis is determined by the specific objectives of the study. For the purpose of this study, which intends to examine Weber's methodological ideas in the context of his

contemporary intellectual background, it seems to be more appropriate to use the genetic approach which enables us to investigate the historical documents in order to show the genesis of Weber's methodological ideas.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Weber's methodological ideas, which were developed in his essays, are unsystematic, and there is no serious attempt to present his views in an integrated and coherent fashion backed up by reasoned argument. The complex sentences and extensive qualifications of the argument often obscure the main point of the discussion. It is a common feature of Weber's writings that he discusses several interdependent investigations simultaneously without explaining their specific relevance to the main argument. Marianne Weber explained this difficulty as follows:

> Weber attached no importance whatever to the form in which he presented his wealth of ideas. Once he got going, so much material flowed from the "storehouse of his mind" that it was often hard to force it into a lucid sentence structure. And yet he wanted to be done with it quickly and express himself as briefly as possible, because new problems from the realm of reality constantly crowded in upon him...Thus a great deal had to be hastily pressed into long, convoluted sentences, and whatever could not be accommodated there had to be put in footnotes (Weber, [1926] 1975:309).

Moreover, Weber indicated a variety of reservations by using quotations, conditional phrases and other linguistic symbols of caution. He used italics, differently numbered paragraphs, different type faces and other devices to structure his materials and to express his emphasis differently (Parsons, 1937; Bendix, 1960:xxi). In this context, in fact, students are forced to use secondary interpretations of Weber's writings to explain certain controversies, even though secondary materials are often criticised for being inaccurate and inadequate. However, a significant part of Weber's writings is still available only in German (e.g. Gesammelte politische Schriften, 3 volumes, Rechtssoziologie. Aus dem Manuskript und Soziologische Grundbegriffe, 2 volumes). There is no well-documented, complete interpretation of Weber's methodological writings in English, other than bits and pieces

selectively taken from here and there.[5] During the last fifty years, Alexander von Schelting's seminal work Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre (1934) was the only major source for both English and German authors. Secondary materials are particularly important because Weber did not clarify many of the specific details of the desirable relationship between the domain of scientific inquiry and the domain of social facts within which social inquiry is to become meaningful. He did not make clear the relationship that must exist between the logic of inquiry and the use of reliable methods for collection of substantive empirical data. Weber did not develop an explicit procedure of operationalism. The distinction that has been suggested to exist between orientational conceptions and operational ones was obtained only by inferential interpretations of what he said explicitly, a way that, to some degree, is always arbitrary. These gaps and others that may hardly be satisfactory to-the modern social scientists, reveal themselves in his historically rich studies, and little benefit may be gained by concealing them. Since Weber would be the first to agree that the interests of organized knowledge increase in time, and with them, logical sharpness of the theory of explanation as well as its methods, he should be hardly be blamed for all that he could not foresee.

CHAPTER OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

The content of the following chapters is as follows: In chapter II, I will first, outline the major issues of the Methodenstreit in a somewhat simplified form to convey a clear-cut understanding about the nature of the methodological controversy because the philosophical arguments of the subsequent discussions are intended to resolve these issues. Second, I will analyze briefly the positivist resolution to methodological issues with reference to the ideas of some prominent positivists in 19th century France and England. The main purpose of this section is to show how the positivists conceived the methodological problems of the social sciences and what solutions they suggested in their writings. Third, I will outline the reaction

[5]According to Werner J. Cahnman (1964:103-127), Weber's writings have been translated into English in such way that the total aspect of his work has been obscured. As a result, a static and atomized Weber has emerged, divorced from the historical background against which he must be understood.

of German philosophers to positivism which illustrates the fundamental elements of the Kantian philosophy--the idealist tradition in Germany. This section is particularly important to understand the basic differences between two major European philosophical traditions--positivism and idealism. Also, this section is the key to understanding the underlying arguments of the subsequent developments of the Methodenstreit in Germany. Both the idealists as well as the neo-idealists in Germany fought against positivism at the early stage of the methodological controversy. Weber in his methodological writings criticised both idealism and positivism from the point of view of neo-Kantian philosophy.

In chapter III, the philosophical ideas of the Southwest German School of neo-Kantians will be discussed in an attempt to provide a systematic analysis of the historical background of Weber's methodological writings. In this section, the writings of Emil Lask, Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband and Georg Simmel are discussed mainly because of their influence on Weber's methodological writings. In chapter IV, the discussion on Weber's criticisms of the positivist thesis and the Historical School of Economics provides a clear-cut view of Weber's neo-Kantian position with regard to methodological issues. In chapter V, first I will discuss Weber's interpretation of subjective meaning of social action (Verstehende Soziologie), and his definition of the unit of sociological inquiry. Second, to show some of the limitations of Weber's arguments Alfred Schutz's criticisms of Weber's interpretive sociology are discussed critically.

In chapter VI, a number of methodological concepts of Weber are discussed in an attempt to analyze the philosophical genesis of Weber's methodological writings. The notion of value relevance (Wertbeziehung), the method of causal analysis and the formation of ideal types were originally developed by the neo-Kantians; but in Weber's methodological writings these concepts were reinterpreted from an empirical point of view. In chapter VII, Weber's philosophy of history would be discussed along with some of his ideas in the comparative historical sociology. It is particularly important to show the difference between Weber's neo-Kantian position with regard to the methodology of the social sciences and his philosophy

of history. In his writings in the comparative historical sociology, Weber radically diverged from the philosophical position he adopted in his methodological writings. This would become more evident in chapter VIII which presents a critical assessment of some of the criticisms against Weber's methodological writings. In chapter IX, it is concluded that Weber's methodological ideas were originally developed by his contemporary philosophers, mainly by the neo-Kantians in response to the methodological crisis in Europe during the late 19th century. In contrast to the the existing view of Weber's methodological writings, this study postulates that Max Weber was a historical sociologist who employed the methodological concepts of the contemporary philosophers in his sociological interpretations.

II. THE ORIGIN OF THE METHODOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY: HISTORICAL DEPARTURE POINT OF WEBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

At the turn of the last century, the profound crisis in European social thought was the problem of "knowledge" in human society.[6] Historians such as Stuart Hughes (1958) and Arnold Brecht (1959) have recognized the core of this crisis in the growing awareness on the part of social philosophers and historians of the limitations of human knowledge and the inherent subjective character of all cognitions concerning human behaviour and social processes. Although positivism in the 19th century had progressively eliminated the traditional religious and metaphysical interpretations of the world, still for the positivists, the universe is an integrated system governed by natural laws, and the methods of natural science would reveal the systematic structure of physical and social reality alike. In the late 19th century, this positivist interpretation of social reality was strongly opposed by German social philosophers, who pointed out the irrational character of man. They began to question how a science of society is possible. They argued, all knowledge which essentially goes beyond the constructions based upon empirical data, is influenced by human subjectivity. The solutions of any ultimate problems are impossible, and the gulf between the world of being and the world of nature was assumed. Any interpretation of reality, other than one based upon the method of induction, was doomed as poetry or imagination. The reliance upon empirical data alone, it was argued, would reveal a universe basically without meaning.

This crisis in modern philosophy inevitably marked an important turning point in the study of human society. The recognition of the limitation of human rationality disclosed the relativistic position of human knowledge, and for that reason, objective knowledge of the physical or the social and cultural world is impossible. During the period between 1883 and

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[6]The Methodenstreit or methodological controversy was a very complex and longstanding dispute involving numerous European scholars--philosophers, historians, economists, sociologists--and many others representing different schools of thought. In this study, I do not intend to cover all of those ideas which contributed to the Methodenstreit. Only those important to the present study will be discussed to show the historical background of Weber's methodological writings.

1903, French and British positivist theories of progress came under attack in Germany.[7] One after another, economists (Gustav Schmoller, Carl Menger), psychologists (Wilhelm Wundt), historians (Karl Lamprecht, Eduard Meyer, Georg von Below), philosophers (Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert), and many other lesser known writers joined in the controversy. Contention centered around the status of the cultural sciences: should they, as the positivists claimed, be assimilated with the natural sciences or, on the contrary, be regarded as wholly autonomous? The fundamental philosophical arguments of German philosophers and historians against positivism were invariably derived from the philosophy of Kant and of Hegel. The primacy of idea over object, freedom of thought before freedom of action, morality before political justice, inner life before the social life of man, are some of the few premises of the idealist philosophy. German idealism grew apace under the auspices of the Historical School, but it failed to effectively counter the positivist use of the methods of natural science in the study of society because it lacked a well-defined theory of knowledge (Willey, 1978:30). As Wilhelm Dilthey, a neo-idealist, believed, the Historical School maintained equally irrational arguments in an attempt to refute positivism.

Before we discuss the detailed accounts of the arguments of various schools of thought, let us first of all examine briefly the major issues of the methodological controversy.

1. The purpose of the socio-cultural sciences. Are the social scientific disciplines based on nomological "laws" which attempt to establish a system of natural laws concerning the

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[7]Joseph Schumpeter (1954:814) has a very negative view about the Methodenstreit and the vast amount of literature devoted to the dispute. Schumpeter argues that the history of this literature is substantially a history of wasted energies that could have been used for other useful purposes. At most, a few contributions were made toward the clarification of logical backgrounds. Albion Small (1924:571) notes that "the fight was so hot, principally because no one was able to make perfectly clear to anybody else just what this historical viewpoint or historical method was, which he advocated or opposed". But Edmund Husserl, in his posthumously published Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften, points out how the crisis of method in a science is foundational inasmuch as it calls into question the very self-understanding of the science, how it conceives its task and relates itself to the other sciences. "The crisis of science denotes nothing less than the fact that its genuine scientific character, the ways in which it sets forth its task and constructs its methodology, is cast in doubt" (Husserl, [1954] 1970:1).

socio-cultural phenomena? Can socio-cultural sciences use the hypothetico-deductive method in developing "laws" of socio-cultural phenomena?

2. The properties of the socio-cultural phenomena. Is the subject matter of these disciplines indistinguishable from that of any other sciences and, therefore, susceptible to the same sorts of explanations and open to the use of the same methods employed in any natural science? Do socio-cultural phenomena have distinctive properties which rule out the possiblities of using the methodological devices of natural science in social scientific discourse?
3. The methodology of the scientific inquiry. Is it possible for all scientific investigations to proceed according to a particular methodological framework or is there one particular logic of scientific discourse for all sciences? Is there a particular form of interpretation (Deutung) peculiar to the socio-cultural domain?
4. The definition of the socio-cultural problems. How are the problems of the socio-cultural sciences to be defined? Are socio-cultural facts independent of any theoretical questions posed about their properties? Is the identification of a phenomenon as socio-cultural in some sense dependent upon the way it is seen and the questions that are posed about it? (Weber, [1906] 1975:19-20)

The positivist resolution of the methodological crisis remained strong for many years despite the various criticisms. The positivists argued that the discovery of laws in nature has enlightened all scientific disciplines and, therefore, it is by no means that a distinctive variety of socio-cultural knowledge can be identified by reference to some peculiar and definitive purpose of socio-cultural research. There are no distinctive features of socio-cultural phenomena, which differ from that of the natural phenomena. All phenomena are natural phenomena, the possible objects of laws of nature. Methods of natural science have the universal perspectives that can penetrate all the phenomena and, therefore, there is no method of investigation peculiar to the socio-cultural sciences. Any attempt to develop such methods are meaningless precisely because they are either defective or inadequate. Therefore, all

sciences must use the methods of natural science as the phenomena of every science constituted in the same way, and the problems of every science are defined in the same order. Thus, positivism denied any possibility of metatheoretical structure peculiar to the socio-cultural problems because they are a part of the natural science, which does not have a distinct meta-theoretical domain of their subject matter. Any meta-theoretical problem alleged to be peculiar to this domain either is not peculiar to the socio-cultural sciences at all or is merely a pseudo-problem. Positivists believed that social developments are subject to laws, which are above and independent of "human control", and such laws cannot be comprehended by any means other than natural science (Weber, [1906] 1975:20-21; Maus, 1962:17).

The positivist resolution to the Methodenstreit had gained considerable academic recognition in many parts of Europe, except in Germany. By the turn of the century, in France, Italy and Britain, positivism had become the dominant academic philosophy, in contrast to the strong opposition it faced in Germany. The dominant current in the 19th century French social thought was the "restoration of social order and the subordination of the individual to a higher social totality". This is the basic idea of the positivist thesis that stems from St. Simon and Auguste Comte, which persisted to influence Durkheim at the end of the last century (Maus, 1962:17-20). Among many British thinkers, who were very much influenced by Comte, Henry Buckle attempted to show in his History of Civilization in England (1871), that social development was subject to laws which were above and independent of the individual. Knowledge of these laws, he contended, would help the individual to be happier in this world. For example, he demonstrated to what a great degree marriage depended on extraneous circumstances, for instance, the price of corn; and religion depended on, for example, climate and geographical conditions. In fact, he exaggerated the importance of geographical factors, just as he was inclined to exaggerate the helplessness of the individual. Buckle (1871:Vol.I:3) denounced the historical method and attributed the failure of historians to raise history to the rank of the natural science, to the intellectual

inferiority on their part. He argues, "in all the other great fields of inquiry the necessity of generalization is universally admitted, and noble efforts are being made to rise from particular facts in order to discover the laws by which those facts are governed. So far, however, is this from being the usual course of historians, that among them a strange idea prevails, that their business is merely to relate events". Buckle concluded, "at present it is enough to say, that for all the higher purposes of human thought history is still miserably deficient, and presents that confused and anarchical appearance natural to a subject of which the laws are unknown, and even the foundation unsettled".

The most fascinating and uncompromising advocate of the positivist thesis was John Stuart Mill. His A System of Logic (1846) inspired fierce debates among many German philosophers. It is particularly interesting to note that the term Geisteswissenschaften, which was first introduced by Dilthey, originally came from Mill's Moral Science, book VI of A System of Logic.[1] Mill (1846:Vol.II:573) argued that the "laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of human nature. Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties; as hydrogen and oxygen are different from water, or as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and azote are different from nerves and muscles... In social phenomena the composition of causes is the universal law". All phenomena of society are phenomena of human nature generated by the action of outward circumstances upon masses of human beings and, therefore, if the phenomena of human thought, feeling, and action, are subject to fixed laws,

[1]Rudolf Makkreel (1969:423-440) argued that it is ironic to think that the German word Geisteswissenschaften originated as the translation of Mill's term moral sciences. Makkreel maintains that the word Geisteswissenschaften does not have a satisfactory English equivalent. Not only is the concept of moral sciences inadequate to characterize Geisteswissenschaften as it has come to be used, but also one would have expected earlier instances of the word, given its common usage today and the long history of the words Geist and Wissenschaft in the German philosophical tradition. But according to Fritz Ringer (1969:96), the German Geisteswissenschaften can be followed back to the influence of Descartes. In Germany, Max Weber ([1922] 1951:44) has traced it to Hermann von Helmholtz, the famous psycho-physicist of the mid-nineteenth century. The work of Hegel helped to bring it into common use, and the neo-idealist Wilhelm Dilthey finally gave it a clear and systematic definition during the 1880's.

the phenomena of society cannot but conform to fixed laws. According to Mill (1846), the moral or socio-cultural sciences, "abandoned to the uncertainties of vague and popular discussions", are in a "backward state". There are no laws of mind and society. Only the duly extended and generalized methods of physical science can be applied to the moral sciences; therefore Mill argued that there is no independently identifiable logic of the moral sciences. He ruled out any possibility of developing a specific methodology for the socio-cultural sciences apart from the methods of physical science.

THE IDEALIST TRADITION IN GERMANY: THE REACTION TO POSITIVISM

In Germany positivism never gained as great a hold as in France, Italy, or Britain. As Stuart Hughes (1958:183) maintains "to a German, an idealist philosophy was a kind of second nature... Kant remained the dominant formative influence on the German mind". According to German idealistic tradition the ultimate reality of the human society lay in "spirit" (Geist) or "idea", rather than the data of sense perception.[9] In contrast, in the dominant Anglo-French tradition, the primacy of sense perception and the validity of empirical procedures were taken for granted as naturally as the supremacy of the "idea" was accepted in Germany.[10] The German philosophical tradition surprisingly diverged from the

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[9]If the defining element in the "cultural sciences" is their spiritual character, then the "spirit" of a social or historical institution is obviously what is of central importance. In the idealist tradition "the unifying concept under which discrete empirical data are subsumed"-as opposed to the general "laws" of positivist theory-"is...a particular, unique Geist, a specific cultural totality clearly distinct from and incommensurable with all others" (Parsons, 1937:478). These Geister are the highest components of which history and society are made. But in their unique individuality, they remain absolutely uncomparable to one another.

[10]The deepest methodological basis of the distinction between German idealism and the mainstream of European thought can be found in a number of directions: first of all, idealists opposed the positivistic thesis that the facts of human life and destiny can be reduced to the terms of the physical world or to biological terms. This opposition became evident when the neo-Kantians recognized the sharp methodological distinctions between the "natural sciences" and the disciplines concerned with human action and culture (the most prominent names in this connection are W.Windelband, H.Rickert, and W.Dilthey). Second, the positivists ruled out any possibility of developing an independent methodological system for the cultural sciences. They believe that the social scientific investigations must be included within the meta-theoretical models of the natural sciences. The idealist attempt to repudiate positivism is, therefore, associated with their conviction of the

main stream of Western European social thought, which was followed by some significant social and political consequences. In Britain and France, utilitarianism and positivism, democracy and natural science made their headway, while in Germany, it was quite otherwise. German academic philosophy did not result in an egalitarian humanistic political framework of its own[11] (Hughes, 1958; Ringer, 1969; Schluchter, 1981).

The 19th century academic philosophy in Germany was dominated by the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). No short account could possibly explore the enormous philosophical achievements of Kant. His contribution to the epistemology of the natural sciences is found in his well known work the Critique of Pure Reason ([1781] 1966). Kant ([1781] 1966:128-131) argued that perception is impossible without conception, i.e., the knowledge expressed in an objective judgment of science or common sense involves both thought and perception. Judgments of a subjective kind, which merely report experiences, but make no claim as to objectivity require conceptual ordering to be imposed on them. The mind does not simply and passively "record" sense impressions. Space and time are the a priori forms in which perceptual experience is ordered. Beyond this, perceptual judgments acquire objectivity that the status of judgments about the existence and nature of some external reality are organized by further a priori concepts or "categories" of understanding. Kant ([1781] 1966:145-147) argued that the concept of causal necessity cannot be abstracted from experience, and it has no rational foundation. The condition for the possibility of objective causal judgments is that the "manifold" of our perceptual experience is organized by the

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[10](cont'd) possibility of general analytical theory in social scientific knowledge independent from that of the natural sciences. This was evident in the 19th century German hostility toward classical economics, which was frequently called Smithianismus (Parsons, 1937:475-476).

[11]It is interesting to examine why the German academic philosophy diverged from the mainstream of Western European social thought. Stuart Hughes (1958:184-85), argued that the central paradox of this problem must be found in the German idealist tradition. In the period from about 1770 to 1880, the German philosophers and writers had been the school masters of Europe. From them the French, British and Italians had learned to be dissatisfied with merely intellectualist explanations and to seek out the living and growing issues of history and society themselves. By the influence of German idealism, social studies were immeasurably enriched during the late 19th century. Yet in "the sense of applied wisdom this teaching came to next to nothing".

application of an a priori concept of causality, which is not abstracted or derived in any other way from experience.

Kant ([1781] 1966:300-302) maintained that the distinctive character of moral experience is based on the idea that the individual is subject to universal duties which call on his or her obedience in opposition to even an individual's desires. A condition for the possibility of the objectivity of such experience is not only that such universal duties do exist but also that the individual "will" can be determined by them in oppositon to the determinations of their own desires or impulses. This is how Kant tried to combine the causally ordered "deterministic" nature with belief in the free will, and the moral responsibility of people. He argued that the human subject participates in both the noumenal and the phenomenal world. As part of the phenomenal world the human individual is an object of possible experience, and also part of the causal order of nature. The phenomenal aspect of world is composed of our desires and impulses. But as part of the noumenal world, the self is not an object of possible experience and is, therefore, outside the scope of the synthetic, a priori categories and principles of natural science, including the category of cause. Therefore, there is conceptual room for a noumenal subject, possessed of a free will (Benton, 1977:100-106).

Kant ([1781] 1966:398-405) shows that the ideas of "immortality" and of "God" are, like the idea of freedom, necessary conditions for the objectivity of moral experience. However, Kant is careful to draw attention to the special character of these concepts, or "ideas" by which reference seems to be made to the noumenal world, beyond possible experience. The ideas of "God", "freedom", and "immortality" are neither abstracted from experience nor are they applicable with it, as in the case of the categories of understanding. To distinguish these ideas from the "forms" of perceptions (space, time) and the categories of understanding (case, substance, and attribute, etc.) Kant calls them "ideas of pure reason" because they are neither derived from nor applicable to experience. There are very severe limitations on their use, and Kant argues that our thinking goes astray into "absolute" or

"speculative metaphysics", if the ideas are misused. When the ideas of pure reason are spuriously applied to objects of experience or when categories of the understanding are applied to the noumenal realm, speculative metaphysics results in confusion and contradiction (Benton, 1977:103).

German idealism made unprecedented progress during the period of Hegel. He emphasized the Kantian thesis that understanding cannot go beyond experience, because human cognition is nothing but a mere reproduction of human perception. Hegel argued that Kant did not go far enough to rigorously apply his own distinction between "reason" and "understanding". In the understanding, Hegel points out, objective judgments regarding the world of appearance (the phenomenal world) are made by the application of the categories of the understanding (cause, substance, and attributes, necessity and possibility, etc.) to sense perceptions. The operations of the understanding in applying categories are limited to possible experience in the phenomenal world (Kaufmann, 1965). In other words, we can understand our phenomenal world only in terms of our experience. The ideas of pure reason, on the contrary, cannot be used to produce objective cognitive judgments at all. They have very limited heuristic use in science, but they provide a foundation in scientific investigations. The ideas of pure reason such as freedom, God, immortality, etc. are indispensable to responsible moral conduct of human beings, but the attempt to use the ideas of pure reason to express theoretical knowledge of "things", as they are in themselves (of the noumenal world) necessarily leads to contradictions. A similar contradiction results with the attempt to apply the categories of the understanding beyond the possible experience (Hegel, [1812] 1929:224-232).

For a few decades, after Hegel, the idealist tradition in Germany remained a memory of some historians, and the growing popularity of Marxism overshadowed the idealist principles of history. However, during the second half of the 19th century, as a result of the organized effort of a group of leading historians, philologists and jurists, idealism began to regain academic recognition in many fields, particularly in history and law. Leopold Von

Ranke (historian), Barthold Niebuhr (philologist) and Karl Von Savigny (jurist) agreed with Hegel that true philosophy and true history are basically one form of knowledge. Therefore, they believed that behind the phenomena of historical study there is a metaphysical reality, and that the aim of all study must be the apprehension of this reality. With this philosophical framework and under the leadership of Ranke, they established the German Historical School, which grew up as the leading philosophical center of the late 19th century Germany. The Historical School maintained that history is by no means a mere collection of facts, but is the only way to true knowledge (Erkenntnis) of our own conditions. They recognized the value and autonomy of every age, and stressed the living connection between past and present. According to Savigny, for example, in the area of law there is no abstract, philosophic law, no law of nature which can be codified; instead, every law is inseparably interwoven with the total historical development of a people. The jurist must eliminate those aspects of the law which have atrophied and no longer constitute a living part of the present (Iggers, 1968:65-66). Ranke, on the other hand, maintained that political and social institutions must not be viewed in terms of their concrete existence, they must be understood in the context of social institutions within which they operate. Social values and ideals, according to Ranke, guide society and individuals, and they possess objective value. Ranke did not consider social phenomena as value-free historical data which have no ethical significance for the scholar. For him, all products of history and every social institution that operates within the context of a historical society are concrete objective values. This extremely optimistic view of history and nature maintained by Ranke was further developed by the subsequent members of the Historical School and other thinkers in the Romantic tradition.

At the turn of the century, Ranke's pupils such as Wilhelm Roscher and Bruno Hildebrand had clearly established idealist thought in historical research. Hildebrand was critical of the concept of natural law of positivism. He argued that the economic and moral life of people is based on free human deeds rather than on natural law. He emphasized the moral-science (Geisteswissenschaft) character of economics and the historical method

(Schumpeter, 1954:507). Wilhelm Roscher, on the other hand, while remaining partially dependent on classical economic theories of Adam Smith, compiled a statement of principles which supported the historical method and distinguished it from philosophical methods (Small, 1924:445-446). Roscher maintained that economic theories cannot be separated from the moral character of people, which influences the economic behaviour of society. This argument was supported by Karl Knies, an economic historian, who pointed toward the methodologically significant insight that statistical rather than causal regularities apply in the socio-historical field.

In this study it is not necessary to discuss the long historical background of the Historical School. For our purpose, it is appropriate to focus on the latter part of the Historical School which had a significant impact on the methodological crisis during the late 19th century. Therefore, in the following section, I will discuss some of the major methodological arguments of Wilhelm Roscher and Karl Knies, who were leading members of the Historical School at the end of the last century. Also, their writings on the methodological issues of the socio-cultural sciences directly influenced many German philosophers and historians including Max Weber. Weber's earlier methodological writings were marked by his profound criticisms of the Historical School of Economics. Considerable methodological clarifications were developed by Weber in his critical essay on Roscher and Knies.

THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS: OBJECTIVISM AND INTUITIONISM

To understand Weber's methodological starting point, one has to begin the analysis from the perspective of the two common methodological doctrines which were opposed by Weber. According to Alexander von Schelting (1934), these two methodological doctrines were called "objectivism" and "intuitionism", the methodological foundation of the Historical School of Economics. Founders of the Historical School, Bruno Hildebrand, Wilhelm Roscher and Karl Knies argued that there is a fundamental difference between the thinking of a concept as such and the thinking of the content of the concept. This fundamental difference

leads, according to the Historical School, to a major methodological demarcation between the cultural sciences and the natural sciences. According to Roscher, the historian cannot apply a system of concepts to the empirical world because philosophical explanations are definitions. The aim of the historical explanations is to envisage. Concrete historical institutions and events cannot be a part of a system of concepts. The aim of the historian is to obtain a total perspective, Gesamtanschauung, which is not a supreme idea nor an ultimate concept. Thus, Roscher argued that the individuality of history is irrational. However, Roscher failed to ascertain the real analytical weight and importance of this historical perception. Therefore, he overlooked the chances of developing a logical method of the historical sciences.

Roscher was strongly influenced by the ideas of Savigny, who later established the "Historical School of Jurisprudence". Roscher's methodological model was basically derived from the Savigny's thesis that the socio-historical foundation of jurisprudence is essentially irrational. However, Roscher's ideas, to some degree, indicated a novel interpretation of the methodology of jurisprudence. Savigny and his school, in their struggle against the legislative rationalism of the Enlightenment, found evidence of the fundamentally irrational character of law. Savigny argued that laws develop and obtain within a cultural community. They cannot be deduced from general maxims. Emphasizing the inseparable connection between law and all other aspects of cultural life, Savigny hypostatized the concept of an essentially irrational and unique Volksgeist as the source of law, language and the entire cultural capital of a people (Weber, [1906] 1975:60-61). Savigny believed that the law is an outgrowth of the spirit of the people. Roscher carried the same idea of spirit over into his historical writings on economics. He rejected not only Hegel's approach to economic history, but also, the abstract laws of classical economic theory. Roscher tried to discover the laws of economic evolution inherent in the history of people by analysing the economic history.[12] Roscher thereby identifies the

[12]It is interesting to make a comparison between Marx and the historical school of economics. Both emphasized the concepts of society and historical progress. Moreover, both departed from the relation of human actions to productive forces. The principal difference is that Marx described social institutions as a superstructure based on the economy, whereas the historical school of economics saw the economy as the superstructure and the Volksgeist or social institutions as the base.

laws of economic activities with the spirit of people Volksgeist as does Savigny in the field of jurisprudence. Roscher considers a people as a reality and unity just as one would an individual organism. The intricate problem of what constitutes a people he does not solve; he accepts this a priori organic idea of a people and, in fact, of the whole cosmos (Ringer, 1969:144-145).

Roscher recognized two types of scientific investigations: One he calls philosophical-the analytical comprehension of reality. The purpose of this type of science is to create generalized abstractions and to eliminate purely contingent facts. The other type of scientific investigations, Roscher calls, historical-the distinctive reproduction of reality in its pure form. These two types of sciences in late 19th century Germany were usually called nomological sciences and sciences of concrete reality. In other words, they are the sciences concerned with natural reality and the sciences concerned with social reality. According to Roscher, the philosophical sciences try to comprehend an extensively and intensively infinite multiplicity of phenomena by employing a system of concepts and laws. In pure form, these concepts and laws are universally valid. The concrete contingent properties of "things" and "events" are perceptually given to us, the properties which make them objects of perception are progressively stripped away. This is a consequence of the logical ideal of these disciplines (Weber, [1906] 1975:54-55). On the contrary, the sciences of concrete reality try to establish a kind of knowledge that is unattainable if the methods of the nomological sciences is applied. Knowledge of the concrete reality is essentially perceptual and accessible to our experience only in its concretely and individually qualitative peculiarities. Because of the infinite qualitative diversity, it is impossible to reproduce exhaustively even a limited aspect of reality.

Karl Knies divided the sciences into three groups: natural sciences, sciences of mind, and historical sciences. The subject matter of the historical sciences, according to Knies, is human behaviour. Human behaviour is influenced by two factors: the "determined" forces of the laws of nature and the "free" and therefore, irrational action of individuals. Knies does not explain the nature of these laws that influence human behaviour, but he accepts them in a

naive manner. Knies argued that human "action" is a product of both natural and historical conditions. It therefore follows that the determinants of the observational materials of economics will include the following two components. From the point of view of human action "freedom of the will" is a determinant. On the other hand, "elements of necessity" are determinants. There are two such elements. First, there are natural conditions-the blind necessitation of natural events. Second, there are historically given conditions, the force of collective complexes. The fundamental idea behind this kind of interpretation is that human behaviour is basically irrational, and it is governed by external forces which cannot be controlled by the individual himself.

Knies argued that the effect of "nature" on human behaviour is nomological. Hence, there is a significant distinction between purposeful human action and the natural and historical conditions. If we consider only the effects of naturally given conditions upon individual social action, Knies argued, such actions are, then, treated as nomological consequences of the influence of nature. In fact, laws of nature do obtain in the human economy. However, they are not laws of human economy. This is, in Knies opinion, because freedom of the human will in the form of personal actions is embedded in human economy (Weber, [1906] 1975:97).

Both Savigny and the Historical School of Economics failed in their attempt to develop evolutionary laws inherent in peoples. As some critics (Iggers, 1968:130-133) argued, the Historical School went as far as to integrate historical knowledge with metaphysics, which they intended to eliminate from the social sciences. Moreover, they had not merely presented social scientists with a new speculative system, but revealed historical reality in an evolutionary process of metaphysics. Therefore, the critical attitude toward the Historical School was mainly manifested in an attempt to re-examine the methodological and epistemological foundations of the socio-cultural sciences. From the beginning this critical reaction to the Historical School stemmed mainly from three directions: (1) The Marburg School represented by Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Rudolf Stammler, (2) Neo-idealist

tradition led by Wilhelm Dilthey, and (3) The Southwest German School of neo-Kantianism led by Wilhelm Windelband.

Let us first discuss the methodological arguments of the Marburg philosophers.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARBURG SCHOOL

Although the Marburg School primarily based its methodological arguments on Kant's forms of perceptions and was less enamored with positivism, it did not emerge as a popular intellectual front mainly because of the lack of enthusiasm of its membership toward social and political issues during that period. The members of the Marburg School were often accused of narrow epistemological specialism, and the School has been described as a purely academic phenomenon with little social and political significance (Willey, 1978:102-130; Rintelen, 1970:9-11). Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, the founders of the Marburg School, responded to their critics by insisting that their effort was to develop a democratic socialist society in Germany on the basis of Kantian philosophy. They argued that social justice cannot be distinguished from social philosophy and that the Kantian ethics provide the fundamental principles of social democracy within which social justice must be accomplished. Thus, the Marburg philosophers argued that their main objective is to understand the formal conditions of experience and the universal rational conditions of right conduct. Although most of their philosophical writings are abstruse epistemology, a large portion deals mainly with ethical, political and social questions considered to be important at that time. As a result, for the most part, Cohen's and Natorp's writings appeared as a form of metaphysical idealism contrary to Kantian criticism and became closer to the neo-Hegelianism of the late 19th century. They proposed a new democratic, evolutionary socialism as an alternative to both the revolutionary dialectics of Marx and the bourgeois liberalism of the educated classes. However, they failed to gain any popular support for their arguments mainly because their ideas were confined to the intellectual class. Yet, they succeeded in arousing interest among revisionist intellectuals of the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Although Marburg

philosophers rejected natural law as such, they were implicitly following natural law tradition by seeking the universal character of justice and right. In the pursuit of a universal ethic they disavowed both Hegel and the Historical School of Von Savigny. They also disputed another powerful ideology of that period--Marxism. Marburg philosophers believed that in Kant's ethical idealism there is a moral mandate for socialism. By accepting the primacy of ethics over economic dialectics they insisted that social justice and freedom are fundamental preconditions for social progress (Willey, 1978:110).

A detailed discussion of the Marburg School will essentially go beyond the objectives of the present analysis. Therefore, I shall confine myself to some of the important methodological arguments of Rudolf Stammler, one of the last fellow members of the Marburg School, who became well-known in his critique of historical materialism. His ideas are particularly important in this study because one of Weber's earliest methodological essays heavily criticised Stammler. Also, Stammler's application of Kantian criticism to jurisprudence inspired both respect and controversy in Germany and the United States.

RUDOLF STAMMLER AND RIGHT LAW

Rudolf Stammler was one of the leading legal philosophers during the period of Weimar Republic. He served as a professor of law at the University of Halle until 1916, and then moved to Berlin. Stammler's book, Historical Materialist Conception of Economy and Law: A Socio-philosophical Investigation, (1906) (Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffung. Eine Sozialphilosophische Untersuchung) provoked many criticisms throughout Europe and the United States. Stammler argued that the cultural sciences are in a state of confusion and uncertainty. This confusion and uncertainty pose, according to Stammler, the following questions: Can lawlike regularities within the sphere of social life be established, regularities that are comparable to the laws of nature that constitute the foundations of the natural sciences? Are there fundamental differences between social life and nature? And if essential differences between nature and social life can be identified, to

what extent is it justifiable to apply the methods and the conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences to the problems of the social sciences? In order to resolve these questions, Stammler claims, philosophical investigation is necessary, an investigation which would resolve the following problem: "what are the basic and formal nomological conditions on which human social life rest" (Weber, [1907] 1977:2). The solution to this problem will explain the concepts and principles that constitute the logical conditions for the possibility of social science. This philosophical inquiry, Stammler maintained, requires an analysis of the concept of social life. Therefore, any attempt to establish the epistemological foundation for the social sciences must begin the inquiry with the analysis of the following concepts: what is social life? what are the constituting properties of social reality? under what conditions can a given item be conceived as a social phenomena?

Stammler argued that the criterion that defines social life as a special object of knowledge is composed of human interactions and collective life. This interaction and collective life is based on the rules, which men themselves have instituted (Weber, [1907] 1977:3).

> The external or observable regulation of human conduct is a necessary condition for the possibility of the concept of social life as a distinctive object. It is the ultimate criterion on which any conception of the social as such formally rests. The definitive conceptual synthesis constitutes the social science as a distinctive and objective form of knowledge. The external regulation of human collective life is a necessary condition for the possibility of this synthesis (cited by Weber, [1907] 1977:3).

Stammler repeatedly claimed that his thesis is an "attempt to overcome the materialist interpretation of history". He believed the religious element of life as the real, ultimate and only basis of all social processes. Stammler argued that the "religious motives will always be discovered at some point, and it is this motive which has the decisive influence upon the manner in which men live" (Weber, [1907] 1977:63). In the final analysis, Stammler maintains, all the other variables that influence human life can be traced to variations in religious attitudes. Since the social and economic factors are only reflections of the variations in religious attitudes, they have no independent, real existence at all. Every change in the independent religious variable produces a corresponding changes in human conduct.

Therefore, according to Stammler, religious factors are invariably the exclusive causal forces in social life. Stammler believed that the only external force that influences human behaviour is religion. Thus he emphasized that every scientific inquiry is subject to the law of causality. This law has the status of axiom. Therefore, every scientific inquiry must be committed to the following basic presupposition: there is only one general law according to which all individual phenomena are exhaustively correlated. Independent of this presupposition, it is impossible to attain nomological knowledge (Weber, [1907] 1977:66). Stammler argued that his attempt to postulate that all social phenomena stem from religious motives may not always succeed, nor does it claim that the attempt will ever be entirely successful. But the postulate is not a mere statement of fact. It is a method. Hence, he insists that the objection to his postulate for being an illegitimate generalization is based on a conceptual error. The postulate was not established by generalizations of this sort. It was established a priori by posing the question that: "in general under what conditions are legitimate generalizations possible in the cultural sciences?" (Weber, [1907] 1977:69).

Stammler's idealistic philosophy of history was an attempt to develop a general theory of human conduct. The basis of this general theory, according to Stammler, is religious motives of people that influence their behaviour. Thus, in the idealist tradition the unifying concept under which discrete empirical data were subsumed, as opposed to the general laws of positivist theory, is a particular unique Geist, a specific cultural totality clearly distinct from all the general characteristics of nature (Parsons, 1937:478). These Geister are the highest components of which history and society are made. But it is impossible to understand or compare them one with another, because the spirit of one civilization is essentially incomprehensible to a member of another. Therefore, the idealist philosophy of the historical school of economics failed to provide a satisfactory methodological solution to the problem of understanding social reality, even though it recognized the unique character of social phenomena. Hence, for the German philosophers, throughout the second half of the last century, the most disturbing problem was how one could possibly arrive at an understanding

of human behaviour. They believed that the idealism went too far in emphasizing the significance of Volkgeist as opposed to the natural law of positivism. A more flexible and logical procedure, which is free from naturalistic tendencies was urgently required. By the turn of the last century, however, in the wake of a decline in the German idealist tradition and the spread of positivist philosophy, the revolt against positivism in Germany took the form of a return to Kantian philosophy.

WILHELM DILTHEY AND NEO-IDEALIST TRADITION

The return of German philosophy to Kant, after a long period of philosophical disputes among the various branches of post-Kantian idealism, was in full swing when Wilhelm Dilthey began his work. At first it meant a return from speculative system-building to empirical caution, from metaphysics to the critique of knowledge. Dilthey strongly opposed positivism; he considered positivism to be a mechanistic science which is inappropriate for the study of man. He maintained that positivists have neglected man's moral nature because they believed that moral values are merely the result of adaptive social processes. Dilthey considered that John Stuart Mill was naive to think that all citizens of modern society are rational and responsible enough to arrive at an independent judgment. He believed that Mill overestimated the role of reason in human behaviour (Dilthey, 1923:3). Dilthey boldly criticized Thomas Buckle's attempt to write a scientific history of England based on natural laws, and called The History of Civilization in England a "dead book" (Dilthey, 1923:8). In the same vain, he rejected the Comtean thesis of the hierarchical order of science. He was dissatisfied with Comte's refusal to consider psychology as a science. Moreover, Dilthey rejected the Kantian idealistic concept of science and emphasized the importance of facts.

Dilthey, in 1883 ([1922-1936] 1962), in his book Introduction to the Human Sciences (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften) presented his basic thesis of the methodology of the social sciences. He encompassed a wide range of social scientific disciplines within the field of Geisteswissenschaften or human sciences--philosophy, psychology, history and literature--are

all, according to Dilthey, interrelated parts of the Geisteswissenschaften. In Dilthey's theory of knowledge there are two major elements which he regarded as the corner-stones of human sciences. First of all, he believed that the origin of all knowledge is experience (Erlebnis) and there is no a priori.[13] Experience (Erlebnis) is the only way to understand the inner-reasons which prompt the individual to take part in action. Second, Dilthey rejected all metaphysical speculations. He argued that knowledge cannot go beyond the limits of experience, and therefore, metaphysics as a science of pure being and a reasoned explanation of world order, is impossible. Thus, experience is the only evidence that anything exists in empirical reality. By referring to our experience, we describe what we mean by something "exists". Dilthey maintains that when we describe our vital experiences, we transform them into language. Our knowledge of our mind represents reality in the sense that we have experienced something in our lives. Hence Dilthey believed that the only way to describe reality is experience. By experiencing something we acquire knowledge about empirical reality. All objects and events that we can observe in reality are true raw materials of knowledge.

Dilthey believed that all sciences rest upon experience, but experience is not merely a passive state of our mind, which receives sense data. All experiences are closely connected with the conditions of our consciousness, in which our experiences are being stored. In this sense, Dilthey believed that the task of the Geisteswissenschaften is to analyze the data of consciousness. The Geisteswissenschaften is the approach to all historical and social reality from the point of view of the theory of knowledge. These sciences must consider that all thoughts, individual actions and institutions are parts of living totalities and processes, and they can be understood only in their context. The social sciences must relate all these social and historical expressions to their context. Hence, Dilthey argued that the social sciences require a method which integrates psychological and historical inquiries. Intellect, analogous

[13]Ringer (1969:326) argues that although Dilthey believed that there are no a priori concepts of knowledge, meaning is a necessary presupposition for Dilthey's theory of knowledge. In addition to the a priori concepts of knowledge, the meaning of an event or phenomenon is an important pre-condition for the human sciences. The understanding is possible only if the object is viewed with a preoccupied meaning.

to volition and feeling, is merely one side of the process of life. Therefore, there is no a priori for knowledge. The problem of knowledge thus cannot be solved in terms of a priori, but only genetically by "evolutionary history (Entwicklungsgeschichte) which proceeds from the totality of our being" (Dilthey, [1922-1936] 1962:xviii).

One of the fundamental contradictions which runs through Dilthey's theory of knowledge is that he believed that it is possible to study human society scientifically, while arguing that all cognitions are highly personal. On the one hand, Dilthey was not completely free from the influence of the Historical School. He believed that history is an objective process. On the other hand, he did not fully give up the idea of the lawful nature of historical development. Although Dilthey was critical of the positivists' attempt to write scientific history, he himself believed that history is a guide to the knowledge of social and historical realities. At the same time, Dilthey believed that any attempt to find meaning in history as fruitless. "Every formula by which we express the meaning of history is simply a reflection of our own inner-life" (Dilthey, [1922-1936] 1962:170). Moreover, as Dilthey argued, if the basis of all knowledge is experience, how do we know about unexperiential objects, or is our knowledge limited to our experience? Dilthey never provided satisfactory answers to these questions.

Dilthey believed that the study of human society requires methods different from those of natural science. As he rejected the positivist claim that all sciences can follow the methods of natural science, Dilthey proposed making the world of man intelligible by means of understanding (Verstehen) (Dilthey, [1922-1936] 1962:318-319). Feelings, consciousness, volitions, desires are not involved in the study of nature, whereas the action of man, which we like to understand, always stems from "inner" feelings. By re-experiencing (Nacherleben) the actor's behaviour, Dilthey argues, we can understand the inner reason of the actor that prompts his behaviour. The re-experiencing (Nacherleben) is accomplished by the projection of our own life into the position which would have been occupied by the inner life of another (Makkreel, 1975:277). The internal re-experiencing enables us to understand the motives,

feelings and values of someone else, as he takes part in a particular action. Dilthey maintained, the Verstehen method discloses the historical reality, and thereby it facilitates our understanding of the regularities of human conduct. Hence, Verstehen is a method of discovering the regularities of human behaviour, and it is not so much an attempt to investigate the motives. It explains the coherent order between motives and actions. It is important to note that, for Dilthey, Verstehen does not imply a kind of self-understanding or self-realization. It refers to knowledge of the inner state of another, whether he lived in the past or is living at present. For example, we can understand the inner state of an artist, who lived in the 19th century by observing his paintings. We can re-live with his cognitive, emotional inner life by projecting our own life into the particular moment he did his paintings. In this way, we disclose the inner life of someone, who lived in the last century. It is not the means, therefore, whereby we understand ourselves, but whereby we understand another. Dilthey believed that we can understand the inner state of another as promptly and correctly as we can understand our own inner life (Dilthey, [1922-1936] 1962:36). His emphasis on Verstehen as an appropriate method for the cultural sciences marked a significant transition of the methodological crisis from the Historical School to the Kantian critique. For Dilthey, the validity of any interpretation of culture is rooted in subjective experience. The universally shared human faculties function as a priori principles of understanding. The individual may recognize or draw out himself those qualities shared with others. In this sense, Dilthey gave more concrete thought to intersubjectivity (Makkreel, 1975:278).

In the latter part of Dilthey's intellectual career he tried to provide more systematic approach to hermeneutics. He tried to interpret human behaviour exclusively from the point of view of experience. From Dilthey's hermeneutical point of view, the process of understanding is not an attempt to disclose observer's own possibilities, but against the observer's own expressions he can understand the actual differences between the experience of his own and the real circumstances around him. In this way, observer can understand reality by interpreting his own behaviour under the given circumstances. Self-understanding is thus

not directly included in the experience, but the observer's own experiences are used to interpret reality. Dilthey believed that in this way we can delimit the number of circumstances which must be included in the analysis. In other words, the complexity of reality can be reduced by using self-reflected social reality as a model for the interpretation. However, Dilthey acknowledged that there is a fundamental distinction between these vague and imaginative expectations implicit in our own experience and reality. But Verstehen has to presuppose our experience in understanding reality, and therefore, these inherent limitations due to the presuppositions cannot be totally avoided. Therefore, the psychological character of Verstehen in Dilthey's theory of knowledge continued to dominate in his hermeneutical perspectives. The shift from psychology to hermeneutics emerged as an attempt to recognize experience as the psychological source of all human significance (Makkreel, 1975:298).

Dilthey's strong emphasis on the human mind as a part of the whole method of human sciences makes it difficult to understand his writings on the Verstehen method, particularly the difference between psychology and sociology. While psychology refers to the individual as a unit of inquiry, sociology focuses on social groups. Although large scale social groups are constituted by individuals, social action is not a mere aggregation of separate and autonomous actions of individuals. Dilthey's ideas on the Verstehen method thus provoked both psychologists and sociologists of his day. This was particularly evident, in the writings of neo-Kantians, where Dilthey's ideas were rejected mainly because of his insistence on the human mind as having a higher degree of empirical reality. However, Dilthey's attempt to establish human sciences as an independent discipline did not dissipate as a result of neo-Kantian criticisms. Particularly his concept of Verstehen as a method for the study of human society continued to dominate the methodological controversy in Germany. Although neo-Kantian philosophers such as Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Georg Simmel and Emil Lask rejected the concept of Geisteswissenschaften introduced by Dilthey, the importance of a unique methodological framework for the social sciences remained an unsolved issue.

To conclude this discussion let us recapitulate some of the main arguments that we discussed in the preceding sections. The Methodenstreit which began in the late 19th century Europe was basically a dispute over the constitutive properties of the socio-cultural phenomena, the domain of the socio-cultural problems, and the specific methodology of social scientific inquiry. Positivism, which was the mainstream of European social thought, argued that there is no particular metatheoretical structure peculiar to the socio-cultural sciences. All phenomena are natural phenomena, the possible objects of laws of nature. The methods of natural science have universal prescriptive applications. On the other hand, Idealism, which was the dominant academic philosophy in Germany, recognized that there is a radical cleavage between the phenomenal and spiritual world, and between the world of natural science and the world of human activity. Hence the idealist came to draw a sharp demarcation between natural science and the cultural sciences or "sciences of mind", including both what we would call humanities and social sciences. The cultural sciences, therefore, could not possibly make use of the methods of natural science, as the positivists advocated. Hence, the tendency for idealistic interest in human action is in two main directions: detailed concrete history on the one hand, the philosophy of history on the other (Parsons, 1937:475). Wilhelm Dilthey, a neo-idealist, focused his investigations upon the problem of understanding and the relationship between experience and knowledge. Dilthey's theory of knowledge grew out of the principle of empathy (direct experience of events) in the German historical tradition. However, the Southwest German School of neo-Kantians were not concerned with empathy; they, instead, used the notion of understanding (Verstehen) primarily to emphasize the profound difference between the methods of the natural science and those of the social studies and humanities.

The Southwest German neo-Kantians or Baden School was the name used for a group of philosophers who held positions at Southwest German Universities: Wilhelm Windelband at Strassburg and Heidelberg, Heinrich Rickert at Freiburg and Heidelberg and Emil Lask at Heidelberg. The philosopher and sociologist, Georg Simmel, a close friend of Weber, who

spent most of his career as a private dozent in Heidelberg, is conventionally labeled as a neo-Kantian. In their efforts to overcome the doctrine of positivism, neo-Kantians derived their methodological propositions from the philosophy of Kant. Following Kant's idea of conceptual ordering in knowledge, they tried to determine categories of thought and to distinguish between the categories employed in the cultural sciences and those characteristics of natural science. In general, neo-Kantians found the difference between the two sciences in their epistemological structure rather than in their scientific object or subject matter, a point upon which Wilhelm Dilthey differed from the neo-Kantians. They argued that the cultural sciences are aimed at an understanding of "particular socio-historical phenomena" or "events", rather than the foundation of "general laws", as is the case in natural science.

III. THE SOUTHWEST GERMAN SCHOOL OF NEO-KANTIANISM AND MAX WEBER

Dilthey's effort to overcome the influence of positivism and the speculative metaphysics on the cultural sciences was highly admired by the philosophers of the Southwest German School of neo-Kantianism.[14] Like Dilthey, neo-Kantians recognized the collapse of the metaphysical systems and sought to develop a new basis for the natural and the social sciences. Further, the neo-Kantians tried to find the basis of knowledge in human consciousness, but they viewed consciousness differently from Dilthey. According to Dilthey, human consciousness is constituted by experience--the source of all knowledge. On the contrary, the neo-Kantians believed that consciousness represents only what we already know and, therefore, consciousness itself is merely a product of knowledge. Thus, according to the neo-Kantians, the formation of concepts representing objects is an a priori condition for knowledge. On the contrary, Dilthey rejected the a priori conditions for knowledge. He believed that the experiences themselves represent phenomena, and therefore, there is no a priori of knowledge. For the neo-Kantians, the methods of the natural sciences are not applicable for the cultural sciences. These two sciences are different from each other not only on the basis of their respective subject matter, but more importantly in terms of their distinctive methods. However, the neo-Kantians attempted to find categories for these studies as rational as those of the natural sciences, and to formulate concepts of causation applicable to the study of human behaviour. They tried to find rational methods to apply to irrational human conduct with which these sciences deal. Windelband, Rickert, Simmel and Lask all agreed that an objective, rational approach to human behaviour is possible. Dilthey too sought an epistemological foundation for the social sciences, but he did not accept the method of causation, and questioned the possibility of a rational approach to human behaviour.

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[14]According to Marianne Weber ([1926] 1975:311), the "intellectual tools required for Weber's logical work were supplied him by contemporary logic and epistemology, particularly Heinrich Rickert's theory of knowledge, ... which was particularly important to him. He took up the logical problems everywhere in order to gain a clear view of the scientific process". Thus he brought works by Dilthey, Wundt, Simmel, Münsterberg, Gottl, von Kries, Eduard Meyer, Stammler, and others into his discussion.

The fundamental philosophical question posed by the Southwest German School of neo-Kantians was that if the cultural sciences do not seek general laws, in the fashion of natural science, what is the purpose of the cultural sciences, and how do they deal with the overwhelming mass of socio-cultural "events"? The neo-Kantians believed that the cultural scientists have choice--that is they can choose by their own preference to examine and to understand one particular aspect of social reality rather than another. This choice inevitably stems from the investigator's own value-system. This theory of choice and the persistent influence of one's own values on scientific inquiry convinced the neo-Kantians that the subjectivity is an "inherent quality" of the social scientific knowledge. Value in the social and historical world could not be arrived at by any verifiable process. It could only be "intuited". Thus there is no guarantee of its validity. Ultimately the social scientist is reduced to an act of faith in his own values.

Members of the neo-Kantian school were concerned with a whole range of methodological problems in the cultural sciences. Emil Lask, a less known but more important fellow neo-Kantian, mainly focused his attention on the problem of irrationality of concrete reality. Lask examined the conditions under which the knowledge of concrete reality is possible (Goldmann, 1971:53-57). Georg Simmel ([1905] 1977:69) was particularly anxious to show the technique of understanding as purely a psychological construction of reality. Simmel's approach to the method of Verstehen slightly differed from that of Dilthey. In the case of understanding, Simmel shared Dilthey's emphasis on psychological insights. In many respects Simmel was in essential agreement with Dilthey. Wilhelm Windelband tried to formulate the ideal of a historical science, the distinctive interest of which lies in the knowledge of concrete reality. This is the methodological ideal of idiographic knowledge, later analyzed by Heinrich Rickert ([1910] 1962) in his discussion of the knowledge of the historical individual. Heinrich Rickert, the leading member of the neo-Kantian school, was able to bring all the different philosophical investigations of the neo-Kantians into an organized methodological system in which Max Weber found the necessary answers to the problem of

knowledge in the cultural sciences.

The ideas of the neo-Kantian philosophers had a profound impact on the methodological writings of many social scientists including Max Weber, at the turn of the last century. Weber's position in the methodological dispute was basically a product of neo-Kantian philosophy. He believed that he found the necessary epistemological answers in the philosophical writings of the neo-Kantians to the problem of knowledge in the cultural sciences. Since the beginning of Weber's intellectual career, the neo-Kantian philosophers were close friends of Weber, and after he was appointed to the Heidelberg chair Weber became more interested in the methodological dispute and the philosophical works of the neo-Kantians. After reading Rickert's Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (1902), Weber accepted Rickert's methodological position. methodological position. Soon after, Weber applied the neo-Kantian philosophy to his studies in economic history. In his critical essay of the Historical School, Weber developed his own arguments in the mold of Rickert's logic. He stated that he would rely on the nomothetic and idiographic distinction between generalizing and individualizing methods of natural science and the social sciences. Weber stated that his aim was "to test the usefulness of Rickert's ideas for the methodology of our own discipline. For this reason, I am not doing what would otherwise be required: citing him at every point at which his views are employed" (Weber, [1905] 1975:213). It is evident in Weber's criticisms of the Historical School and positivism that Weber was basically an advocate of the neo-Kantian philosophy. His methodological arguments, for the most part, were taken over from Rickert's writings.

Therefore, the fundamental philosophical arguments of neo-Kantians on different issues of the methodological crisis reveal the direction which Weber took in his own writings with regard to the same methodological issues, and the extent to which he differed from neo-Kantians. Particularly, since Weber was not a specialized methodologist, in his criticisms of the Historical School and positivism Weber extensively relied on the neo-Kantian philosophy. His neo-Kantian position can be established only by a careful and detailed

examination of the neo-Kantian philosophy. Therefore, in the following section, first of all, I will discuss the various philosophical arguments of the individual members of the neo-Kantian School. Secondly, the influence of the neo-Kantian philosophy on Max Weber will be demonstrated by discussing his criticisms of positivism and the Historical School of Economics.

IRRATIONALITY OF CONCRETE REALITY

No neo-Kantian has grasped Kant's theory of knowledge so precisely as Emil Lask, whose brilliant works are little known to many philosophers today. For this study, Lask's analysis of the Kantian theory of knowledge is particularly important because of its decisive influence on Weber. In Lask's doctoral dissertation Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte 1902, Weber found what he regarded as an exemplary answer to the problem of irrationality of concrete reality (Oakes, 1984:6). For the neo-Kantians the problem of knowledge is the problem of concept formation. The conditions for the possibility of knowledge of an object are conditions for the possibility of forming concepts of that object. An item becomes an object of knowledge when it is brought under concepts, or when concepts are formed which represent that particular item. Valid concept formation, therefore, constitutes knowledge. It is argued that the problem of knowledge of the historical individual is the problem of individual concept formation. The dichotomy between concepts and knowledge is explained by Lask (1914:39-56) in terms of two principles:

1. Analytic Logic
2. Emanatist Logic

All theories of concepts, Lask points out, falls into either of two main categories. In anaiytic logic, also called atomistic logic, the immediate experience of the object is concrete reality, the basis of all concept formation. However, reality itself cannot be conceptualized because the infinite diversity of concrete reality is incomprehensible by limited conceptual definitions. Hence, concept formation itself is a limited methodological exercise by which

artificially abstracted parts of reality are ascribed some meanings. In the process of constructing meaningful interpretations of reality, we progressively eliminate the diverse and infinite elements of any given phenomenon that actually exist in an intermingled fashion. Lask (1923:31-40) argued that general concepts are formed by abstraction and simply denote classes of individuals with certain properties in common. In this way, we try to establish more or less general scientific laws which ever more closely approach, but never actually reach, the individual. The individual remains an eternally irrational element, against which thought must always struggle without ever being able to conquer it. In this sense, therefore, concept formation is simply a process of the generalization of immediate "perceptions" of the observer. The immediate perceptions are transformed into conceptual definitions which describe the phenomena. Therefore, there is no direct relationship between concepts and reality; the logical accuracy of the concept depends upon the accuracy of the perceptions of the observer. Hence it is purely conceptual, and there is no significant ontological value of such conceptions because the ontological vastness of concrete reality is unobservable. The more abstract and general the concept, the more remote from reality it becomes. Thus, concrete reality can never be totally conceptualized. Any attempt to develop an exhaustive conceptual profile of concrete reality is, according to Lask, irrational because it is not a possible object of knowledge.

According to emanatist logic concepts themselves are constituted by the concrete experience which emanates from the reality. Therefore, concepts do not represent any particular aspects of reality, but they derive their meanings from the experience. Lask (1914:83) argued that concrete experience can be deduced from concepts which are ontologically richer than empirical existence, and in this sense, represent a higher reality. As a result, experience not only falls under concepts, but the content of experience is also included in the content of concepts. The logical relationship between concept and reality in analytical logic becomes an ontological relationship in emanatist logic. Lask believed that emanatist logic includes all that is limited and partial, starting from the necessarily prior knowledge of the

whole, of the universe and of the human community. Since the whole embraces everything, any significant emanatist logic must be a logic of content and thus there is no separation between content and form.

In the epistemological debates between the neo-Kantian Schools of Heidelberg and Marburg, Heidelberg emphasized the analytic logic with its atomistic and individualistic conception of substance, while the latter, starting from mathematics, emphasized the functional concepts and tended towards emanatist logic, albeit in a purely "scientific" and contemplative sense. Lask recognized that the two groups could lay equal claim to Kant, for the simple reason that in Kant's thought the logic of mathematics (space and time) diametrically opposed to that of matter. The first is emanatist, and the second is analytic.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IDIOGRAPHIC AND NOMOTHETIC KNOWLEDGE

One of the most important contributions of Wilhelm Windelband to modern philosophy is his analysis of Kant's theory of historical knowledge. Windelband rejected the Kantian definition of science. He distinguished between "nomothetic" and "idiographic" approaches to experience. According to Windelband, the possibility of history as a science is based on three principles: (1) the individualistic conception of value, (2) the nomological character of scientific knowledge, and (3) the individualistic character of historical sciences (Windelband, 1924:136-148). In nomological knowledge, Windelband argued, objects and events are explained in terms of general rules that are derived from the order of such events. They are classified according to the level of generality of their characteristics. Windelband called this Naturwissenschaft or natural science. In idiographic knowledge, on the other hand, we are interested in the unique character of events which are important to us because of their specific relevance to our values. This is called Kulturwissenschaften or cultural sciences. Thus we seek to ascertain a complete profile of such events insofar as they are meaningful to us (Windelband, 1901:320-331; Ringer, 1969:324).

Windelband argued that although the idiographic methods are appropriate in the historical sciences, they can also be used in the study of nature. He believed that psychology is not a nomothetic science, although we often use the nomothetic techniques in psychological research. Disciplines such as psychology, according to Windelband, are composed of both generalizing and individualizing characteristics that must be analyzed in their proper methodological order. However, Windelband rejected the positivist thesis, and argued that the epistemologists in the past had failed to realize the importance of the idiographic approach to socio-historial phenomena. They have used the nomothetic method as an epitome of all knowledge. Hence, Windelband tried to rectify the methodological misconceptions of the positivists.[15]

Windelband maintained that the idiographic nature, as an inherent problem of the cultural sciences, makes it especially difficult for us to select our subject matter of investigation from a whole range of discrete events. For Dilthey, this was not a serious methodological problem because one had only to reproduce what men in the past considered as important in their intellectual world. But the methodological division between idiographic and nomothetic sciences introduced by Windelband required a definite method of identifying the subject matter of the idiographic knowledge. In the nomological sciences, the relationship between instances and general rules are held to provide adequate criteria for the necessary choices of subject matter, but the search for generalizations was explicitly excluded from the idiographic realm; it seemed only natural to ask what was to take its place. Windelband maintained that it is the inherent importance of a given object of idiographic investigation which leads the historian to isolate it for analysis. He argues that values can be ascribed to phenomena that are unique and incomparable in their individuality.

[15]Stuart Hughes (1958:47) argues that for many German intellectuals the Southwest German School of neo-Kantianism is nothing but a group of anti-positivists. Windelband and his student Heinrich Rickert are recognized as prominent spokesmen of the anti-positivist campaign among the German philosophers. Windelband's rectoral address at the University of Strassburg in 1894 sounded to his contemporaries like a "declaration of war against positivism".

The investigator's value interest makes it possible for him to isolate a particular problem for investigation among innumerable events. The attribution of values always has a concrete and singular referent because values are attached exclusively to individuals. We have a theoretical interest in any given phenomenon as long as it is meaningful to our value-interest. Thus the probability of becoming an object of inquiry is the probability of having value attributes which are ascribed to phenomenon by the observer. This theoretical value interest cannot be satisfied in the natural sciences which abstract from the unique and the qualitative properties of reality in order to disclose general nomological regularities or laws of nature. These sciences have no interest in the individuality of concrete reality. Therefore, natural sciences are "nomothetic" disciplines. Nomothetic knowledge is general and abstract; it is absolutely devoid of any form of value interests.[16] In contrast, social scientific knowledge, according to Windelband, is evaluative and idiographic. The purpose of such knowledge is to understand or interpret the properties of unique events. Therefore, generalized and abstract theories as methodological devices are inappropriate in social scientific discourse (Windelband, 1924:151-152).

THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL CONCEPT FORMATION

Windelband suggested that it is important for a historian to treat any given "object" or phenomenon of idiographic knowledge in the context of its social circumstances. However, Windelband did not elaborate his arguments in any detail. This is where Heinrich Rickert made his most significant contribution to the whole discussion of the problem of knowledge in the cultural sciences. Rickert conceived of knowledge as a state of the human mind; when we have knowledge of empirical reality we have something in our minds (Burger, 1976:13).

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[16]However, Weber disputed this view. In "Objectivity in Social Science" Weber argued that all sciences originate in technical, practical pursuits (Weber, [1922] 1947:51). The scientist differs from the pragmatic user of scientific, technical means by virtue of his interest in the subject, which is not utilitarian but for its own sake. In this respect, according to Weber, the notion that "science is value free" is itself a "value judgement" widely acknowledged by the scientific community (Weber, [1922] 1948:129-159).

However, Rickert rejected the idea that human knowledge is an exclusive reproduction of the external reality. He argued that the capacity of the human mind is essentially limited, and it comprehends only what it can perceive. Man can never know things as they are, but only as they appear to him in the mind as particular phenomena. Rickert ([1910] 1962:39-43) warned against the common sense opinion that our knowledge is a copy of empirical reality. He argued that any kind of observation involves an active transformation of experience into conceptualization. In this process we isolate what appears to us in the essential aspects of any object or event; then we construct our own objects of cognition.

Rickert distinguished sciences from one another with respect to both materials and methods.[17] The former was called the material basis of knowledge, and the latter was called the formal basis. Rickert accepted Dilthey's scheme as the most basic formal antithesis, but on the material level he objected to the traditional distinction between "nature" and "spirit" (Geist). Rickert shared Dilthey's anti-positivist aim of distinguishing the cultural sciences from natural science, but for Rickert, the important difference is one of "method", not "content". The methodology and the typical theoretical interest of the Kulturwissenschaft, Rickert ([1910] 1962:40-41) argued, individualize and involve "value relevance" (Wertbeziehung), whereas the natural scientific methods and theories generalize and are devoid of human values. However, Rickert emphasized that this classification is an ideal-typical one:

> We do not mean that the one science, as it is practiced today, operates only in a generalizing manner, and the other only in an individualizing way, that one is only concerned with non-meaningful existents and the other only with meaningful reality (Rickert, [1902] 1921:466).

Rickert proposed that the "material" division of sciences must be based on the difference between nature and culture, but not on the nature and Geist. He tried to show that

[17]However, Rickert ([1902] 1921:196) seems to believe that a generalizing science of human life, if it were successful, could only be a positive natural science. If sociology tries to do this, to provide a "natural scientific" or generalizing account of social reality, there can be no logical objection. But sociology must be emphatically opposed as soon as it claims to be the only science of the "historical life" of human beings or the science of history itself.

the word "culture" inevitably implies human valuations and purposes which are more than mere by-products of mundane needs and expectations. The values are always attached to the cultural objects. In contrast, natural science conceives of the objects of nature as devoid of values and without relevance to it. If we extract all the values from conceptions of a cultural object, we can say that it thereby becomes a mere object of nature. Thus according to Rickert, the presence or absence of relevance to values can serve as a reliable criterion for distinguishing between two kinds of scientific objects. Without attaching values to the object, every real cultural phenomenon can also become a part of nature (Rickert, [1910] 1962:18-29). At all events, in the distinction between nature, as devoid of values, and culture, as affected by values, we already have the essential principle of division for the classification of the sciences. Rickert argued that the relevance of values, that is the distinction between meaningful and meaningless objects, is the logical structure of the methods of the various sciences. Their subject matter cannot be demonstrated until the methodological significance of the relevance of objects to values becomes clear.

CONCEPTS AND REALITY

If the fundamental difference between the natural sciences and the cultural sciences is expressed by saying that in the one case, natural objects, and in the other case, cultural phenomena, are investigated by one and the same method, such a proposition would have little significance from the point of view of epistemology. In order to demonstrate the other fundamental differences that exist between these two groups of sciences, it is necessary to consider the formal principle of classification. Rickert opposed the idea that our knowledge is a passive mirror image of reality (Abbildung). He argued that our cognition involves an active transformation of experience into concept formation. However, such concepts represent only what we can observe or experience; but beyond our apprehension there is a "transcendent" world that cannot be comprehended by our observations. The task of cognition is, therefore, to organize the data of immediate experience to formulate concepts that are capable of

penetrating the transcendent world. Consequently, in order to understand the nature of cognition, we could begin only by investigating the process of reconstruction, in which ideas or concepts are consonant with the transcendent world. Hence, in any event, our cognition is not a mirror image or copy of reality, but a reconstruction of data of immediate experience. Therefore, our knowledge or cognition in the various sciences is limited to the immediately-given, immanent world of sense (Rickert, [1910] 1962:30-31).

Empirical reality is an immeasurable manifold continuum, which seems to become greater and greater the more deeply we delve into it and begin to analyze it and study its particular parts. The part of reality that we can include in our concepts, and thus in our knowledge, is almost infinitesimally small when compared with what we must disregard. Hence, in order to understand reality, we must form conceptual models of it, and confront them with problems that are essentially insoluble. Knowledge is not a reflection of the empirical reality on our mind, but a process of reconstructing the data of immediate experience. It is a process involving the simplification of the actual multiplicity of reality itself. Since it is impossible to develop conceptual representation of reality "as it is", the totality of the empirical reality is irrational. Only the knowable portion of reality is rational and vice-versa (Rickert, [1910] 1962:33).

The immeasurable continuity of empirical reality, according to Rickert ([1910] 1962:34-39), can be overcome by conceptual distinction between differentiation and continuity, thereby enabling reality to become "rational". The continuity of reality can be conceptually comprehended as soon as empirical reality is homogeneous. The heterogeneous continuity of reality becomes conceivable when we transform the continuous and intermingled social events into a domain of discrete objects. Thus, only two mutually opposed methods of concept formation are open to sciences. One is the transformation of the heterogeneous continuum into a homogeneous continuum, and the second is, the transformation of heterogeneous continuum into a domain of discrete objects. Insofar as this is possible, reality itself can be called rational. It remains irrational only for the kind of cognition which aspires

to portray it without constructing it. There is only one science which would appear to be capable of attaining a conceptual grasp of the entire reality, and that is, for obvious reasons, mathematical physics.

However, Rickert did not make any attempt to solve the problem of conceptualizing the individual by overcoming the hiatus irrationalis or closing the gap between concepts and reality. In contrast, according to Rickert's theory of individual concept formation, the gulf between concept and reality is an inevitable feature of the idiographic knowledge. There is no epistemological solution to this problem; it is grounded in a very general fact about human existence that lies within the universal pragmatics of human experience. Human beings set certain value premises in an attempt to realize the empirical reality within their reach. Human experience can never reach a universal entity of any given fragment of the empirical reality. It is impossible to attribute value premises to each and every feature of phenomena in the domain. This is the dilemma that we confront throughout our life (Rickert, [1902] 1921:319). The possibility of ascribing values to certain objects presupposes that there are some other objects which do not occupy this status. If reality can be exhaustively derived from concepts, there would be no basis for the claim that one aspect of reality has more cognitive significant than the another. If a universal entity of any given aspect of reality is possible, it is not necessary to recourse to values (Wertbeziehung) in social inquiry to isolate a particular problem from discrete events.

HISTORY AND SCIENCE

Rickert ([1910] 1962:71) maintains that there is no science which can reproduce reality; all sciences must select from the empirical given to create a meaningful explication. To transform an "indeterminable heterogeneity of reality into a determinable domain of discrete objects", all sciences require universal concepts. This is especially the case in natural science. Such universal concepts are used to select salient features of objects and to correlate them in a meaningful order from a theoretical standpoint. History, according to Rickert, deserves the

rank of a science because it too employs certain principles to select its subject of inquiry (what is essential from what is unessential). Those principles employed in historical inquiry are value concepts which are related to concrete historical events. Only those events and phenomena are reported by the historian. They are either positively or negatively efficacious in realizing certain cultural values. Rickert contended that although the historical method is value oriented, the historical analysis is still scientific. He distinguishes between valuations and reference to values: "valuations must always involve praise or blame. To refer to values is to do neither" (Rickert, [1910] 1962:90). The science of history, therefore, does not lose its objectivity by making reference to values:

> If the historian constructs his concepts according to the values of the community to which he himself belongs, the objectivity of his account will seem to depend entirely upon the accuracy of his factual material, and the question whether this or that event of the past is important cannot arise...He is immune from the charge of arbitrariness if he relates, for example, the development of art to the aesthetic values of his culture and the development of the state to its political values. He thus creates a narrative which, so far as it avoids unhistorical value judgments, is valid for everyone who accepts aesthetic or political values as normative for the members of his community (Rickert, [1902] 1921:494).

Following Windelband, Rickert argued that the historical method deals with events such as revolutions, capitalism, feudalism, etc., which cannot establish universal laws. But Rickert expresses doubt about the appropriateness of Windelband's distinction between the nomothetic and idiographic knowledge because the latter term does not exclude the arts (Rickert, [1910] 1962:72). However, Rickert emphasized that history is more than an art which intuitively captures historical accounts. Its function is to create individual concepts, not to pursue details for their idiosyncratic charms. Given such a theory in science that formulates either generalizing or individualizing concepts, one can ask whether the natural sciences do not also operate with complexes of universal concepts rather than just single universal concepts. The peculiarity of the historical method would then be that the complexes are more intricate so as to apply solely to one phenomenon and that its conceptual components may be less refined.

It seems, however, that Rickert's polar antithesis of method must disintegrate into a distinction of degree. The peculiarity of the historical method can be recognized, if we examine how its selective concepts are arrived at. In the case of natural science, trial and error is possible insofar as success in prediction can serve as a final criterion. In history, in contrast, predictability cannot be expected. The problem of what to select is most acute when writing universal history. Hence, Rickert could only suggest that there must be a universally valid system of values among historians by which they can select phenomena (Rickert, [1910] 1962:138). However, mundane value systems themselves cannot serve as selective principles because they are too diverse and scattered in various aspects of everyday life. Therefore, in general, there is no intelligible continuum of realized values in the real world. Values possess a superpersonal validity for Rickert which he does not expect history to realize since they are by definition nonsensory. Nevertheless, Rickert contended that historians would gradually become more conscious of the absolute validity of certain cultural values. In the final analysis the objectivity of the historian presupposes that the cultural values to which he refers his subject matter, be objectively valid. The metaphysical postulate that there is progress in history gives way to an epistemological postulate of progress.

NOMOLOGICAL REGULARITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

Despite the common philosophical background of the neo-Kantian philosophers, there was a form of specialization among individual members of the neo-Kantian School. The different institutional background and the intellectual contacts with different philosophers naturally led each members of the neo-Kantian school to pursue different aspects of the Methodenstreit. For example, unlike Rickert who continued to work on the ideas of his teacher, Windelband, Georg Simmel was not so much a representative of neo-Kantianism as he was a prominent authority on the work of Kant. Simmel, who worked on his Habilitation at the University of Berlin under the supervision of Dilthey, can be regarded as a mediator between the neo-Kantians and Dilthey because of his intensive familiarity with the writings of

Kant as well as Dilthey (Simmel, [1905] 1977; Weber, [1905] 1975). The starting point of Simmel's theory of knowledge is closely linked with Dilthey's formal psychology. In many ways Simmel was in essential agreement with Dilthey with regard to the methodological issues of the cultural sciences. He adopted the terminology of objective and subjective Geist, as well as the concept of understanding. At the same time, he distinguished between propositions and persons as objects of understanding. In the case of propositions, he shared Dilthey's emphasis upon manifest meanings. With regard to persons, however, he saw the act of understanding in more ordinary terms as a kind of psychological insight (Simmel, [1905] 1977:39; Ringer, 1969:322).

Simmel argued that the theory of knowledge stems from the human perception i.e., knowing is a kind of conceiving objects or events.[18] Therefore, objects of historical knowledge are conceptions, intentions, desires, and feelings of personalities. In other words, the subject matter of historical inquiry are individuals. It follows then, that all observable external events and objects, such as politics, economics, religion, law and technology are both uninteresting and unintelligible, if they are not causes and effects of individual mental process. All those social and cultural institutions lead the individual to react to his environment and to his fellow members of society. Thus, Simmel describes, all observable social events that are subjected to historical explanations link with human impulses and volitional actions. The mental status of historical process, therefore, requires the following ideal for historical inquiry: history should be a form of applied psychology. If there were a nomological science of psychology, then the relationship between history and psychology would be the same as the relationship between astronomy and mathematics (Simmel, [1905] 1977:39-40).

Simmel was particularly interested in explaining the technique of understanding (Verstehen) in a methodologically valid manner. The whole theory of understanding grew out

[18]Like Dilthey, Simmel begins his inquiry into the problem of knowledge from a purely psychological point of view and extends to more complicated notion of understanding. Simmel starts by saying that "All observable or external events and processes-political and social, economic and religious, legal and technical, would be both uninteresting and unintelligible if they were not causes and effects of mental processes" (Simmel, [1905] 1977:39).

of the old principle of empathy in the German historical tradition. Simmel focused his methodological investigations almost exclusively on this problem. Although he diverged, to some degree, from Dilthey's thesis with regard to the Verstehen method, Simmel still more emphasized on the psychological dimension of Verstehen. Simmel, like Dilthey, makes the transition from a purely psychological to a more complex notion of understanding. As Raymond Aron described it:

> Simmel first studied understanding in a purely psychological way: what are the necessary a prioris for us to be able to reconstruct another person's status of consciousness? In particular, how do we manage to grasp, as a unity, the personality of another person? This last question already draws us beyond the initial formulation of the question; understanding is no longer psychological participation, but intellection (cited from Outhwaite, 1975:44).

Simmel (1918:4) argued that the structure of every Verstehen is from the beginning intrinsically a synthesis between two separate elements. Given is a factual appearance, which as such is not yet understood. And added to it from inside is the subject, to whom this appearance is given, which either emerges directly from the subject or is taken over and applied by it--the recognition of meaning (Verstehender Gedanke), which in a way penetrates the initially given factual appearance and transforms it into something that is understood (Verstehenden). According to Simmel, it is possible to distinguish the "objective understanding" of the meaning of an utterance and the "subjective understanding" of motives and intentions.[19] The objective understanding, according to Simmel, is a process in which we try to grasp the meaning of "speech", which is the object of an understanding. In the case of subjective interpretation, we try to understand the "actor" or the "speaker". Simmel believed that in objective understanding we are only concerned with theoretical knowledge. It is just a presentation of substantive matters in a logical form. Since it is knowledge, it is possible to verify in exactly the same sense in which it was discovered. However, when we try to understand someone's motives, which is the subjective interpretation, we are not only

[19]Weber ([1906] 1975:152) made some useful comments on this point. Weber praised Simmel for his penetrating analysis of the distinction between the objective understanding of the meaning of motives and the subjective interpretation of motives of a speaking or acting person. But he criticised Simmel for advocating a "psychologism" within the conceptual parameters of understanding (Verstehen).

concerned with the comprehension of motives and subjective intentions of the actor, but also the conditions in which the person acts. In this type of understanding, it is important to take into account the historical circumstances within which the particular action takes place (Simmel, [1905] 1977:63-65). Simmel maintained that:

> When we perceive this motive of the utterance, we have "understood" it in a very different sense from involvement in the comprehension of its objective content; this type of understanding is now related not only to what is said, but to the speaker. It is this type of understanding and not the former one which arises in relation to historical personalities (Simmel, [1905] 1977:64-65)[20]

Simmel believed that the conceptual explanations used by historians are extracted from other disciplines, because history itself can never arrive at a full, detailed analysis of the historical individual. History is not capable of reproducing a complete profile of comparative historical conditions of two historical events. Simmel opposed the commonsense view that history is a reproduction of what, observably and unobservably, really happened. In contrast, he emphasized ([1905] 1977:87) both the proximity and the distance between history and its subject matter. On the one hand, in the historical analysis, historians must be able to recreate the mental acts of historical persons. It presupposes that in some sense the historical person and the historian have the same nature and the emotional feelings. Unless this condition is satisfied, according to Simmel, the observable acts of historical persons would simply be an unintelligible collection of historical facts that does not account for historical reality. And on the other hand, the mere identity of the content of the historical event--the mental act of the historical person is not sufficient to satisfy this condition. Hence, it is necessary to conceive such historical content in its peculiar historical circumstances that ascribed unique individual character to the historical event. The complete and conclusive understanding of historical knowledge is, therefore, based on both a contextual and perceptual approach to historical phenomena.

Friedrich Tenbruck (1965:83-84) suggests that the origin[21] of the ideal type method is

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[20]I have changed the translation see: Simmel, [1905] 1977:38.

[21]The origin of the ideal type method is a highly controversial issue. A number of philosophers seem to be responsible for the initial development of the concept. Rickert himself claimed that he partially inspired the invention of ideal types.

Simmel's concept of "pure form". Simmel used the "pure form" to describe the complex ideas which represent the central elements of his sociological interpretations. However, Simmel was reluctant to use this concept in his writings after Weber began to work on the "ideal types". William Outhwaite (1975:45) argues that one should not overlook that Simmel anticipated Weber's concept of ideal type as an elaborated stage of the pure form. They both believed that the understanding of motives essentially involves a reconstruction (Nachbilden) and projection onto an imaginary ego, since such motives are not clearly experienced by the historian as his own. What makes these processes and the connections between them understandable is that they can be recognized as typical. Simmel believed that a multitude of forms are present in every social situation as a historical phenomena, and each limits the realization of the other. As a result only "distorted" forms can be discovered in reality. Simmel himself solved this problem by using one-sided exaggerations that represent given historical phenomena. Simmel ([1908] 1950:200) suggests that sociology must exaggerate certain characteristics of the historical phenomenon to the point where they become "absolute lines and figures", so that they can be defined in a purely one-sided manner. He maintains that:

> Innumerable times, we form our concepts of objects in such way that experience can show no equivalent of their pure and absolute character; they gain an empirical form only in being weakened and limited by opposing concepts...This method of exaggerating and reducing concepts yields knowledge of the world which begins with our mode of cognition...Our intellect can grasp reality only by limitations of pure concepts which, no matter how far they deviate from reality, prove their legitimacy by the service they accord for the interpretation of it (cited from Tenbruck, 1965:85).

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[21](cont'd) However, Bruun (1972:206-7) argued that Weber developed ideal types partly in order to avoid some unnecessary implications of Rickert's Wertbeziehung (value relevance). Some others (eg. Runciman, 1972 and Marianne Weber, 1926) give the credit to Weber's family friend Georg Jellinek. Hence, Runciman (1972:9), following Tenbruck, argues that "although the term ideal type came from Jellinek [...] the idea behind it, in the form which Weber was to adopt, probably, came to him from Simmel". Tenbruck was correct, however, to point out that Jellinek coined the term to designate utopias, normative ideas which he then banished from social and political science in favour of "average" or "empirical types" derived by comparison and induction. Bruun (1972:210) has shown that in 1904, Weber himself acknowledged Jellinek as a forerunner, having misread his use of "ideal types" as only logical, and not moral idealization.

Tenbruck (1965:85-86) argues that there is no doubt, Simmel's concept of pure forms was the origin of the ideal type method. Weber did not claim to be the first to recognize the true methodological character of such concepts in sociological research. However, Simmel's original version of the ideal type method--the pure form--was elaborated and refined by Weber, and in substance, Weber's undertaking is hardly larger than Simmel's. In his study of social groups and the philosophy of money (Philosophie des Geldes), Simmel applied the concept of pure forms in a much more broader sense. But in Weber's work, the ideal type method was narrowed to historically circumscribed phenomena, which has definite conceptual meaning. According to Tenbruck, Weber would never have considered applying the method of ideal types to such a topic as money. Weber read Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes just before he wrote his major methodological essay Die Objektivität, and he had fully realized certain interpretative limitations encountered in Simmel's work.[22]

WEBER'S INTELLECTUAL ORIENTATION

At the beginning of Weber's intellectual career, he was more interested in social and political problems in Germany, rather than purely academic philosophical matters of the social sciences. As a young sociologist Weber began his investigations in the field of "agrarian policy" and the rural agricultural problems in Germany (Bendix, 1960:41-42). It was only at the end of the last century Weber became interested in the methodological problems of the social sciences. By that time, in fact, Weber himself had gained significant intellectual recognition among philosophers and historians at the University of Heidelberg. Also, by that time the methodological controversy had reached a peak, and many of Weber's family friends such as Heinrich Rickert and Georg Simmel had made their names as leading opponents of positivism and the Historical School of Economics. Therefore, as many commentators (Hughes, 1958; Tenbruck, 1959; Burger, 1976) pointed out, Weber's concern with the

[22]Gerth and Mills, in their introduction to From Max Weber (1948:14), provide some useful information regarding the development of Weber's interest in methodological problems of the social sciences.

methodological problems of the cultural sciences developed only as a sideline to his intellectual productivity (Weber, [1926] 1975:309,325). Marianne Weber ([1926] 1975:306) maintains that the external stimulus was partly responsible for Weber's interest in philosophical problems. She explains that Weber's methodological interest began when he was invited by a friend in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg to contribute an essay to a commemorative volume. Weber felt obliged to accept this request. In 1895, for the first time, in his inaugural address at the University of Freiburg, Weber clearly expressed his views on philosophical problems of the cultural sciences (see. Marianne Weber, [1926] 1975:305-307). In this address, Weber discussed a wide range of investigations concerning the meta-theoretical development in economics. Weber's first formal methodological treatise, Roscher und Knies und die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, was begun in 1902, and was not completed until 1906. Marianne Weber points out that during this period Weber was slowly recovering from the nervous breakdown that kept him away from his regular academic activities. Therefore, he reluctantly accepted any invitation to take part in a discussion on logical problems of the social sciences.[23]

Biographical information provided by Marianne Weber supports Tenbruck's argument that Weber was not a specialized methodologist who tried to develop a systematic methodological foundation for the social sciences. Weber's methodological essays are not a logic of science developed from an epistemological viewpoint, but derived from the concrete problem situation in his field. Weber published a series of methodological essays in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, and Logos. Most of these essays have a critical and polemical point of departure, as they were developed by Weber in a form of critical examination of the existing opinions in the field (Weber, [1926] 1975:308; Ringer,

[23]In addition to the essay on Roscher and Knies, Weber's methodological reflections may be found first and foremost in his programmatic pronouncement on Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy, with which he launched his editorship of the Archiv in 1904, and in only slightly less important form in the essay entitled Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences 1906, and the Meaning of Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics 1917-18. To these one might add the article published just before the war in which Weber outlined the method of Verstehen in the elaboration of sociological concepts.

1969:327-329). Weber formed his own views in a series of confrontations with the doctrines of others. Therefore, Weber's ideas are not always consistent and systematic; they are not presented in an integrated and coherent fashion. However, his methodological ideas are important not only as criticisms of the Methodenstreit, but also as a historical account of the controversies that he treats. Taken together, Weber's procedure of presenting his arguments are three-fold: First, Weber tried to refute the positivist thesis advanced by French and British philosophers with respect to the Methodenstreit. Second, he critically analyzed a number of interrelated theories of the Historical School (Karl von Savigny, Wilhelm Roscher and Karl Knies) such as intuitionism and objectivism. Third, his criticisms of Rudolf Stammler's thesis (philosophy of Marburg School), and finally, Weber's own methodological arguments that were based on the neo-Kantian philosophy try to address some the main issues of the methodological controversy. In the following chapters these major issues would be addressed systematically.

IV. WEBER'S NEO-KANTIAN CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM

In Roscher and Knies, Weber's ([1906] 1975:53) first formal methodological treatise, he points out that the purpose of the essay is "to establish certain basic logical and methodological problems which were subject to discussion during the previous generation". Weber believed that the methodological dispute concerning the logical status of socio-cultural sciences has gained an undue importance among a group of social scientists. He believed that methodological problems can be solved only within the domain of substantive socio-cultural research. "Sciences are formed and their methods are progressively developed only when substantive problems are discovered and solved. Purely epistemological or methodological statements have not made any significant contribution to the scientific knowledge" (Weber, [1922] 1951:217). In Weber's opinion, inquiry into the methodological foundation of knowledge itself is not a profitable research. As Weber metaphorically described it, "the knowledge of anatomy is not a necessary condition for the ability to work". The methods of the socio-cultural sciences, according to Weber, constantly developed with the continuity of empirical investigations and the development of new potential problems, which must be answered only by substantive research.

Weber rejected the positivist thesis that the aim of any socio-cultural science must be the discovery of "laws". According to Weber ([1906] 1975:63-67), this cannot be conceived as the goal of any science: neither a natural science nor a socio-cultural science. But it may be true that "in a given case, empirical generalization of the socio-cultural phenomena may have extraordinary heuristic value". Weber denied the positivist view that the enormous successes of natural science has given rise to the conviction that a "rational" perception of all reality is possible, a perception that is free of both metaphysics and individual chance. One universal method could and should predominate in its entire sphere, and only the results of that method could claim to be the valid truth; anything that could not be included within this method, does not belong to the science. "Naturalism" as a method and Weltanschuung claimed dominion in all areas of life and thought. Weber argued that the establishment of a hypothetico-deductive

system of nomological laws cannot be conceived as the aim of the socio-cultural sciences. Socio-cultural phenomena have definitive properties which distinguish them from the subject matter of other sciences and rule out the possibility of a natural science of the socio-cultural (c.f. Rickert, [1910] 1962:10-13). There is a peculiar method of identifying, describing, and explaining the socio-cultural phenomena. This method is "understanding" (Verstehen) or interpretation (Deutung) which has properties that differentiate it from any method employed in the natural science.

Weber ([1922] 1949:67,80-82) argued that the socio-cultural facts do not speak for themselves; they do not identify themselves as constituting socio-cultural problems. There is no socio-cultural observational language, theoretically neutral and logically independent of the way we see these phenomena and the questions posed about them. On the contrary, it is our socio-cultural "theoretical interest" (Erkenntnisinteresse) which constitutes any collection of phenomena as a socio-cultural problem. Such problems cannot be interpreted by means of general theories of social reality. The unique and individual character of the social phenomena is inconsistent with the analytical properties of natural science. The logical ideal of natural science is a system of empirically confirmed laws of ideal generality, that are spatially and temporally unrestricted. However, our interest in the socio-cultural phenomena, according to Weber ([1906] 1975:63), is tied to the unique character of the phenomena, and therefore, social investigations produce non-generalized knowledge of reality. If socio-cultural sciences can establish an enormous number of "empirical" generalizations, such generalizations would have no causal status. The method of causal relations in the cultural sciences can constitute only the subject matter of a scientific investigation.

Hence, Weber ([1906] 1975:64) argued that the social scientific disciplines can never produce exact knowledge in the natural scientific sense. Any attempt to develop generalized theories of socio-cultural phenomena would result in an elimination of the "individual character" of any given phenomenon. As a result, the general concepts become increasingly empty of content and alienated from empirically intelligible reality. The logical ideal of such

knowledge is a systematic formation of absolutely general theories. Such theories constitute an abstract representation of the common features of all phenomena. Causal explanation is, therefore, used to formulate increasingly general theories by which all phenomena are reduced to purely quantitative categories (Weber, [1906] 1975:64-65). These quantitative categories make no sense when they are applied in the socio-cultural phenomena which represent concrete manifold reality. Hence, the correlations are only one among many possible techniques of developing concrete concepts. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that the ultimate purpose of concept formation in the historical sciences is the development of generalized theories.

CRITIQUE OF THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

Weber's strong and profound criticisms against the Historical School of Economics clearly demonstrated his neo-Kantian position in the methodological controversy. In rejecting isolated abstraction as the means of comprehending reality, Weber maintained that Roscher was ignorant of the problems contained in explaining history by means of laws. Weber argued:

> Roscher's problem is not to clarify the irrationality of reality, which struggles against being subordinated under laws, but to explain the organic unity of historical social coherences which must remain in principle unexplained (Weber, [1922] 1951:35).

Weber ([1906] 1975:66-67) argued that both Savigny and the members of the Historical School of Economics failed in their search for the respective evolutionary laws inherent in human history. Their methodology has been abandoned by recent legal and economic theory. Roscher's explanations are just as unacceptable as Hegel's and his methodology is ambiguous and the results of his historical investigations are incomplete. For Weber ([1922] 1951:36), the characteristic feature of Roscher's methodology is that enormous confusion results from his failure to distinguish clearly between concepts as such and their content. Roscher's efforts terminate in a sort of organic conception of social and economic history which borders on Hegelian emanatism. His attempt to comprehend reality by

postulating universal laws which are discovered in empirical reality is incompatible with Weber's method and philosophy of life. Roscher failed to realize, according to Weber, the Hegelian theory of the transcendence of the limits of discursive knowledge because of his religious inclination in interpreting social reality. For Roscher, the ultimate and maximally abstract laws of events--the most general laws--constitute "ideas of God". Natural laws are orders of God. Weber ([1906] 1975:71) argued that Roscher's agnosticism as regards the rationality of reality was derived from the religious ideas.

Weber ([1906] 1975:80-81) points out that there is a fundamental contradiction between Roscher's philosophy of history and his methodology. Roscher's intention was to find out "in what conceptual form the relationship between the individual economic institutions and the social organization can be analyzed". In Roscher's view, this can be done only on the basis of certain assumptions concerning the psychological basis of the action of individuals. Weber argued that if Roscher's aim is to understand the socio-economic life on the basis of psychological motives and emotions, he must focus his investigations on the constant influence of non-economic factors on economic factors. Yet, for Roscher, the basic scientific task of economics is to formulate economic laws. Thus, Weber argued that if an abstract analytical account is abandoned in favour of an account of the concrete reality of life, there is no basis for the development of an abstract nomological knowledge. Weber argues that Roscher could not understand this basic contradiction in his methodology because he bypassed this problem by means of an extremely simple individual psychology upon which his research is based.

Weber rejected Knies's conception of "freedom of will" as an unscientific assumption that can never be proved by empirical research. Following Herman Helmholtz's (a German natural scientist) classification of sciences, Knies distinguished between the natural sciences and the social sciences on the basis of differences of the objects of investigation. In order to deduce the method of economics from the problems it investigates, Knies identifies a third group of sciences--the "historical sciences". These disciplines, according to Knies, investigate

external phenomena that are causally dependent upon human "mental" events. Human behaviour, according to Knies, is influenced by two factors: the determined "forces" of the laws of nature and the "freedom of the will". Weber ([1906] 1975:97) argued that in the natural sciences as well as in the historical sciences, human necessity and the "free will" have been misunderstood. Human necessity has often been referred to the nomological regularities, while the "free will" has been characterized as "concrete" and, therefore, irrational. Thus, irrationality is the peculiar status of the socio-cultural sciences. Weber argued that this is an elementary error, which is by no means peculiar to the work of Knies. Many historians have repeatedly discussed this problem, as they attributed the unpredictability of human conduct to the "freedom of will".

On the contrary, Weber argued that the rationality of which end-result is predictable, stems from the sense of freedom, a feeling of the absence of constraint by emotional elements. Human experience of concrete reality, according to Weber ([1906] 1975:120-21), contains elements of "calculability" and "predictability" peculiar to human conduct. Although every remark that we make in conversations with others does not depend upon absolute certainty and unambiguity, it does depend upon a form of calculability which is sufficient for the purpose of prediction in the socio-cultural sciences. Calculability and predictability are, according to Weber, inherent qualities of the social scientific analysis, and from the logical point of view, they are not fundamentally different from the statistical computations employed in the natural science. In both cases, there is an adequate empirically attainable degree of precision. Weber ([1906] 1975:122) argued that "even if we abstract from our values, it simply is not the case that human action is in any objective sense more irrational than natural process". If the irrationality of human action is a result of the "freedom of will", Weber says, we should expect the sense of freedom to be associated primarily with irrational actions, those involving emotional outbreaks and the like. On the contrary, however, the reverse is much more nearly true. It is when we act most rationally that we feel most free, and the given end rational action is to an eminent degree both predictable and

subject to analysis in terms of general concepts (c.f. Parsons, 1937:467-469).

CRITIQUE OF STAMMLER

In Weber's essay on Rudolf Stammlers Uberwindung der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung (Rudolf Stammler's the Overcoming of Historical Materialism), we find interesting criticisms on Stammler's thesis. Stammler tried to overcome historical materialism scientifically by postulating its antithesis:

> History is nothing more than a product of the religious attitudes and struggles of mankind. In the final analysis, all the phenomena of cultural life--and especially the phenomena of political and economic life--are simply consequences of religious interest and attitudes. All events, even political and economic events, are ultimately reflections of the specific attitudes which men adopt on religious issues (cited by Weber, [1907] 1977:62).

Weber maintains that Stammler attempts to interpret social and economic history, just as Marx does, from one limited point of view. He selected the religious element of life as the real, ultimate, and only basis of all social processes just as Marx had previously selected the material-economic factor. For Weber, Stammler's effort was just as unattainable as historical materialism. The thesis that the totality of social events is determined in the last instance by religious motives is itself unfounded and is, moreover, a hypothesis incompatible with established facts (Weber, [1907] 1977:64-65). Stammler argued that research in a limited field has no purpose unless oriented to a general law and undertaken in relation to an ultimate point of view. In contrast, Weber argued that:

> Both the ordering of facts into a concrete whole and the abstraction of laws from facts often take place from very definite point of view. Indeed, the division of labour among the special sciences depends on this principle. It would, however, be out of the question to speak of one point of departure for the totality of the empirical disciplines (Weber, [1907] 1977:73).[24]

Weber criticised Stammler for identifying "nomological regularity" with a "uniform problematic", which can be ascribed for all sciences. Weber points out that the differential and multiple "problematics" in terms of which a variety of social scientific disciplines conceive reality is a distinguishing feature of the social sciences (Weber, [1907] 1977:73).

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[24] I have changed the translation, see: Weber's Wissenschaftslehre, [1922] 1951:303.

According to Stammler (cited by Weber, [1907] 1977:74-77), the "ultimate nomological regularity of social life emanates in the fundamental conception of the relation between the individual and the totality". Weber points out that Stammler is confused in his analysis and the use of scientific terminology. Stammler's book is certainly not free from the attempt to produce "sensation", in particular, the sensation of "suspense". The careful reader, Weber maintains, is thereby pressed to the disagreeable conclusion that Stammler was not unaware of the ambiguity in his use of expressions like "nomological regularity" and "universal validity". Weber believed that the ambiguity of Stammler's thesis is a consequence of the idiosyncratic style of the dogmatist and his strong belief in the cosmic law, which is the basis of his thesis. Hence, Stammler failed to see the logical inconsistency between "dogma" and "science".

Weber ([1907] 1977:102) rejected Stammler's argument that "social scientific inquiry is concerned with phenomena which function according to rules". Weber stated that "rule" is an abstraction from the natural process, and it is different from the concept of "empirical regularity" according to which socio-cultural facts are evaluated. The empirical regularity is a causal consequence of an attempt to achieve "ideal typical" models. The empirical facts, according to Weber ([1907] 1977:106), can be observed against such "ideal typical" models, which entail propositions concerning any given phenomenon or action. It is a teleological standard which presupposes purposive conduct as an "ideal". However, this ideal rule is a heuristic principle, that can be employed to discover the actual causal conditions for the given empirical conduct. We employ such ideal typical constructions, Weber argued, as hypothetical situations, which must be verified in order to determine whether it agrees with the empirical facts. Such ideal typical constructions are useful in answering the question: what are the empirical causes responsible for the person's conduct and to what extent does his conduct approximate its ideal typical representation?

Weber's criticisms of Stammler are very sarcastic and often unsubstantiated, a tactic he criticised in many other writers. However, Weber later apologized to Stammler for the severity of his criticisms (Weber, [1922] 1951:575). In The Critique of Stammler, Weber

discussed a number of methodological concepts including Verstehen (understanding), Bedeutung (meaning) and ideal types in order to refute Stammler's thesis.[25] Weber discussed the same concept to a great extent even in the Roscher and Knies essay (Weber, [1906] 1975:154, 157-158, 185-186). In both of these essays, Weber's main purpose was to refute the methodological ideas of the positivists and the Historical School of Economics, which dominated the Methodenstreit during that period.[26]. Therefore, it is incorrect to believe that there is a basic unity of Weber's methodological writings, as Dieter Henrich has argued. There is no particular advantage of assuming that Weber's methodological writings are systematically interconnected, in the sense that later writings are simply based on the earlier methodological remarks. Weber did not pay much attention to the way he presented his arguments, and the same methodological concepts were discussed even in volume one of Economy and Society ([1922] 1978), and Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ([1922] 1947). Weber analysed many interrelated problems simultaneously, and without completing the previous argument, he would start to write on a new problem. It was sufficient for him if his thought had been expressed with rigor and precision. It was only by making such self limitations that he could complete them at all.

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[25]Because Weber repeatedly discussed the same methodological concepts in these two essays, Guy Oakes, the translator of the Roscher and Knies essay (1-49), argued that Weber's later methodological writings rest mainly on the thesis that he developed in the Roscher and Knies monograph. This idea was first introduced by Dieter Henrich (1952), who argued that there is a fundamental consistency of Weber's methodological writings, and the conclusions that he reached in the Roscher and Knies essay constitute premises on which all his subsequent methodological work rests. Therefore, Henrich maintains that Weber's methodological writings are a well organized and systematic project that he completed during the period between 1903 and 1917. However, it seems that Henrich has exaggerated some similarities of Weber's earlier and later writings to show that there is a basic unity throughout Weber's methodological writings. The critique of Stammler contains Weber's most extensive analysis of the Verstehen thesis which he recognized as the fundamental methodological criterion of the social sciences.

[26]Talcott Parsons argues that Weber had to begin with combating two European philosophical traditions, namely "positivism" and German "idealism". He accepted the subjective interpretation combined with a critical attack on the "historical" position. His basic "thesis in this connection is that generalized theoretical categories are as essential to the proof of causal relationships in the human and cultural field as they are in the natural sciences (Weber, [1922] 1947:8-9, Parsons introduction)

Weber's position in the Methodenstreit is basically consonant with the neo-Kantian school, particularly with Rickert. Weber's ideas on methodological issues are nearly identical with those of Rickert and Windelband. He believed that Rickert and Simmel had made some important discoveries about the nature of explanatory techniques in the social inquiry. Like Rickert, Weber ([1922] 1949:105-106) argued that all knowing must involve conceptualization, and its establishment must be based on the human intellect.[27] Therefore, the acquisition of scientific knowledge is subject to certain limits imposed by our experience (Burger, 1976:60). Like Rickert, Weber ([1922] 1951:64-66, 171) argued that "reality is a manifold realm; the vast concreteness of its individuality can never be totally grasped by systematic and abstract concepts. However, all scientific disciplines must, directly or indirectly, make use of concepts, and that such concepts can encounter only a part of the concrete reality". Therefore, in Weber's opinion, there is no scientific discipline which can justify the claim that its concepts illustrate reality because they represent only selections from concrete reality. The logical formulation of the difference between the nomological sciences and the sciences of concrete reality that Weber accepted as the basis for the methodological demarcation was originally developed by Rickert. However, Weber was careful to avoid Rickert's theory of idiographic selection and his complex speculation on the subject of the cultural disciplines. Weber preferred to maintain the old distinction (based on subject matter) between natural science and the socio-cultural sciences, and he was more cautious than Rickert in delimiting the role of value judgments in social analysis (Ringer, 1969:331).

Weber's analysis of the formation of concepts and their limits as well as his understanding of the essence of the historical point of view, does not significantly diverge from Rickert's views; but one can see a shift of emphasis in Weber's arguments. The methods of natural science are only briefly discussed by Weber as a separate subject; and in Roscher

[27]Raymond Aron (1964:48) maintains that Weber's theory is pre-eminently a synthesis. Between Hegel and Rickert, between the interpretation of evolution and the logic of science, Weber introduces empirical propositions, of a very general character, concerning the various spheres of historical reality. Further, he attempts a conciliation between the philosophers of progress (Kant or Hegel) and the theorists of a historical morphology (Spengler), which would result in a real synthesis.

and Knies ([1906] 1975:120-132), in which Rickert's influence on Weber becomes evident, Weber's theoretical and methodological arguments are mere repetitions of the Rickert's thesis that natural science extracts its individuality from reality and seeks to reduce it to general and quantitative formulas. Weber found Rickert's thesis of the individuality of historical interest as convenient way to interpret the subject matter of the cultural sciences, and he identifies this individual and qualitative reality with the concrete and diverse nature of reality. However, Weber was very cautious of using Rickert's thesis that historical interest is based on the individual character of phenomena because Weber ([1922] 1951:67) believed that the essential part of reality is identical with the sum of regularities and general qualities of its characters.

Following Rickert, Weber argued that the purpose of the social scientific analysis is to understand the distinctive character of social reality. He defines social science and it methodology as follows:

> The social sciences which we treat here are sciences of reality. We wish to understand the distinctive character of the reality of life which surrounds us and in which we are placed; the coherence and social meaning of its present form on the one hand, and on the other hand, the explanation of its particular historical evolution and why this evolution has taken place as it has done and in no other ways (Weber, [1922] 1951:170).

How is an understanding of empirical reality possible? Reality presents us with an inconceivable and immeasurable multiplicity of objects and events. How can we comprehend their meaning and grasp their significance in the social order? Weber maintains that no objective criteria adheres to events in reality. In and of themselves they have no meaning. Nor are we acquainted with ultimate factors or universal laws by means of which we could interpret empirical reality. Weber ([1922] 1951:161) argues that the quality of an event as a socio-cultural phenomenon is not something that adheres objectively to it as such. It is determined rather by the character of our intellectual interest which ensues from the specific cultural meaning which we bestow upon the phenomenon in question in each case. Following Lask's theory of irrationality of concrete reality, Weber contended that there is no individual science capable of furnishing an authentic "copy" of reality. The utmost that can be accomplished by such sciences, either in the historical or the social disciplines, is through

reasoned thought, to bring order into the world of reality, which is in a state of ceaseless flux. The principles of classification by which this order is to be achieved, cannot, however, draw upon reality, but must be imposed by the scientist himself. Therefore, no scientific inquiry can claim that it represents the "totality" of any given portion of reality. The "individuality" inherent in every phenomena of reality can never be totally accomplished; it is not a possible object of scientific inquiry.

Weber believed that the domain of the socio-cultural is composed of understandable and, thus, meaningful human conduct. Independent of human evaluation there are no such things as social and economic processes. There exist events only to which we give social and economic meanings and values by our own interest in them (Wertbeziehung). Our ideas of values determine the specific character of events in empirical reality. Socio-cultural facts are defined by reference to their "subjective meaning". As Weber ([1906] 1975:185) described it, "an item qualifies as a socio-cultural fact because and insofar as it can mean something to us". A socio-cultural phenomenon is, therefore, a possible object of interpretation. In socio-cultural sciences, our criteria for causal explanation are not generally valid elements of phenomena, but they are common values attached to the social phenomena which influence human behaviour. In an attempt to analyse causally any given phenomenon we try to understand the subjectively meaningful human conduct. Thus our criterion of social inquiry is not a process of quantitative reduction of phenomena, but a qualitative understanding of meaningful action from the point of view of the actor. Weber described this distinctive feature of socio-cultural knowledge as follows:

> As regards the interpretation of human conduct, we can at least in principle, set ourselves the goal not only of representing it as possible-comprehensible in the sense of being consistent with our nomological knowledge, but also we can attempt to understand it (Weber, [1906] 1975:125).

The socio-cultural sciences have a distinctive theoretical goal which is different from that of establishing a set of deductive nomological laws. This theoretical goal is an interpretive understanding (Verstehen) of the distinctive properties of the meaningful socio-cultural problems which are by no means analogous to the properties of natural phenomena.

Despite the many similarities of the methodological arguments of Weber and those of Rickert, Simmel and Dilthey, Weber's ideas marked a radical shift in the direction of the controversy. With his training in sociology, history, economics and law, Weber was able to address the methodological problems from an empirical viewpoint. His methodological essays are replete with concrete examples flowing easily from the reservoir of his universal erudition. Weber's methodological arguments went beyond the natural boundaries of neo-Kantian philosophy. In his criticisms of the Historical School, Weber demonstrated an outstanding grip of the methodological problems and discussed the whole issue of methods purely from the point of view of empirical science. In the Objectivity of the Social Sciences, he treated the question of values as a practical problem of the academic community rather than a philosophical question. A great deal of methodological clarification of this problem was discussed with regard to University teachings in Germany. For Weber, value judgments are "practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena" (Weber, [1922] 1949:11). Although, for Rickert, this was simply a logical problem, Weber recognized the enormous practical relevance of this particular problem. "What is really at issue", Weber argued, "is the intrinsically simple demand that the investigator and teacher could keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts and his own practical evaluations" (Weber, [1922] 1949:11). As he put it more succinctly, "I hold that a lecture is different from a speech". Weber's clarification of value free inquiry and his denunciation of personal bias were aimed at the prophets of the "Ideas of 1914", which were produced "by dilettantes" (Weber, [1922] 1949:47). Weber was referring here to Paul Natorp and other ultra-nationalistic intellectuals who were using a warped interpretation of history to preach Germany's cultural mission from their academic pulpits. Their lectures had become speeches and thus abused the academic positions for political opportunities (Willey, 1978:1964).

In order to understand the immense differences between the methodological arguments of Weber and his contemporary philosophers, it is important to discuss these methodological concepts separately. Otherwise Weber's true contribution to the methodological controversy

would remain in the shadow of the neo-Kantian philosophy. While it is true that the original ideas of Weber's methodological arguments were developed by the neo-Kantian philosophers, in Weber's writings those philosophical concepts were reinterpreted from the perspectives of empirical science. For instance, the method of Verstehen was originally defined by Dilthey and Simmel as a method of understanding the "inner motives" of the acting individual. Therefore, according to Dilthey and Simmel, the social action must be understood in terms of the "inner-reasons" of the acting individuals. On the contrary, the Verstehen was defined by Weber in terms of the "subjective meaning" of social action. In sociological analysis, according to Weber, only meaningful actions can be understood, and thus, emotional and tradjtional actions are marginal to the sociological analysis. His definition of the Verstehen in terms of subjective meaning is consistent with his typology of action and the philosophy of history. For Weber, the sociology was no longer the philosophy of human existence. It is the particular science of human behaviour and its consciousness. These distinctive approaches to the theory of interpretation would be further discussed in the following chapter. First, I will discuss Weber's interpretation of subjective meaning and its implications in his typology of action. This would delineate Weber's neo-Kantian position and his opposition to incorporate the Verstehen with Geist. Second, Alfred Schutz's criticisms of Weber's interpretive sociology will be discussed in order to show some of the limitations of Weber's Verstehende Soziologie.

V. UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJECTIVE MEANING: MAX WEBER'S VERSTEHENDE SOZIOLOGIE

In much of the secondary literature (e.g. Wrong, 1970; Aron, 1964; Friedmann, 1974), the notion of Verstehen is often treated as a novel feature of Max Weber's methodology of the social sciences. While this view is not entirely incorrect, insofar as it takes into account the significant contribution Weber made toward improving this notion, it is certainly incomplete because it tends to overlook the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. As, for the most part, Weber's methodological ideas were originally developed by neo-Kantians, the genesis of the notion of Verstehen must be found in the work of Dilthey and Simmel. As a matter of fact, Weber ([1922] 1951:92-93) himself acknowledged that "the most developed logical account of a theory of 'Verstehen' may be found in the second edition of Simmel's The Problems of the Philosophy of History ... Simmel should first of all receive all the credit for establishing within the wide range of possible contents of the word 'Verstehen'... a clear distinction between objectively understanding the meaning of a message and subjectively interpreting the motives of the talking or acting person". However, long before Simmel, the concept of Verstehen as a method of Geisteswissenschaften was developed by Dilthey, who argued that systematic generalizing social science can be developed on the basis of Verstehen and Erklären--understanding and causal explanation (Tuttle, 1969:1-2).

According to Dilthey, the methodological significance of Verstehen rests on four assumptions: (1) Understanding is a common process of everyday life (2) It is important as a source of even the most elementary knowledge of human beings (3) It is a unique process which cannot be derived from or replaced by another and (4) It is an essential part of the methods of human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) which differentiates them from the natural sciences (Rickman, 1979:74-75). The term "understanding" in the ordinary usage implies grasping what people say or write or, perhaps, convey by other means such as gestures or symbolic expressions. For Dilthey, Verstehen has basically the same meaning. It is an essential part of human behaviour; like all the other basic cognitive processes, understanding

is a part of everyday human life. It is not a specialized technique, not something invented by philosophers or social scientists. Therefore, it is a unique method which cannot be derived from or replaced by any other cognitive process. Dilthey defined the method of Verstehen as a methodological device which gives access to the psychological reality.

Like Dilthey, Simmel used the term Verstehen purely from a psychological point of view. Simmel, in his The Problems of the Philosophy of History argues that "no matter what method of verification we choose, we would not ascribe what we call truth to these constructs unless we could understand the mental acts which they putatively identify". The first condition for this kind of understanding is that "we must be able to recreate the mental act of the historical person...we must be able to occupy or inhabit the mind of the other person" (Simmel, [1905] 1977:64-65). Simmel believed that the process of communication or meaningful interaction is a direct relationship between the speaker and the listener. As soon as fundamental differences between two parties arise with regard to ideas, then the content of communication is either misunderstood or incomprehensible. Simmel distinguished the objective understanding of the meaning from the subjective interpretation of the motive of the actor. In the first case, speech is the object of understanding, while in the other, the speaker or actor is the subject matter. The objective understanding, according to Simmel, becomes evident when we are concerned with theoretical knowledge of substantive matters. In analysing substantive data we try to develop theoretical propositions that can explain similar situations. On the other hand, in the subjective understanding we try to put ourselves into "the spoken word and try to produce the mental process of the speaker". Simmel's interpretation of Verstehen emphasized the psychological dimension of this method. He believed that life can only be understood in terms of life, and it divides itself for this purpose into levels of which one mediates the understanding of the others and their interdependence expresses the unity of life.

Max Weber is known to many social scientists as the founder of the Verstehende Soziologie. His emphasis on the subjective meaning of social action is usually identified with

the concept of Verstehen. Hence, Dennis Wrong (1970:22) argued that the "concept of Verstehen is the link between Weber's methodological reflections on the social sciences and his general sociological concepts" (emphasis is mine). Talcott Parsons, in a long footnote in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Weber, [1922] 1947:88-89), elaborates Weber's two major methodological concepts such as Verstehen and Handeln along with a number of other concepts that Weber employed in his writings. Parsons points out that the most appropriate English equivalent to Verstehen is "understanding of subjective meaning". The term Handeln is translated as "action". Parsons argues that Weber used these two terms together because they are directly related to one another. By amalgamating these two terms Verstehen is commonly defined as "understanding of subjective meaning of social action".

Hence, for Weber the understanding of subjective meaning or Verstehen, is possible only insofar as such actions have subjective meanings attached to them by the acting individuals. Weber ([1922] 1951:12-13) maintained that the "course of human action and human expressions of every sort are open to interpretation in terms of meaning" (Sinnvolle Deutung). Unlike Simmel and Dilthey, Weber was not concerned with the "inner" motives of the actor, but with the meaning of the action as it is understood by the acting individuals. As Weber ([1922] 1947:90) put it, "one need not have been Caesar in order to understand Caesar". Weber criticised Simmel for using a psychological approach to Verstehen. He argued that Simmel has obscured the method of subjective understanding of action by mixing it with psychological variables of human behaviour: "I doubt that this psychological description of the logical character of this sort of understanding is sufficiently precise" (Weber, [1906] 1975:153). For the verifiable accuracy of an interpretation of meaning of a phenomenon, empathic participation is not an essential condition. To identify a socio-cultural phenomenon is to understand its meaning. An object becomes qualified for interpretive understanding as long as it has meaning to our socio-cultural interest.

In his definition of sociology, Weber ([1922] 1947:88) argues that "sociology is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action...". Then Weber

explains what he means by social action. In action Weber includes "all human behaviour insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it". However, Weber does not include all actions in his definition of sociology, but only social actions that result from the meaningful interaction between two or more individuals. Weber considered social actions as the subject matter of the sociology. Hence, the method of Verstehen, as Weber employed it in his sociology, can comprehend meaningful social actions in terms of both highly rational intellectual grasp and empathic participation. The basis of verifiable accuracy and clarity in the method of meaningful understanding can be either rational or emotional. Therefore, according to Weber, Verstehende Soziologie is an empirical science because Verstehen has direct reference to the meaning of an action rather than to its form. The knowledge that we are interested in, in social scientific analysis, according to Weber, is an empirical science of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft).

> The type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality. Our aim is the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationship and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations, and on the other hand, the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise (Weber, [1922] 1949:72).

Thus, our purpose is to understand the characteristic uniqueness of reality. The relationship between individual events and their cultural significance in any given context becomes meaningful for social scientists because they have their focus on the embodiment of cultural values in concrete events and phenomena. Meaningful and understandable elements make up a prominent part in any historical description. Therefore, according to Weber ([1922] 1949:72), "understanding" is the specific aim of historical sciences. But it is neither a logical operation nor a method of abstraction. He opposed Simmel's psychological reductionism and believed that the empirical approach to social phenomenon guided by the "theoretical" value interest. The elements of reality that must be included in the analysis are determined by the relevance of the values of the observer. Only what is value relevant and, thus, important for our theoretical interest can be understood. Only in this sense is Verstehen the specific aim of the historical sciences. To justify why it is worth knowing is irrelevant to the Verstehen

method, and it is primarily based on the value interest of the observer. According to Weber, every attempt at a psychological interpretation of social events has shown that an analysis of social institutions in terms of psychological variables as a starting point of the individual social behaviour is neither appropriate nor adequate. On the contrary, Weber argued that the psychological interpretations presuppose an acquaintance with social institutions and their objective causal conditions. One can never "deduce social institutions from psychological laws or explain them from elemental psychological process" (Weber, [1922] 1951:189).

All human behaviour, as a matter of fact, has a subjective aspect, and in order to understand it we do not have to proceed with our investigations from the "inner" state of the acting individuals. A sociological explanation shows how human behaviour is determined by the interpretation or definition of meaning attributed to an objective situation by the acting individuals. It arrives at an understanding of social behaviour not by deriving it or reducing it to elementary psychological facts, but by explaining what concrete subjective expectations have been held with respect to the behaviour of others, based on personal experience (Abel, 1965:128). He points out that the explanatory understanding, which involves the process of motives of the actor, aims to comprehend specific emotional circumstances under which the particular action takes place. He argues that many of the emotionally-prompted actions are irrational, or at least their causes are irrational. In such actions, the observer can understand only the "intended meaning" because the origin of such actions is not clear. Therefore, logical proofs are not available for such actions as nobody exactly knows whether such intended meaning "really" exists. Hence, Weber proposed to formulate an operational concept which can provide scientifically important observations. The test of validity of the observations is not whether their object is immediately clear to the common sense, but whether the results of these technical observations can be satisfactorily organized and related to those of others in a systematic body of knowledge (Parsons, 1947:96n). Weber argued that:

> Every science of psychological and social phenomena is a science of human conduct (which includes all thought and attitudes). These sciences seek to "understand" this conduct and by means of this understanding to "explain" it "interpretatively". ... The means employed by the method of "understanding explanation" are not

> normative correctness, but rather, on the one hand, the conventional habits of the investigator. ... and on the other hand, as the situation requires, his capacity to "feel himself" empathically into a mode of thought which deviates from his own and which is normatively "false" according to his own habits of thought. The fact that "error" is, in principle, just as accessible to the understanding as "correct" thinking proves that we are concerned here with the normatively "correct" type of validity, not as such but only as an especially easily understandable conventional type (Weber, [1922] 1949:40-41).

The empirical validity or the correctness of the knowledge of any given event cannot be determined in terms of the particular quality of the material subjected to investigation or by the ontological differences of its existence. Empirical knowledge, whether in the realm of the mental (Geist) or external nature, is always bound to apply conceptual models in terms of theoretical value interest. Weber persistently objected to any attempt to incorporate Verstehende Soziologie with any other scientific method or discipline. Although, he was primarily concerned with human behaviour, he clearly distinguished his method of understanding from psychology[21] which was recognized as a science of human behaviour. His objection to establishing sociology on the basis of psychology or mixing the two sciences together, as Simmel and Dilthey wanted to do, is based on several facts. Weber associated psychology with naturalism and grouped it among the natural sciences. His whole effort was to develop social sciences independently from the natural scientific method. Weber opposed the natural science of the socio-cultural world. Thus, the aim of his sociology is to understand the subjective meaning of social conduct. He was interested in the empirical meaning, whether it is the actual historical meaning of the conduct or that meaning postulated in a pure type by the researcher. In history, according to Weber, we seek to ascertain the actual meaning of conduct in any given historical period, while in sociology we try to understand the average and approximate, constructed, intended meaning of individual behaviour. The border line between meaningful and meaningless conduct fluctuates. Individuals bestow some meaning, no doubt,

[21]Raymond Aron (1970:85) points out that Weber refused to regard psychology as the basic discipline of the cultural sciences because he considered that psychology has very little value to the historian. The aim of psychology is to establish laws. The general propositions to which the historian has recourse are, in Weber's view, those of the "wisdom of nation" or of common sense which it would be pedantic to formulate.

upon every act in which they take part, and each act is composed of either meaningful or meaningless components of behaviour. However, it is the task of sociologists whose purpose is to understand the subjective meaning of such actions to distinguish the meaningful action from the meaningless behaviour.

How can sociologists understand and interpret the subjective meaning of social action? What makes human conduct meaningful to sociologists? According to We[illegible] ([1922] 1947:90-91), the sociologist must strive for evidence, i.e., the basis for certainty as in other sciences. The evidence is either (1) rational and, if so, it could be either logical or mathematical; or (2) intuitively relivable, emotionally receptive. "Rationally evident" is that the action which can be clearly and completely understood as evidence as in the axiom of 2x2=4. Such self-evident conduct is limited. However, self-evident rationally-oriented action, in which the acting individual selects proved, reckonizable means to attain self-postulated purposes, possesses the highest degree of evidence or certainty even though it be empirical and not axiomatic. "Intuitively evident" is that action which is able to fully relieve in reality, in fancy or imagination. This type of evidence is insignificant as they are quite apart from the Weltanschuungen (philosophies of life) of both the acting individual as well as the observer. These are the two methods of obtaining evidence. When they fail, conduct remains incomprehensible and will not be included in the Verstehende Soziologie.

THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS IN SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY

According to Weber, the fundamental unit of sociological inquiry is individual conduct. The conduct is endowed with meaning by the individual actors as they orient themselves with regard to the conduct of others (Weber, [1922] 1947:88-102). Human conduct, in Weber's opinion, as the locus of both meaning and social relations, is the subject matter of sociological inquiry. All social institutions, groups, and classes as well as the development of any of these, are therefore, thought constructs, which serve as useful methodological propositions for the analysis of social phenomena:

> For sociological purposes there is no such thing as a collective personality which "acts". When reference is made in sociological context to a state, a nation, a corporation, a family or an army corps, or similar collectivities, what is meant is ... only a certain kind of development of actual or possible social actions of individual persons (Weber, [1922] 1947:102).

When we consider such notions, for instance, as the "political system" or "state", we simply refer to a possible thought construct. Therefore, an investigation, which would seek to ascertain the causal relations between the political system and the scientific development of a given historical period, would have to show this causal relation in individual conduct. Thus Weber, in his analysis of sociological concepts in volume one of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, attempts to account for all social configurations of human history in terms of individual conduct. The concept of collectivities, in this context, has meaning only as a methodological device (Weber, [1922] 1978:6-8). From the sociological point of view collectivities have empirical reference in the sense that the individual acts with reference to others and gives meanings to the actions of others. Therefore, according to Weber, collectivities must be treated as the subjects of rights and duties or as the performers of socially significant actions (Weber, [1922] 1947:101). Further, since it is the task of the social sciences to penetrate the subjective understanding of the individual (Verstehen) to get at the motives for social action, social scientific analysis differs from that undertaken by natural science. Weber ([1922] 1947:92-94) argued that "we do not try to understand the behaviour of cells or the movement of the planets. We observe the structure of the cells and the motion of the stars and then try to formulate general laws about structure and motion. We the observers, impose our own explanations upon these phenomena by the application of our own concepts and categories".

However, some critics have argued that the reduction of collectivities to individual conduct tends to disregard the importance of social bonds and collective sentiments within social groups (Schutz, [1932] 1967). This seems to be an empty charge, because Weber did take into account the basis of social cohesion and how the collectivities can be constituted by individual conduct. According to Weber, the aggregation of individuals into an institutional structure or a collective mode of behaviour is based on the logical consequences of specific

action patterns of separate individuals. An example of this is his general treatment of domination, specifically bureaucracy based on legal rational action (Friedmann, 1974). For Weber, an interpretation of such mass phenomena requires an abstraction from complex ideas and motivations of those elements. This abstraction is called an "ideal type", i.e., the typical meaning which as a shared individual attribute, defines a set of actors (Weber, [1922] 1951:78).

However, this interpretation itself creates some methodological problems which never received Weber's attention. For example, if the collectivities can be understood on the basis of abstract models derived from complex motives and sentiments of the individual actors, what would become of the Verstehen approach in sociology? On Weber's accounts, however, it is possible to assume that insofar as the Verstehen method is concerned, the personal motives and subjective meanings of individual actors are no longer relevant to the conduct of collectivities (Parkin, 1982). Thus ideal types enable us to think about collectivities in a way that can be generalized about rather than particularized. Therefore, only individual conduct and their subjective perceptions are the very subject matter of Verstehende Soziologie (Weber, [1922] 1947:101-102,146). Weber maintains that only the conduct of individuals, as it is oriented toward others, is a social fact, i.e., a datum which can be empirically ascertained. The collectivities, in Weber's view, are inferred from such data, and the meanings of such collectivities are solely based on the perception of individual actors. Therefore, on this ground Weber denied that collectivities have meanings apart from individual conduct (Weber, [1922] 1978:6-9).

However, these methodological restrictions Weber imposed on his sociological inquiry enabled him to bypass some interpretative limitations inherent in the cultural sciences. If the meaning of conduct is believed to have its origin only with the individual, it follows then that those types of conduct of which meaning is taken over from the socio-cultural environment are excluded from the analysis. Weber includes the "traditional" type of action patterns in his methodology as long as individual actors consciously endeavor to perpetuate certain traditional

value systems of the society, but not as far as it goes to the vast number of habitual activities of everyday life. Further, Weber ([1922] 1951:64) points out that "affective" or "emotionally expressive" conduct is likewise not consciously directed with meaning by the individual actors. Therefore, individual conduct becomes methodologically important only insofar as individual actors consciously behave towards the others in order to fulfil a task or order. For Weber, the rational mode of behaviour plays a central role methodologically as well as substantively. The philosophical and historical background of this view can be found in Weber's criticisms of the idealistic theory of Karl Knies, who argued that irrational human action is a result of the "freedom of will". On the contrary, Weber ([1922] 1951:1-145) pointed out that when we act more rationally we feel more free, and the outcome of such actions are both predictable and subject to analysis in terms of general concepts. Weber believed that rational human conduct is a result of the human freedom which includes, not only civil and political liberty, but also an exemption from cultural and emotional obligations. Therefore, he considered traditional and affective types of behaviour patterns as "marginal" because it is difficult to see the exact meaning of such conduct:

> For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, affectually determined elements of behaviour as factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action (Weber, [1922] 1978:6).

In this respect, Weber's interpretation of human conduct seems to have ~~two major~~ consequences in his methodology:

1. Weber was interested in rational individual conduct as a "criterion" or "model" of the sociological explanation whereby subjective understanding can occur. Thus, he places rational action above all other kinds of actions.
2. The sociological concepts with which Weber was concerned are, therefore, those of an empirical explanatory science that attempts a causal explanation of the consequences of social action.

However, Weber acknowledged that it is not possible to draw a sharp distinction between meaningful action and merely reactive behaviour which has no subjective meaning.

All sociologically relevant traditional actions are marginal to both subjectively meaningful and merely reactive actions. But for the purpose of meaningful interpretation the construction of a purely rational course of action serves the sociologist as an ideal type which has the merit of clarity and unambiguity. By comparing with such ideal typical models of rational actions, we can understand the ways in which actual action is influenced by all sorts of irrational factors under different circumstances. For this reason, according to Weber ([1922] 1978:6), the method of sociology is rational, although sociology itself does not advocate the idea that human life is exclusively constituted by predominantly rational elements. As Alfred Schutz ([1932] 1967:240) pointed out, sociology can claim no monopoly on the rational method. The methodologies of all true sciences are rational, involving the use of formal logic and interpretive schemes. All true sciences demand the maximum of clarity and distinctiveness for all their propositions. There is no such thing as an irrational science. Thus, we must never cease reiterating that the method of Weber's sociology is a rational one and that the position of "interpretive sociology" should in no way be confused with that of Dilthey, who opposed rational science in favour of metaphysical presuppositions and incorrigible intuition.

Weber's understanding of "interpretive sociology" is associated with the neo-Kantian dualism between rational and irrational reasons. For Weber, to maintain this dualism was a convenient approach to social action, which he classified into four classes depending upon rational and irrational reasons. Thus, Weber argued that the rational action is an ideal type against which all actions can be understood. By imposing the rational action as the fundamental unit of social inquiry, Weber was able to overcome inherent difficulties of the social sciences. However, action theorists such as Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons believe that Weber has over simplified the complex and ramified area of the social action which needs further study. According to Schutz ([1932] 1967:8), Weber's interpretive sociology does not differentiate the action in progress from the completed act, and the meaning of the producer of a cultural object from the meaning of the object produced. He argued that Weber does not try to identify the fundamental relation between the "self" and "others", which is essential to

the understanding of the "subjective meaning" of action. Schutz maintains that Weber naively took for granted the meaningful phenomena of the social world as a matter of intersubjective agreement. He argues that it is the task of the social sciences to explain how meaningful social action is constituted in the social world. Schutz believes that this oversight by Weber is a serious mistake which jeopardizes the objectives of the social sciences. Therefore, he argues that the main objective of his Phenomenology is to rectify Weber's errors on this point.

According to Schutz, the problem in Weber's methodology is his self-imposed restrictions in the analysis of social action. He recognizes that the action must be distinguished from behaviour because the elements of an action are unified by interaction or "project" of the actor. In other words, the elements constituted as an action are unified by the subjective meaning given by the actor. Schutz agrees with Weber that the subjective meaning endowed by the actor for his action makes action "meaningful" and that the interpretation of this "subjective" meaning is the goal of the social sciences. But the problem in Weber's interpretation of subjective meaning, according to Schutz, is this: if the meaning of action is given by the actors, this meaning must be accessible to social scientists if they are to interpret subjective meaning. However, Weber does not explore the way in which subjective meaning is constituted; he does not go far enough to reveal how the subjective meaning is endowed by the social actors. Therefore, he believes that Weber's interpretation of subjective meaning is incomplete and cannot be completed without exploring the way in which the meaningful action is constituted. Weber does not make any attempt to fill this gap. According to Schutz, there are two major errors in Weber's interpretation of meaning: first of all, subjective meaning has two levels, one is the meaning constituted within the consciousness of the individual social actor; the other one is the meaning which is constituted in the process of social interaction. Weber does not distinguish these two levels of meaning and therefore he creates a serious difficulty in comprehending the subjective meaning. The second error in Weber's analysis, according to Schutz, is that both of these levels of meaning are constituted in the intersubjectivity. In other words, both levels of meaning stem from the shared

concepts. This intersubjectivity which provides meaning for social action must be accessible to social scientists. Weber does not clearly identify this intersubjectivity.

Schutz's criticisms essentially go beyond Weber, and they take into account his neo-Kantian position in the philosophy of social science. A full-scale analysis of Schutz's criticisms is not possible in the context of the present study. However, before we discuss some of the major problems in Schutz's criticisms, it must be noted that his distinction of meaning levels and the recognition of intersubjectivity as important in understanding subjective meaning is not without Schutz's own theoretical goals. Schutz, along with Parsons, has understood the impossibility of establishing, within strictly Weberian framework, general theories of action that uphold, in opposition to Marxism, the "subjective point of view" (Zaret, 1980:1189). The major obstacle to this theoretical goal in Weber's methodology is his neo-Kantian position--the relevance of values (Wertbeziehung) in social inquiry and the historical individuality of social phenomena that was presupposed by Weber. If these two presuppositions can be detached from Weber's methodology of the social sciences, Schutz believes, generalized social theory is possible. Thus, Schutz tried to redefine Weber's methodological arguments in order to meet his own theoretical objectives, which are not permitted within the methodological parameters of the neo-Kantian philosophy. Although all three theorists (Weber, Schutz and Parsons) believed that the essential feature of social life is to pursue "ends" that have meaning for actors, they significantly differed from each other in their methodological approaches to social action. Weber, as a neo-Kantian, insisted that identification of meaningful "ends" of action presupposes value-relevance--the selective criterion of the social scientist. Schutz tried to eliminate this presupposition from Weber's methodology and thus he developed an uncritical approach to social facts (the term uncritical is used here in Kantian sense). He argued that meaning originates in the process of interaction or intersubjectivity, not in the minds of individual actors. The units of social action are immediately presented to the observer in actor's accounts of their action. Thus the observer's value criterion cannot constitute possible objects of analysis. "It is methodologically

inadmissible to interpret a given series of acts as a unified sequence without any reference to a project and then ascribe to them a subjective meaning" (Schutz, [1932] 1967:216). Despite Weber's repeated claim, Schutz argued that Weber was not concerned with the subjective meaning of action but "with the external course of the act quite apart from any concern with the conscious experiences of actor" (Schutz, [1932] 1967:226-227). For Weber's theory of interpretive understanding, the relevance of values in social inquiry (Wertbeziehung) epistemologically justifies interpretive procedure. For Schutz, instead, the ontological descriptions of certain invariant features of consciousness guide the interpretive understanding. "The meaning structure of the social world can only be deduced from the most primitive and general characteristics of consciousness" such as the "internal time consciousness" in which meaning is constituted originally and in its most generic sense (Schutz, [1932] 1967:12-13).

Schutz's efforts to clarify Weber's concept of subjective meaning has been widely acknowledged as a valuable contribution to modern social theory. His interpretation of meaning constitution in the social world provided a new direction for the social scientists to develop action theory. Moreover, Schutz's study has provided the impetus for most of the studies which fall under "phenomenology". However, as far as Weber's methodological and epistemological objectives are concerned, Schutz's criticisms have little relevance to Weber. The fact is that the ontology of everyday life which underlies the general theory of action in Schutz's analysis is absolutely incompatible with Weber's methodology and so with the neo-Kantian philosophy. Any careful analysis of Weber's writings reveals that he believed Verstehen as an empirical tool of social inquiry. He was convinced that the subjective meaning of social action can be apprehended by the observer and, thus, meaning is a publicly accessible element of the social world. Such elements are included in our value systems of the social world and that values and meanings are inseparable. The meanings of the external world must include the notion of values as there is no "external" world unless it is tied together with what we attribute to it in terms of values in one world of experience. Therefore, at the outset,

it is assumed that the external world or noumenal character of phenomena are not accessible to the understanding; they are "things" in themselves. They can only be perceived by means of categories or values. Otherwise a phenomenon cannot become an object of analysis. The reference to values must enter into the construction of the cultural objects themselves, and their characterization depends on the specific viewpoint of the investigator. It is only by this means that a cultural object can be detached from the manifold reality. In this context, it is evident, that Weber's methodology can explain only selected aspects of reality. Particular concepts developed cannot represent reality but only accentuate already selected aspects of it. The construction and elaboration of particular concepts serve to explain a singular event or phenomenon and their systematic order in social reality. Further, it facilitates our understanding of the internal meaning of events and their adequate causation. Weber's method of ideal types too must be understood in light of this because the claim of cultural science to arrive at objectively valid empirical knowledge rests eventually on the possibility of constructing adequate concepts. The epistemological relationship between these three methodological techniques, i.e., the method of value relevance, adequate causation and ideal type, is the core of Weber's methodological writings.

VI. VALUE RELEVANCE (WERTBEZIEHUNG) AND IDEAL TYPES IN SOCIAL INQUIRY

Weber's idea of "objectivity in social science" has become a major issue in the modern social sciences. Weber initially developed this argument in opposition to the contemporary social sciences, and thus, in a sense as a critical tool for analyzing society. However, the basic tenets of this thesis came from Rickert's "absolute system of values", i.e., all scientific activities must presuppose some framework of meaning or values. Weber shared the neo-Kantian view that scientific interests are guided by the values of the scientists. In this sense, the initial orientation of a scientific project stems from the subjective interest; the scientist selects his problem of inquiry from a multitude of problems theoretically available to him within his field. This is the basic argument Rickert had developed long before Weber. As we have already seen, Rickert ([1910] 1962:19) distinguished social sciences from natural science on the basis of values. He argued that values are always attached to cultural objects which are the subject matter of the social sciences. In contrast, natural science does not conceive of the objects of nature as cultural objects; it views them as devoid of values. Therefore, Rickert argued, the presence or absence of relevance to values can be regarded as a reliable criterion for distinguishing between two kinds of scientific objects.

Weber basically accepted this neo-Kantian thesis and began his analysis of the cultural sciences by viewing empirical reality as an infinite and manifold realm attached to our cultural values. He argued that all historical sciences have a necessary orientation to values, which not merely influence the objectivity of social inquiry, but is the very principle that makes objectivity possible in the first place. Orientation to values, Weber believed, functions as a principle of selection whereby fragments of the succession of cultural events are endowed with a form of objectivity--becoming as a result, the subject matter of social inquiry. Thus, he maintained, "theoretical relation to values", as Rickert put it, does not solely interfere with the acquisition of objective knowledge, but it becomes an active subjective pre-condition which allows social scientists to acquire objective social scientific knowledge. Further, it

enables social scientists to detach themselves from social reality, itself considered "an infinite richness" by Weber--a definite object. This object is, therefore, constituted by reference to the values of the investigator.

Weber points out that the selection of a research problem is determined by the values or interest of the researcher (Weber, [1922] 1949:72; [1906] 1975:259). The value criterion of the cultural significance provides the selective point of view that creates discrete events out of an infinite flow of history (Zaret, 1980:1183). This is one of the basic tenets of the neo-Kantian philosophy which was accepted by Weber as a useful methodological criterion in the philosophy of the social sciences.

> ... valuation of the object in its individual particularity supplies the reason that the phenomenon becomes an object of reflection and of--at this point we will deliberately avoid saying "scientific"--intellectual treatment, that is, it becomes an object of interpretation... Interpretation can and does become first "value interpretation" (Wertinterpretation), i.e., it teaches us to "understand" the "meaningful" (geistig) content of [the phenomenon in question]...; it develops and raises to the level of articulate "valuation" that which "feel" dimly and vaguely. For this purpose, interpretation is not at all required to enunciate or to "suggest" a value judgment. What it actually "suggests" in the course of analysis is rather various possibilities of relating the object of values (Weber, [1922] 1949:143).

These values vary with changes in the historical situation and with the problem to which they give rise. New historical perspectives are, therefore, continuously arising. Weber declared that it is the distinctive task of social sciences to analyze phenomena in terms of their "cultural significance" (Weber, [1906] 1975:256, [1907] 1977:122). Hence, according to Weber, our cultural evaluations have a specific role in social analysis. Weber ([1922] 1947:159) contended that "without the investigator's evaluative ideas there can be no principle of selection of subject matters and no meaningful knowledge of concrete reality. Just as without the investigator's conviction regarding the significance of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyse concrete reality is absolutely meaningless; so the direction of his personal belief gives the direction to his work". Empirical reality thus becomes culture to us because, and insofar as we relate it to value concepts. Although our value-conditioned interest can conceive only a small portion of the existing reality, it alone is more important for us because it illustrates the relationship between our values and those specific aspects of concrete

reality. Thus we cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a "presuppositionless" investigation of empirical data. The perception of the meaningfulness for us is the presupposition of it becoming an object of our investigation (Weber, [1922] 1949:76).

Although our values enter into the determination of the problems which we would like to investigate, once given this initial determination, values should not play any further role in the relation between the knower and the object to be known. They do not, and methodologically cannot, interfere with the construction of the scientific object to be analyzed. These principles are absolute in the sense that we have no other way of knowing what is important to us. This is not a matter of techniques of research which ensure rigorous and inter-subjective criteria of investigation and proof, but it is a question of the epistemological foundation of scientific inquiry itself. This is the foundation that ensures scientific objectivity. Without this, not only would there be no such thing as objectivity, but science itself would be impossible:

> The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us (Weber, [1922] 1949:110).

It is objectivity which defines the relationship between the knower and the thing known. But this has nothing to do with subjective detachment; it is a matter of submitting to principles which make objectivity, and hence knowledge, possible. Objectivity, therefore, is not a problem for the sciences because it resides in the formal principles which constitute them as sciences. These principles establish fundamentally the relationship between the knower (subject) and the thing known (object). In the process of acquiring scientific knowledge, the "object" or thing known is transformed into a concept or definition, which represents some characteristic qualities of the object. In some sense, this conceptual definition is a subjective a priori condition for knowledge. Therefore, it is a raw datum which must be verified by means of experiments or investigations. But it has an objective status insofar as, first, its

construction is not the result of chance or subjective whim, and second, its claim to truth-value can be perceptually confirmed. Therefore, the scientific object is an intended object, and not a simple fact. The selection of research problems on the basis of the investigator's value interest itself cannot jeopardize the objectivity of the analysis of factors which are being studied. The value interest of the investigator, which lends the cultural significance of "phenomena", is based on his preoccupied knowledge about his subject matter. It is insufficient to derive the interpretative direction and the cultural significance of phenomena solely from the object to be investigated:

> All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view... If the notion that those standpoints can be derived from the "facts themselves" continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception of the specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas with which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns himself (Weber, [1922] 1949:81-82).

However, Weber insisted no less strongly on the fundamental difference between "value relevance" (Wertbeziehung) and "value judgments" (Werturteil). By value judgment, Weber explains, we understand evaluations of satisfactory or unsatisfactory characteristics of a phenomenon. This is reminiscent of Rickert's distinction between evaluations and reference to values. Rickert argued, "valuations must always involve praise or blame. To refer to values is to do neither" (Rickert, [1910] 1962:90). Weber points out that the freedom of "expression" is a scientific object, but to evaluate its significance from the point of view of social ethics is a value judgment. However, Weber ([1922] 1949:1-3) explains that one can discuss value judgments from an academic point of view without according his own evaluative assessments:

> By saying that something is relevant with regard to political freedom, for example, one does not take a stand for or against political freedom. The social scientist does not evaluate the objects constituted by reference to values; he merely explains them by tracing them to their causes (Weber, [1922] 1951:90-91,124-125).

Weber discussed in detail the difference between "value judgments" and "value relevance" with regard to university teachings in Germany during his time. He suggested that it is possible to make a clear distinction between value judgments and "letting the facts speak

for themselves" (Weber, [1922] 1949:9-10). At the same time, he opposed the idea that scientific "objectivity" can be achieved by weighing the various evaluations against one another and making a "statesman-like" compromise among them. He believed that to use a "middle way" approach in scientific discussions is just as undemonstrable scientifically as the most extreme evaluations. Such an approach is not appropriate for the scientific community, but for the political leadership. By the nature of the social sciences, practical evaluations regarding the desirability or undesirability of social facts become a major issue in their investigations, and as a result, social science becomes more vulnerable to counter criticisms. Despite this very nature of the social sciences, Weber ([1922] 1949:10-11) maintained, "science strives to attain valuable results, meaning thereby logically and factually correct results which are scientifically significant, and that further, the selection of the subject-matter already involves an evaluation". Therefore, scientists must keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including the value oriented conduct of the empirical individual who he is investigating) and their own practical evaluations, i.e., their evaluations of these facts, whether satisfactory or unsatisfactory. The causal relationship between factors must be determined on an empirical basis independently of the influence of any particular value judgments. Causal analysis provides absolutely no value judgments, and value judgment is absolutely not a causal explanation (Weber, [1922] 1949:123).

METHOD OF CAUSAL ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL INQUIRY

Among all the neo-Kantians, only Rickert paid serious attention to the problem of objectivity in the cultural sciences. Both Windelband and Simmel just mentioned the question of "objective" interpretation of social facts, but they produced hardly any methodological statement to resolve this problem, which was one of the major concerns in the Methodenstreit during that time. Rickert completed his essay, "Science and History", with a brief chapter on the objectivity in historical sciences. Rickert believed that the problem of objectivity in historical sciences is a legitimate question, and the given nature of these disciplines permits us

to raise this fundamental question. If what guides the selection of the data of history and thus ultimately determines the formation of all historical concepts is values, one can, and indeed must, raise the question whether arbitrariness can ever be entirely eliminated from the historical sciences. Like all the other sciences, Rickert argued ([1910] 1962:135-137), the historical sciences can provide theoretically valid truth only for a definite period of time. There is no absolutely valid science. Even the generalizing natural sciences more or less approximate absolutely valid truth. Hence, according to Rickert, historical sciences have no relation whatsoever to absolute truth as long as the guiding principle of the formation of their concepts is nothing but actually accepted values.

Weber accepted Rickert's thesis and maintained that the purpose of social scientific investigations is not to attain precise "laws" of concepts which are universally valid. Any given historical phenomenon represents a unique feature of reality, and that particular phenomenon becomes meaningful to us because of its individuality (Eigenart) in the given historical epoch. Despite the unique character of each historical and social event and the infinite vastness of historical reality, Weber suggests that the historian must develop a causal relationship of any given event which is meaningful to our culture. If a description of the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive, how is the causal analysis of an individual fact possible? According to Weber, the point of departure for causal analysis in social inquiry is the construction of empirical facts in terms of the cultural significance of the event (Weber, [1922] 1951:255-256). Only those factors which can be attributed to the individual character of a given event would be selected. As long as we are concerned with the individuality of a phenomenon which is important for our cultural values, and therefore, the object of the inquiry, the question of causality is not a question of "universal laws", but of concrete causal relationships or causal imputation. Therefore, the causal analysis in social inquiry, which demonstrates the serial causality of an event, is different from that of "universal causal laws" developed by natural science (Weber, [1922] 1949:78-79; Rickert, [1902] 1921:282-285).

> The focus of attention on reality under the guidance of values which lend its significance and the selection and ordering of the phenomena which are thus affected in the light of their cultural significance is entirely different from the analysis of reality in terms of law and general concepts in the natural science. Neither of these two types of analysis of reality has any logical relationship with the other (Weber, [1922] 1949:77).

However, this does not imply that the knowledge of universally valid propositions and the construction of abstract "laws" have no scientific meaning in the cultural sciences. In contrast, the valid causal effects of concrete causes have a definite general "nomological" status. According to Weber, the "adequate" effects of the causal elements, which are attributed to any given event, must be regarded as nomological knowledge. The extent to which a historian can develop this type of causal imputation is, to a greater extent, dependent upon his personal experience and training in analytic methods. The more certain and the more comprehensive our general knowledge, the greater is the certainty of causal imputation. As Weber ([1922] 1949:80) pointed out, this type of knowledge is based on the adequate causal relationships of "objective possibility", and thus, it is different from that of universal "laws" in natural scientific disciplines. The establishment of such regularities, in cultural sciences, is certainly not the end, but rather the means of knowledge.

If the unit of analysis in sociological inquiry is individual conduct, it follows then, there is no universal order of all antecedent social and historical events other than specific meanings given by individual actors. In Weber's opinion, meaning originates in the individual, and it is by chance if different individuals have the same meaning in their mind as they orient their conduct toward others. In view of this multiplicity of meanings in human conduct, Weber discards all monistic interpretations of human history and selects specific antecedent-causal events depending upon his theoretical interest (Weber, [1906] 1975:197,218; Bendix, 1946; Zaret, 1980). However, he acknowledged the great analytical value of the materialist interpretation of history; he recognized the enormous usefulness of the materialistic method as a heuristic device. But he resisted all efforts to absolutize it into the sole method of social sciences, much less into a Weltanschauung (philosophy of life). The true value of this method, like all the other intellectual schemata, according to Weber, is only ideal typical. As

against the Marxian theory of economic determinism of social change, he expounded a pluralistic interactional theory. Hence, he added significantly that to derive capitalism from religious ideas would be quite inadequate (Weber, [1920] 1958:183; [1922] 1951:169). In Weber's view, it depends upon the specific historical instance, whether material conditions or ideas are of greater causal significance. Consequently, examples of each of the types of explanations can be found in his comparative historical sociology. Weber ([1922] 1978:418-419) suggested, for example, the Western European monotheism seems to have originated in the desert countries of the Near East, where the harvest is not produced by rain, but by artificial irrigation. The concept of an almighty King, who created the irrigation economy and harvest on the desert sand, is analogous to that of God, who made the earth and man out of nothing. On the other hand, Weber's analysis of ascetic Protestantism and its influence on the development of Capitalism in Western Europe is the best example of a non-materialistic interpretation of human history, i.e., ideological factors have influenced material conditions (Schelting, 1934:281-283).

However, in the process of causal analysis the potentially infinite series of causes are delimited by the onesided accentuation of significant elements in the event to be analyzed (Weber, [1907] 1977:88-103). The construction of empirical facts "creates the points of attachment from which there are to be regressively traced the web of causal connections" (Weber, [1922] 1949:149). Therefore, Weber admitted that this analytical reduction of unique events in the process of causal analysis is theoretically an abstraction which inevitably effaces the individuality and uniqueness of a series of social events, and consequently overlooks the cultural significance of events. Therefore, in fact, the reduction of the uniqueness of events in the process of causal analysis eliminates certain characteristic elements of the object that are important for the social scientist. Hence, he insisted that the complete individuality of social reality can never be conceptualized by any scientific analysis. However, it should be noted that the causal analysis in the social sciences does not "subordinate" social facts under abstract causal models--but it integrates "particular facts as a real causal factor into a real, hence

concrete context" (Weber, [1922] 1949:135; [1906] 1975:197). By doing so, causal analysis attempts to limit not only the degree of abstraction, but also the number of possible theoretical explanations of social and historical events.

> Those empirical disciplines which employ the category of causality and investigate the qualities of reality--history and every "science of culture" of any sort belong to this group of disciplines--invariably employ the category in its full meaning... In part, they attempt to establish "causal generalization" by abstracting from the concrete properties of a complex. In part, they attempt to "explain" concrete complexes on the basis of these generalizations (Weber, [1906] 1975:196).

Thus, causal analysis considers only those antecedent factors of an event that are relevant to its culturally significant elements. The historical interpretation of any given "event" of the past, such as the Reformation, attributes its causal significance to subsequent events or developments. This has been described in Weber's methodology as "Objective Possibility" (Objektiven Möglichkeit). For example, if we assume that a certain development of thoughts and actions (e.g.Puritanism) had not taken place, then we try to construct hypothetical consequences of actions which might have occurred according to our knowledge (nomological knowledge) of historical settings and regularities of human social conduct (Weber, [1922] 1951:285-86). Then we may find, perhaps, that history would have taken a different course, if Puritanism has not taken place. Our theoretical construction will find some other causally significant antecedents which seem to have rather explicit social and cultural consequences in our society. And also the method of "Internal Analysis" (Sinndeutung) (the interpretation of meaning) reveals the specific social and cultural circumstances within which the particular event has taken place. Finally, by applying the "Method of Causal Adequacy" (Kausaladäquanz) we will ascertain the probability of a similar development taking place under like circumstances.[29] Therefore, these three major principles of "Objective Possibility", "Internal Analysis", and "Causal Adequacy" taken together constitute Weber's methodology of Kausalen Zurechnung (causal imputation) (Weber, [1922]

[29]Weber ([1922] 1949:165-168) explains that the methods of causal adequacy and objective possibility have significant logical relevance to causal analysis in the social sciences. The theory of objective possibility, according to Weber, was originally developed by the German physiologist Von Kries in his well-known Über der Begriff der objektiven Möglichkeit und einige Anwendungen desleben, (Leipzig, 1888).

1951:286-290; Schelting, 1934:255-309; Bendix, 1946).

SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY

Throughout the sociological enterprise of Weber, he contributed to two major interesting areas: causal historical analysis and comparative sociology. He maintained that history is concerned with investigating the causes of unique events. Like the other scientists (both natural as well as social), historians selects their research problem depending on their interest or preoccupied knowledge about historical events; but historians are handicapped in their analysis because they do not know which aspects of their problems are unique and call for especial explanations (Bendix, 1946; Weber, [1922] 1947:177-179). The historian cannot produce a complete profile of any specific aspect of social reality without a prior knowledge about the regularities of human conduct, and therefore, historical causal analysis itself does not provide a generalized knowledge (Weber, [1922] 1949:177). In order to determine the importance of any given historical constellation historians must conceive it as nonexistent or changed. According to their prior knowledge, they must try to assume what would have happened under these hypothetical circumstances. If the phenomenon whose cause is being studied would have been different in these hypothetical circumstances, in respects which come within their field of interest, they then attribute these aspects of phenomenon to this particular historical event. For example, historians can never tell us what might have happened had the battle of Marathon not been successful for the Greeks. Moreover, they can never estimate the probability that a similar battle would again have resulted in a Greek victory, unless they could approach their material with a supplementary knowledge of the regularities of human conduct (Weber, [1922] 1947:177-179).

According to Weber, this supplementary prior knowledge must be acquired through a comparative approach to world history and the knowledge that sociology provides. Sociology, according to Weber, seeks to ascertain the regularities of human conduct in all the civilizations of mankind. Regularity means that a certain type of value system can influence the entire

behaviour pattern of human beings. These regularities can be used for the interpretation of social events since they furnish us with the knowledge of how men can typically be expected to behave under different circumstances. Sociology is, therefore, a supplementary discipline which provides a comparative knowledge of human conduct (Weber, [1922] 1947:164). While the historian selects his subject matter on the basis of his values (like the others) without inquiring about any causal historical significance for his analysis, sociologists try to discover the unique aspects of the historical configuration that has been selected by the historian. This particular uniqueness indicates its historical significance. Thus it seems that a historian, for example, will seek to explain the development of Western European rationalization without assessing its overall causal significance, while a sociologist attempts to disclose that this development is the most significant aspect of Western European history (Weber, [1922] 1949:156; Parsons, 1937:529-532).

Weber's own substantive sociological works explain well his methodological propositions. Weber's remarkable contribution to comparative sociology becomes evident in his analysis of Economic Ethic of World Religions. By comparing different religious ethics of conduct, Weber derived distinct aspects of world civilizations which made them unique. His method of selecting the research problem such as the Protestant Ethic and its role in the development of capitalism fits well into his description of the relation between history and sociology. Weber never said that rationalization is the unique feature of the Western European historical development. Instead, he maintains that it is the object of his own value hypothesis which designates the ascetic mode of conduct of Western European civilization. It is the historical genesis of the rational element of modern Capitalism that concerns Weber (Weber, [1922] 1948:293; Bendix, 1946).

However, Weber's attempt to distinguish history from sociology created a number of methodological problems that he never discussed adequately. First of all, in the face of incomparable singularity or uniqueness of each historical constellation, how can sociology arrive at its formulation of the universal regularities of human conduct? Second, if the

historian too selects his problem of inquiry on the basis of his value relevance, like the sociologist, why does historical causal analysis fail to provide a generalized knowledge about the historically significant events? Although a sociologist, like a historian, selects his problem of investigation depending upon his value interest, beyond that he must rely on empirical evidence in his attempt to understand what is universal and what is unique among the chaotic data of history. However, the question is whether the sociologist only needs to rely on empirical evidence and then to distinguish the unique from the universal constellation. Weber does not provide a clear-cut answer to this question; but it is possible to understand in his accounts that this fundamental differentiation cannot be done without a theory of society, which involves more than the use of value judgments for selecting the research problem. Weber himself was not without such a theory, and his overall procedure in social inquiry involves rather substantive, i.e., not merely methodological, judgments or evaluative statements. The whole enterprise of his sociological inquiry is based on his interpretation of the nature of social facts which led him: (1) to view rational individual conduct as the basic unit of analysis in social inquiry, (2) to assert all historical data as unique constellations of human conduct, (3) to conceive of historical data as receiving their formality through historical causal analysis, (4) to assign the historian the task of establishing the causation of unique events, and finally (5) to define sociology as a comparative study of meaningful individual behaviour in all societies and all times (Bendix, 1946; Giddens, 1971).

This comparative analysis would eventually result in a knowledge of the universal regularities of human conduct. And this knowledge can be formulated in a system of ideal types which includes the whole range of regularities of human conduct which would provide the sociologist with unambiguous conceptual tools. However, this analysis of the relationship between sociology and history illustrates Weber's view of world history.

FORMATION OF IDEAL TYPES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL FACTS

Unlike all the other methodological concepts of Weber, the method of ideal types has been a highly controversial issue in the social sciences since the beginning of this century.[30] There has been a series of political and academic debates on this concept, both in Europe and North America, during the last few decades. Most of the earlier critics (Bennion, 1933; Becker, 1934; Hempel, 1965; Lachmann, 1970) have focused on the ambiguity of Weber's ideal types and, in particular, his application of this method in political sociology and comparative history. Few studies (Von Schelting, 1934; Tenbruck, 1959; Bruun, 1972; Burger, 1976), which investigated the original development of this method, have attributed a great deal of credit to Rickert and Simmel for their original contribution to it. Some authors (eg. Burger, 1976; Bruun, 1972) argue that the development of ideal types was a part of Rickert's theory of concept formation, but this methodological requirement was never fully developed by Rickert. Hence, the ideal type was Weber's solution to the problem of determining the conceptual status of certain elements of historical phenomena within the premises of Rickert's theory of concept formation. In this context, Burger believes that Weber deserves the credit for the development of ideal types, although the current recognition seems to be grossly distorted. He argues that in 1904 Weber first wrote on ideal types in his essay on Objectivity, and later in Economy and Society he basically tried to confirm what he had already discussed in Objectivity. Therefore, in Burger's view, the discussion on ideal types in Economy and Society appeared as a mixture of definitions, classifications and hypotheses, creating a serious confusion regarding the logical basis of this method.

Although it is not exactly clear in Burger's argument whether Weber was directly responsible for the development of ideal types, it is certainly true that with the development

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[30]Among the earliest English-speaking commentators, Lowell L. Bennion, Max Weber's Methodology, (1933:168) argued that "Weber's ideal types lack systematization. They are indefinite in number and offer us no differentiation in regard to their importance to one another". Howard Becker, "Culture Case Study and Ideal Typical Method: with special reference to Max Weber", Social Forces XII (1934), maintained that "it may be said with confidence that this method has stood every test that can legitimately be applied to it".

of ideal types, Rickert's theory of concept formation was completed by Weber. According to Bruun (1972:206-7), Weber developed the ideal types partly in order to overcome certain methodological difficulties of value relevance, but the fundamental logic behind this method undoubtedly came from Rickert. Weber recognized the ideal types as a fundamental requirement in social scientific analysis, and his contribution to this method clearly goes beyond Rickert's theory of science:

> ... the reference in Grenzen (Rickert's major work) to the ideal type are extremely cursory, in spite of the claim advanced by Rickert himself that Weber found the elements of the concept in the Grenzen (Bruun, 1972:206).

But if Rickert is to receive the credit of the initial development of ideal types, the claim of Simmel and Georg Jellinek has to be dismissed. Tenbruck (1965:83-84) suggests that the origin of the ideal type method is Simmel's concept of "pure form". He argues that Simmel employed pure forms in order to describe complex ideas which represent the central elements of historical phenomena. Ideal types, in Tenbruck's view, served Weber for the same purpose in his comparative historical sociology. Thus, relying on this argument, Runciman (1972:9) maintains that "although the term 'ideal type' came from Jellinek ... the idea behind it, in the form which Weber was to adopt, probably, came to him from Simmel". None of these commentators seem to believe that Weber has done anything more than a mere improvement of the method of ideal type in his work, and the underlying logic of this concept had already been developed by Rickert, Simmel and Jellinek. Therefore, the best way to understand this dispute is that although Rickert, Simmel and Jellinek had already expounded the original methodological premises of the ideal type Weber, in his writings, clarified this methodological concept as he used it in his research in comparative historical sociology.

THE USE OF IDEAL TYPES

Since all historical data are unique aspects of social reality, it is virtually impossible for us to develop meaningful concepts out of such data to describe a given kind of historical event or a form of conduct. The individuality of various historical configurations must be

eliminated (or at least reduced) in order to develop comparative models in social inquiry. Such models or ideal types can be constructed only at the cost of exaggerating their uniformities. This is a fundamental requirement of the causal imputation of empirical events because reality is an infinite continuum of individual occurrences. Thus from the logical point of view, according to Weber ([1922] 1949:42-43), the ideal type is an abstraction combining several analytical elements which appear in the reality, not in pure form--but in various admixture. In economics, such models are developed by assuming that individual's economic behaviour is exclusively rational and purposive. By doing so, economists try to reduce the complexity of their analytical components and to interpret them in terms of the degree to which they approximate or deviate from the ideal typical model. These models never exactly correspond with reality, but they approximate in various degrees. Hence, it is possible for economists to understand how men act under these assumed conditions, if their actions are entirely rational. As Weber described it:

> Whatever the content of ideal type ... it has only one function in an empirical investigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities ... and to understand and explain them causally (Weber, [1922] 1949:43).

The ideal type is neither a representation nor a reproduction of reality. It has nothing in common with such concepts of biology as genus and species, nor is it to be confused with the universal laws of the natural sciences. It is not an expression of the general or average type of reality. It must not be identified with reality itself. Ideal-types, according to Weber ([1922] 1949:90), serve to establish "historical reality" which is concerned with the imputation of concrete effects to concrete causes and not with the ascertainment of abstract laws. The ideal type is not a "hypothesis", but it gives guidance to construct a meaningful hypothesis and unambiguous mode of expression. Thus, Weber argues that by applying ideal types we can arrive at specific interpretations of historical phenomena which existed in the past. For example, if we take the relationship between the King and Clergy in 13th century Europe, in order to ascertain in what way this relationship differs specifically from other relationships between the King and Clergy under the "feudal" system, it is, first of all, necessary to

construct an ideal type of feudalism. This means that we would like to see how the relationship between the King and Clergy in the 13th century deviates from the hypothetical (i.e., the simplified and exaggerated) form of relationship which was constructed as a part of the ideal type of feudalism. It is then the task of the historian to explain this unique deviation from the ideal type:

> An ideal type is formed by one sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality (Weber, [1922] 1949:90).

In Economy and Society, Weber ([1922] 1949:22-23) emphasized that "the theoretical concepts of sociology are ideal types not only from the objective point of view, but also in their application to subjective processes". He believed that a great majority of social actions, which become the subject matter of social inquiry, are composed of half-consciously or unconsciously articulated subjective meanings. The actor is more likely to be aware of them in a more vague sense than the explicit self-conscious participation in the action. Thus, the ideal type of meaningful action is a reliable platform for sociologists to determine the diversity of the real social world and to understand the extent to which we can approximate the existing social reality. Hence, Weber argues, in an empirical investigation, the sociologist can systematize interpretation within a reasonable range of diversity to represent reality, but can never reproduce it by any means. This means that, according to Weber, there is always a gap between the actual facts, that are being studied by sociologists, and the ideal typical situation in any empirical analysis. Therefore, the construction of ideal types in the social analysis is not an end, but a means. Thus, in Weber's view, ideal types are constructed in order: (1) to get a clear-cut concept out of the infinite diversity and complexity of social reality and, (2) to arrive at generalizations about human conduct despite the individuality of each historical constellation.

However, it is incorrect to understand ideal types as historical generalizations, which would be stated that under given circumstances X, behaviour Y is likely to occur. Rather, they comprise, as Weber formulated, one possible typology of conduct. By suggesting these ideal types as conceptual tools, rather than generalizations, Weber argued that the historical data are unique, and therefore, historical generalizations are theoretically impossible (Weber, [1922] 1949:101-103). He argued that any intellectual examination of historical concepts essentially involves the development of concepts which are precisely and unambiguously defined in terms of their elements. But they are not general concepts because they are only approximately correct. In Weber's ([1922] 1949:90) example of classical economic theory, the "propositions" of theory are usually interpreted as economic laws. They are descriptions of the common features of all the concrete empirical phenomena, and they are only approximations to the real phenomena. Thus, for this reason, Weber refused to consider them as "general concepts" and "laws of nature". Weber argues that concepts such as "individualism", "imperialism", "feudalism", "mercantilism" and "capitalism", for example, are ambiguous constructs of which meaning are only concretely felt, but not clearly thought. A simple descriptive analysis of these concepts can be developed only as an ideal type. "It is a conceptual construct, which is neither historical reality nor even the "true" reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance". The significance of these concepts is purely ideal with which a real situation can be compared and surveyed in order to disclose certain important elements of social reality. Thus, for Weber ([1922] 1949:93), the construction of ideal types is an attempt to analyze historically unique configurations or their individual concepts by means of genetic concepts.

Weber ([1922] 1949:94) argued that every concept of historical reality diverges drastically from "true" reality. The discursive nature of our knowledge, i.e., the fact that we comprehend reality only through a chain of intellectual modifications, postulates such a conceptual shorthand. Although our imaginary ideas can often dispense with explicit conceptual formulations as a means of investigation, when we consider their epistemological

clarity and the extent to which they represent the true reality, they have extremely limited empirical validity. Yet, in the field of cultural sciences these conceptual models are inevitable. As these sciences are concerned with the practical significance of social phenomena, Weber ([1922] 1949:94) maintained that this significance can be understood only by relating the empirical data to an ideal limiting case:

> If the historian rejects an attempt to construct such ideal types as a "theoretical construction", i.e., as useless or dispensable for his concrete heuristic purposes, the inevitable consequence is either that he consciously or unconsciously uses other similar concepts without formulating them verbally and elaborating them logically or that he remains stuck in the realm of the vaguely "felt" (Weber, [1922] 1949:94).

Weber's method of ideal type has significant social and political implications. The notion of bureaucracy has been the most influential sociological concept of Weber throughout the modern era. Having set up the ideal typical bureaucracy, Weber attempted to compare it against the empirical cases of bureaucracy such as the Prussian civil service, the university bureaucracy and the trade unions in Germany and many other modern organizational developments in Europe (Weber, [1922] 1947:324-349). For Weber, bureaucracy is a system governed by highly formalized, inflexible rules and disciplines. It is an administrative system, in which, volition, feelings, and sentiments can have no place (Parkin, 1982:35). Thus an important feature of his theory of bureaucracy is the manner in which he relates it to the main currents of European political, economic and social history. Bureaucratization becomes, for Weber, a powerful manifestation of the historical principle of rationalization. The growth of bureaucracy in government, business, religion and education is an aspect of the rationalization of culture. Bureaucracy, in short, is a historical process through which we may account for much of what distinguished the modern from the medieval world and also for analogous differentiations in the ancient and Asiatic society.

As a sociologist, Weber found that rationalization of economic life was the distinguishing characteristic of Western European development. In constructing an ideal type on the basis of this aspect of human conduct, Weber considered the past events of European history as an approximation to the ideal typical social paradigm. The directions and the

developments of history were primarily based on the specific individual action patterns and their values which characterized the "social development" at any given stage of history. This implies that all social changes of the past should be regarded as "changes" toward or away from an ideal type. Therefore, as far as Weber's methodology is concerned, the idea of historical development is a thought construct, and one cannot study it because there is no empirical reference other than past individual conduct. In this connection Weber maintained that the past was an infinity of causal sequences of individual conduct, since he has no theory of social change. Weber conceives of social changes rather in terms of a succession of specific historical events. This interplay of an infinity of unique events assumes direction only because the sociological interpretations create an illusion of social development by viewing the events of the past as so many different, unique approximations to a series of ideal types.

Our understanding of Weber's philosophy of social science is incomplete unless we take into consideration his philosophy of history. Because there is a fundamental gap between Weber's neo-Kantian position with regard to the methodology of the social sciences and his philosophy of history. In his methodological arguments Weber maintained a pluralistic causal approach to social reality, while in his philosophy of history he emerged as a determinist and "a believer in historicism in Karl Popper's sense as well" (Kolko, 1959:21). Like Marx, Weber believed that history is man made, and it is a product of a fully conscious interactional process. Weber predicted the future, but he did not welcome what he predicted. He viewed it as inevitable. His pessimistic determinism in the philosophy of history is quite opposite to what he believed in the methodology of the social sciences. Weber's reputation as a rationalistic liberal seems no longer valid when we examine his views towards the future development of the modern industrial society. This fundamental difference between Weber's methodology and his philosophy of history reflects some of the limitations of Weber's methodology. Moreover, this indicates what some authors said "Weber's turn from the methodology of agreement to the method of difference in his approach to Western civilization" (Parsons, 1949:533). In discussing Weber's philosophy of history, in the

following chapter, I will examine not only his speculative theory of the direction of history and forces shaping it, but also some of the methodological assumptions that Weber utilized in his research. An examination of both aspects is necessary, for Weber's basic concept of inevitable rationalization in all modern institutions is to some extent a reflection of the methodological technique he used and advocated.

VII. WEBER'S INTERPRETATION OF RATIONALIZATION AND HIS PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

In the preceding sections Weber's methodological ideas were discussed in the context of his contemporary intellectual background in Germany. It was argued that the original ideas of Weber's methodological writings were developed by the neo-Kantian philosophers. At the same time, the distinctive feature of Weber's thinking was attributed to his academic training in a wide range of social scientific disciplines such as history, law, economics and sociology. However, to complete this discussion on Weber's methodological writings it is important to examine his philosophy of history, particularly his interpretation of rationalization. As Karl Löwith (1982) has emphasized, Weber's methodological standpoint is inseparable from his other works, and more particularly from his general interpretation of rationalization, the central theme of his comparative historical sociology. In the following section, Weber's interpretation of rationalization will be discussed with reference to his philosophy of history. The position which he adopted in this respect will be examined critically in order to reveal some of the methodological contradictions in Weber's thesis.

Weber asserts that human conduct is as predictable as are events in the natural world: "the predictability of the process of nature such as weather forecasts is not nearly so certain as the calculation of action of someone, who is known to us..." (Weber, [1922] 1951:64). Thus, according to Weber, the irrationality is not a typical character of human conduct; on the contrary, it is an "abnormal" behaviour pattern associated with those individuals who are designated as "insane". In his critiques of Roscher, Weber no less strongly insisted that human freedom results in an eminent rational behaviour and thus the rational world today is no less than a reasonable and calculable object amenable to generalizations. Social life depends upon regularities in human conduct, such that one can calculate the probable response of another to one's own actions. Only in this sense Weber argued that rational, and hence calculable, human conduct can be understood in terms of general concepts. Despite the subjective quality of human behaviour, every meaningful action is essentially subjected to

explanations. In this sense Weber refused to identify "free will" with irrational human action. Many commentators on Weber's concept of rationalization have failed to emphasize its methodological significance for Weber's empirical sociology, particularly for his comparative historical sociology. Rationalization, according to Weber, has eliminated all magical and metaphysical contemplations; it has established the empirical sciences. The elimination of magic has made people aware of their own resources and capabilities to overcome existing obstacles to human progress. Man is compelled to maintain his position in the face of recurrent chances. In this struggle, he becomes conscious of his freedom. The epistemological position Weber adopted in his interpretation of history is clearly different from that of Marx and of Hegel. Marx's argument that "mankind always sets itself only such as it can solve" is as antithetical to Weber's position as is Hegel's famous proposition that "what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational". As Weber often argued, truth and goodness stand in no definite historical relationship to each other (Giddens, 1972:43). Hence, for Weber, there can be no sense in which history can be "rational", as postulated either by Hegelian objective idealism or by Marxism, whereby the social development of man unfolds a progression towards the attainment of rationally determined ideals.

Weber's concept of rationalization is a very complex one, and he often used it to express a variety of meanings. Stephen Kalberg (1980:1145-1175) recognized four different types of rationality in Weberian sociology: practical, theoretical, substantive and formal. All four types of rationality become manifest in a multiplicity of rationalization processes orchestrated at all levels of social and civilizational developments. Wolfgang Schluchter (1979:14-15) recognized quite a different classification of rationality in Weber's writings. First of all, rationalism refers to the capacity to control the world through calculation. Here rationalism is a consequence of empirical knowledge and know-how. Therefore, in its first sense rationalism is scientific-technological rationalism. Second, rationalism refers to the systematization of meaning patterns. This involves the intellectual elaboration of ultimate ends. In this sense rationalism is a consequence of cultured man's "inner compulsion", not

only to understand the world as a "meaningful cosmos", but also to take a consistent and unified stance toward it. This is called metaphysical-ethical rationalism. Third, rationalism refers to the achievement of a methodical way of life. Here, rationalism is the consequence of the institutionalization of meaning and interest. It is called practical rationalism.

In the Protestant Ethic, Weber ([1920] 1958: 24-26,136) defined rationality as "ideational intentionality", i.e., the men are not at the mercy of historical forces that they do not control. Every individual essentially has a priori knowledge of what he is doing, and therefore, the outcomes of such actions are both predictable and subject to analysis in terms of general concepts. Weber believed that man created his own history, that he had sufficient freedom to do so, and the result of such action in some sense exemplified what is desirable for man. In this sense, rationality is, to a great extent, an individual freedom in order to accomplish his own wishes. The "means" and "results" of such actions may not always be socially acceptable, but as far as an acting individual's purpose is concerned, they are rational:

> Suppose we "understand" human action as determined by clearly conscious and intended "ends" and a clear knowledge of the "means" required for these "ends". It is incontestable that the degree of "self-evidence" attained by this sort of understanding is unique. Suppose we consider what this degree of "self-evidence" is based upon. It is obviously the following circumstance: the relation between "means" and "ends" is intrinsically accessible to a rational causal account which produces generalizations, generalizations that have the property of "nomological regularity". There is no rational action independent of the causal rationalization of certain aspects of reality which are concerned as objects and instruments that can be manipulated ... (Weber, [1906] 1975:186).

Rationality is connected with freedom inasmuch as it is a teleological rationality, i.e., the pursuing of a goal or purpose which has been marked out through ultimate value or interpretations of life in free consideration of the adequate means to attain it freely. The knowledge of the means and only of the means, and not of purposes, constitutes rational science. The rational consideration of the given means in relation to the self-postulated purpose and relation of purpose itself with regard to the chances and results of its attainment, constitute the responsibility of free and rational conduct (Weber, [1922] 1951:441). Weber believed that our aims and purposes are concealed in the irrational world beyond the reach of

scientific analysis. The means to attain self-cherished or self-postulated purposes belong to the rational world and are subject to scientific analysis. It is this knowledge of the "means" which stamps our age as being rational.

In comparative sociology, Weber applied the concept of rationalization along with the concept of action. First, two types of actions--legal rational and value rational--are directly involved in practical aims of which means-end are calculable and predictable by the actor. Therefore, such actions have meaningful outcomes that could exceed the individual level of social relations, and have broader societal outcomes. Hence, for Weber "rational action" is the fundamental "atom" in all societal and civilizational processes. The most convincing example of this type of action pattern is Weber's analysis of Calvin's teachings and their influence on the development of Western capitalism. Calvin's teachings are fundamental ethical values concerning this-worldly activities. The strict commitment to such values by the people of Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries brought about unprecedented structural changes in their societies. Weber questioned what is the essence of modern capitalism and what has determined, more than anything else, its development? He considered it to be the "rational calculation" of capital as a norm of industrial entreprenuership engaged in satisfying the needs of everyday life. Thus, rationalism has been the predominant factor in the creation of modern capitalism. Rationality, as applied by Weber, is nearly synonymous with calculability and predictability. For Weber, the end result of an irrational action is unpredictable:

> The "freer" the decision to act--that is, the more this decision is a response to its "own" reflections rather than to "external" pressure of irresistible affect--the more completely, ceteris paribus, the motivations involved in the decision may be fitted into the categories, end and means; so much the more adequate will be the rational analysis of these motivations... but the greater the freedom of action--that is, the further removed from the process of nature--the more there comes into play, finally, the conception of a personality that finds self-realization in the constant attunement of its inner being to definite ultimate values and life meanings; through the medium of an action these values and meanings are transformed into aims and purposes, and in the process this action becomes teleological and rational. Consequently, there is less and less place for the romantic-naturalistic conception of personality (Weber, [1922] 1951:132-33).

However, Weber believed that rationalization is a universal phenomenon and not peculiar to any particular civilization, although capitalism in its Western form did not develop

in the other civilizations. Rationalization can take place in different spheres of social life. In other civilizations, rationalization developed in the areas like law, architecture, aesthetics, grammar, geometry, music and even medicine and physics. Hence, the qualitatively different rationalization that potentially advance at their own indigenous rates could take place at various societal levels and in different life-spheres (Kalberg, 1980:1150). Therefore, there is no one universal pattern of rationalization that can be seen in all societies. The economic rationalism that developed in the Protestant societies is only one example and that may not be the case in other societies. Moreover, he did not believe that the economic factor is the only causal determinant of all social changes; every historical event is, according to Weber, only one set of alternatives that happened to occur but did not have to.

For Weber, rationalization is a methodological criterion whereby historical developments of different societies can be identified and compared as "universal historical problems". The spirit of capitalism is best understood as one particular phase of the development of rationalism. Therefore, Weber ([1920] 1958:26) suggests that the historian must identify what particular aspect of life is potentially significant in the process of change in any given society. Every society is in its own state of change. This implies that what is rational from one perspective may appear irrational from another, both within a given culture and across cultures. Hence, historians who recognized one particular aspect of rationalization in one socio-cultural system could not expect to find the same rational characteristics in another.

However, until recently Weber's theory of rationalization was not subjected to a serious philosophical debate. Most of the discussions (e.g. Löwith, 1970; Mommsen, 1970) narrowly touched upon the philosophical and historical dimensions by emphasizing the evolutionary perspective of rationalization. In his long discussion on rationalization and legitimation, Habermas tried to bring together both Weber's theory of rationalization and classical Marxism in order to reconstruct critical theory from a more empirical point of view. Habermas (1984:144) argued that Marx, Weber, and critical theorists such as Adorno,

Horkheimer and Marcuse identified rationalization with the expansion of instrumental rational action, and they all shared a vague and empirically described notion of rationalization. They all, according to Habermas, became victims of the action concept--the action theoretic bottlenecks. The rationalization of action and the developments of lifeworld are not the same as the expansion of the "rationality", that is, the complexity of action systems. Habermas argued that:

> According to Marx, the rationalization of society takes place directly in the development of productive forces, that is, in the expansion of empirical knowledge, the improvement of production, technologies, and the increasingly effective mobilization, quantification and organization of socially useful labor power. On the other hand, productive relations, the institutions that express the distribution of social power and regulate a differential access to the means of production are revolutionized only under the pressure of rationalization of productive forces. Max Weber views the institutional framework of the capitalist economy and the modern state in a different way--not as relations of production, but as subsystems of purposive-rational action in which Occidental rationalism develops at a societal level. Of course he is afraid that bureaucratization will lead to a reification of social relationships, which will stifle motivational incentives to a rational conduct of life (Habermas, 1984:144).

Habermas maintains that Weber's starting point in the theory of rationalization is the 19th century evolutionism and the philosophy of history. He believes that Weber and many subsequent sociologists failed to overcome the influence of speculative metaphysics. The theory of rationalization does not belong to that evolutionary heritage from which sociology itself had to become free as an independent science. Sociology emerged as a discipline concerning the origin and the development of modern society in the wake of 19th century moral philosophy. Many classical sociologists found the theme of societal rationalization a convenient methodological approach to the problem of social change. However, this theme was at the outset developed by the 18th century philosophy of history, and later it was taken over by the evolutionary theories of society. Under these historical circumstances, Weber could not easily avoid the influence of the evolutionary perspective on his own interpretation of rationalization and legitimation. Although Weber adopted a very cautious universalistic position, and he did not regard the rationalization process as a phenomenon peculiar to the Occident, Weber could not elaborate rational perspectives of other civilizations that exist

outside the religious ethic. In the Protestant Ethic, Weber wrote:

> We shall as far as possible clarify the manner and general direction in which, by virtue of these relationships, the religious movements have influenced the development of material culture. Only when this has been determined with reasonable accuracy can the attempt be made to estimate to what extent the historical development of modern culture can be attributed to those religious forces and to what extent to others.

Yet these "other" factors never received Weber's attention, and in his posthumously published lectures, General Economic History, Weber purposely underestimated the causal significance of these other factors even in Western history. Gerth and Mills (1948:70) point out that Weber opposed "monocausal" explanation of history as found in Marx and contemporary anthropology. "Weber's liberal heritage prevented him from taking a determinist position...The future is a field of strategy rather than a mere repetition or unfolding of the past. Yet the possibilities of the future are not infinite, nor are they clay in the hands of the wilful man". However, they admitted that Weber was inconsistent when he argued against monocausal interpretations of history ignoring apparent monolithic character of his own theory.

Moreover, Weber's evolutionary perspective becomes evident in his pessimistic appraisal of scientific civilization in the West. Despite his strong conviction of the victory of rational, industrial man over the irrational, socio-cultural environment, Weber's pessimistic fear deeply disturbed him. He soon began to mistrust the rationalization process, and realized that the rational man is slowly, but surely, moving away from the traditional social values. Naturally, Weber was not prepared to see the inevitable dehumanizing effects of the growing industrial capitalist system accompanied by rational individual conduct. In this respect, in fact, Weber fundamentally affirmed what Marx described as self-alienated humanity because, for him, precisely this form of existence did not merely permit the maximum "freedom of movement," but enforced it (Löwith, 1982:58). The rationalization of individual conduct has an adverse effect on social values. Weber believed that the future of modern industrial society is moving toward an inescapable danger (iron-cage), from which mankind can never be rescued. As Wolfgang Mommsen described it:

> The rational construction of historical evolution was overshadowed by a deeply pessimistic fear of a new enslavement to come. Looming through the mist of and as yet unspecified time ahead Max Weber perceived the outlines of a petrified society similar to that of late Antiquity, in which Western concept of freedom and the personal responsibility of the individual would have lost all meaning ... Weber was afraid lest the historical development of man might lead to something very similar to the total victory of "technical man" over cultured man (Mommsen, 1970:185-86).

On many occasions, Weber clearly expressed his serious concern about the increasing threat to the human values and freedom in the modern industrial society. In 1917, in his studies on the future constitution of Germany, Weber questioned, "How is it, in view of this overwhelming tendency towards bureaucratization, at all possible still to save anything of what is meant by individual freedom of movement? How could modern society be preserved from 'mechanical' petrification?" (Mommsen, 1970:186-87). The specialized official, like any other rationalized specialist, must be prepared to answer to himself not as an individual, but only with regard to his office, to the respective institution, i.e., to himself as a member of this institution:

> For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truely said: Specialist without spirit, sensualists without heart, this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved (Weber, [1920] 1958:182).

Weber has demonstrated the most general and penetrating success of rationalization, particularly, in the case of modern "science", which he regarded as the fundamental disenchantment of world (Löwith, 1970:119). The rise of science as a means of attaining knowledge and experiencing reality has fateful consequences. It has replaced "values" and the sense of "duty" which bound individuals together throughout history. With the advent of the scientific world view, even values could become subject to empirical observations and mathematical calculations (Weber, [1922] 1948:139). This development, Weber emphasized stood the most distinctive opposition to all religious and metaphysical world views. He recognized the history of science and technology as a pattern of rationalization. That means, for Weber, an evolutionary acceptance of the struggle for existence. This Darwinian component is quite consistent with the Nietzschean emphasis of Weber's argument (Lewis, 1975:85). Weber believed that the magic and rituals which governed the relationship between

man and nature in the past have been replaced by the scientific rational-instrumental action. The opportunity provided by this disillusionment of man and disenchantment with the world has improved social and economic life. But, for Weber, this kind of material progress means merely a "change" toward predetermined rails of fate, with passion and resignation. "There is no peace in the economic struggle for existence. Only those who take the appearance of peace for the truth can believe that the future holds peace and enjoyment of life for our descendants" (cited from Mommsen, 1974:29-30). Even science may be trapped in an iron-cage of its own making from which there is no escape because the disenchantment of the world has reached science itself; no longer can it provide meaning:

> In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented view of the world develops refutations of every intellectual approach which in any way asks for a meaning of innerworldly occurrences (Weber, [1922] 1948:351).

Weber's predictions of future developments in the modern industrial capitalist society can hardly be disputed, and his intellectual genius must be rewarded. However, to treat scientific development as an evolutionary process, which eventually results in the total destruction of human civilization, is certainly incorrect. As Habermas (1984:115) pointed out, Weber was correct for using modern science and technology as a model of progress in human history, but he must have evaluated them as problem-solving mechanisms that influence human social values.

VIII. CRITIQUES OF MAX WEBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN APPRAISAL

Weber's contribution to the philosophy of social science, like his comparative historical sociology, has resulted in deluges of critiques and commendations ever since he presented his ideas in a series of essays. An increasing number of secondary literature on Weber's methodological writings exemplifies the profound influence of his ideas on the contemporary social sciences. As one author described it, "Weber has become transformed from a dead saint into a living thinker" (Giddens, 1972:7). Although Weber's writings in the philosophy of social science are unsystematic and often polemical, his thoughtful arguments forcefully directed against the contemporary philosophers on various issues gained the considerable attention of many commentators. Therefore, many social scientists who have "rediscovered" Weber in recent years have done so either to discard or criticize his methodological arguments (Hekman, 1983:14). Even those who discuss Weber at great length often conclude that his ideas are outdated or need to be reconstructed in a systematic form in order to find some solutions to the contemporary epistemological problems in the social sciences (Burger, 1976). Some others (e.g. Giddens, 1976:23) believe that despite Weber's fascinating insights of the problems of the philosophy of social science, his methodological ideas are "obsolete" in the light of recent discussions. However, at the same time, there is a strong opinion among some social scientists, who have taken Weber's position seriously, that "a return to Weber would be a progressive step in the philosophy of social science" (Fay and Moon, 1977:216). They believe that an understanding of Weber's complex views is an essential starting point for much of the discussion which follows (Keat and Urry, 1975:144). Each of these groups has interpreted and re-interpreted Weber quite differently from one another. As often we encounter, a greate deal of debates on Weber's methodological arguments have resulted from the misunderstandings or misinterpretations of his position. Many interpretations purporting to clarify Weber's position have obscured it, and created more confusion and criticisms. Some of the interpretations are even incompatible with

Weber's neo-Kantian position and have radically diverged from his intentions in the methodological writings (e.g. Parsons, 1965; Runciman, 1972).

Many commentators criticized Weber for the inconsistency and the lack of clarity of his methodological arguments. They have attempted to systematize Weber's thesis in an attempt to achieve a more consistent and comprehensive methodological framework for the social sciences. Their effort has been justified by the fact that Weber was not a philosopher who would have foreseen the limitations of his own methodological propositions and the ever increasing necessity within social science to advance its formal methodological techniques in order to study social phenomena more accurately in the face of corresponding systematization of human behaviour. Therefore, as they argue, what is needed today is to accomplish a clearly stated methodological synthesis of subjective and objective critiques originally developed by Weber (Hekman, 1983:12-13). The problem with this type of interpretation of Weber is not only do they propose to achieve a synthesis of Weber's subjective and objective critiques, but also they ignore Weber's contemporary philosophical background within which his arguments must be understood. For Weber, however, the lack of consistency is not a peculiar defect of his own work, but it is the very nature of the social sciences. The construction of a definitive and exhaustive methodological system is not a possible goal of the socio-cultural sciences. Moreover, Weber's neo-Kantian position, as we discussed in the preceding chapters, did not accept the idea of systematic general theory of social phenomenon, and it opposed any form of generalizations of concrete individual events of social reality as proposed by the idealist tradition in Germany. Therefore, it is absolutely incompatible with Weber's neo-Kantian position to develop a systematic generalized methodological system for the social sciences. It is certainly true that Weber's methodological arguments provide useful impetus to the current methodological debates in the social sciences and some significant insights to understand the nature of the social sciences, but it is incorrect to reconstruct Weber's arguments in order to develop a systematic methodological paradigm for the social sciences. It is more beneficial to understand his ideas, as they were developed by Weber, in the context of his contemporary

intellectual background. Methodological issues Weber addressed in his writings reflect the status of social science during his time, and a proper understanding of these issues would improve our ability to apprehend the current problems in the social sciences.

With this particular background one has to review the vast amount of secondary literature on Weber's methodological writings developed in the past few decades. The relevance of various criticisms on Weber's arguments must be assessed not on the basis of what he failed to achieve, but what he wanted to achieve in his methodological work. Weber could not answer all the questions appearing to be important in the social sciences, nor did he intend to do so. All he wanted to accomplish was some form of methodological justification for the substantive problems in his own sociological research. As far as that particular object is concerned, Weber has produced some methodological solutions for the social sciences. In the following section, I will discuss some of the major criticisms on Weber's methodological writings which have appeared in the past few decades. They will be discussed under three main headings namely: (1) Parsonian critique, (2) Natural right critique, and (3) Left-wing critique. This classification is only a nominal one, and many critics discussed under these categories do not represent unified opinions with regard to Weber. For example, among left-wing critics, Jürgen Habermas's approach to Weber's methodological writings is basically different from that of his predecessors of the Frankfurt School; he tried to reconstruct critical theory on the basis of Weberian and Marxian interpretations of society. However, despite these differences, they all seem to be critical of Weber's neo-Kantian position and, in particular, his philosophy of history. These three groups of critics approach Weber's writings from different theoretical and methodological standpoints. Therefore, they see the same methodological issues differently. Also, it is important to remember that Weber's methodological arguments were originally developed by the neo-Kantian philosophers, and therefore, they cannot be discussed without taking into account his neo-Kantian position with regard to the methodology of the social sciences. In this context, it seems more appropriate to discuss the criticisms of the above named writers since the focus of their studies are consistent

with the objectives of the present study. However, I do not intend to provide detail accounts of the philosophical and theoretical positions of these critics, but only their criticisms of Weber's methodological arguments would be analyzed. Such a detailed discussion is not possible within the limits of the present study.

PARSONIAN CRITIQUE

Among all the major topics discussed in Weber's methodology, his analysis of values in the social inquiry has resulted in extensive debates among social scientists. As we already discussed, Weber insisted categorically on the logical independence of the judgment of facts and the judgment of values and as a consequence, the irrelevance of the social scientist's own aesthetic, political or moral opinions to the validity of his inquiry. It is quite true, indeed, that the selection of a topic for investigation is a matter of subjective preference and that the practice of science presupposes such norms as correct procedure, legitimate influence, valid reasoning and so forth (Weber, [1922] 1949:22). But on this ground Weber did not try to establish a rigid demarcation between natural science and the social science as many critics have pointed out (Parsons, 1936; Bendix, 1946; Runciman, 1972). Parsons among many earlier critics of Weber, argues that Weber's methodological work has bridged the division between the two groups of sciences created by idealists. But following Rickert, Weber tried to maintain an untenable distinction between the relative roles of generalizing and individualizing concepts in the natural and the social sciences respectively.

According to Parsons, both Weber and von Schelting failed to see that the elements and general laws of the schema of proof are not homogeneous categories, but that under each, two different types of concepts are included (Parsons, 1936:678-679). According to Parsons, Rickert and Weber believed that natural science intends to form systems of general theoretical concepts; in the social sciences such concepts serve only as a means to the understanding of unique events. Further he added that one group of science, such as theoretical physics and theoretical economics, is primarily concerned with constructing theoretical systems, while the

other, like geology and history, is concerned with understanding unique historical individuals. In the one case, according to Parsons, general concepts constitute an end in themselves, while in the other, means. This distinction as the two bases of classification of empirical sciences do not coincide, but cut across each other and lies at a deeper methodological level than that between the natural and the social sciences. Therefore, Parsons concludes that Rickert, Weber and von Schelting make an unwarranted assimilation of the two distinctions.

First of all, it should be pointed out that Weber's insistence on the difference between natural science and the social sciences is based on his methodological criteria of value relevance in social inquiry, rather than the traditional distinction of subject matters as Parsons implies. As Weber recognized this difference, the subject matter of social science--the character of social reality, cannot be recognized meaningfully without approaching it from the point of view of human values and their meanings. But the subject matter of natural science, that is the character of natural reality, cannot be determined by human valuations. Nor has its explanation any significance if made in terms of unique characteristics of specific phenomena. On the contrary, the significance of individual unique events of social reality must be recognized in terms of their particular relevance to the culture or to human valuations; only those specific aspects of reality are important for social scientists. The direction of a scientist's interest, for example, in theoretical economics, does not make economic activity totally devoid of human values, but simply makes valuations remote rather than immediate. As long as any aspect of reality is value relevant, it has to be understood in terms of social scientific terms--that is general concepts which serve as means to individual explanation (Sahay, 1971:148). Therefore history, which is social scientific, cannot be included with theoretical physics or theoretical economics because history must take into account the factors of the value and the meaning of unique events.

Also, Parsons argues that the elements and general laws of the schema of proof are not homogeneous but include two different types of concepts. He gives the example of the generalizing ideal type, and says that it is ambiguous in the sense that it may either mean a

hypothetical "objectively possible" fictional entity or it may mean part of the "historical individual". Further, he adds that Weber's theoretical work tended to separate in these two directions, with the former tendency predominating in his explicit formulations. But he feels that "even with these corrections, the substantive theoretical propositions of science, both natural and social, are subject to the relativity inherent in their relevance to value" (Parsons, 1936:675-681). As Arun Sahay (1971:15) has pointed out, Rickert, Weber and Schelting applied the concept of value relevance in social inquiry as the distinguishing principle between natural and social scientific description and explanation. Thus, when they used the concept of value relevance they particularly referred to human valuations and their social consequences which are the subject matter of social science. They did not refer to the fact that a particular science seeks general uniformities or descriptions and classifications of the constituents of a particular phenomena. However, Parsons could not recognize the concept as it is presented in their common formulations since he attributed an analytical role to descriptive or substantive methodological concepts, such as "historical individual" and "ideal types".

Further, Weber's neo-Kantian position did not accept the idea of generalization of social phenomena. Weber's criticisms of the Historical School of economics clearly stated that the unique social events cannot be reduced to abstract general theories, which eliminates the individual character of social events. For the social scientist, any given social event is meaningful and subject to interpretive understanding because of its qualitative individuality, which is relevance to his value interest. Also, Parsons does not distinguish the methodological role of the formal characteristics derived from the fundamental analytical concept of value relevance from their contents. Thus, he confuses the role of general analytical, i.e., methodological with the role of general descriptive in both the natural and the social sciences. The two types of general concepts are both abstract in their form, but their aims and roles are different. The methodological concepts define the form of the analysis, while the descriptive concept defines the form of the contents. Therefore, the general substantive concepts are considered not an end in themselves, but means to the understanding of unique historical

individuals because the determination of uniformities of historical or social behaviour still leaves the real phenomenon under investigation empirically unexplained. The empirical reality of social facts is their meaning in terms of the values they refer to, not their common classifiable characteristics (Sahay, 1971:149-150).

Parsons' criticisms have been reiterated by Runciman in a recent essay entitled Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science (1972). Runciman believes that Weber's conviction that causal explanation is guided by value analysis follows a trivial and misleading sense of value. "The more important question is", according to Runciman, "whether there is still a difference between causal explanation in social and natural science although in both cases the investigator has first to have formulated his hypotheses by reference to what happens to puzzle or interest him...Weber's denial of the applicability of general laws in the social sciences arose in part from his mistaken view of psychology...He was inconsistent in denying that human history can be explained by reference to laws while insisting at the same time on the universal applicability of cause and effect...". First of all, Runciman did not distinguish Weber's concept of causal analysis from that of his causal law with regard to their analytical meanings. Weber clearly stated that the concept of causality is equally important in both the natural and social sciences. But the causal explanation in the social sciences which reveals the serial causality of an event is not identical with the search for universal laws in the natural science. They are different only because the latter searches for general causal laws, while the former reveals the concrete social causality of an event (Weber, [1922] 1949:135, [1906] 1975:197). According to Weber, causal analysis is subject to verification and is verifiable only because the range and types of empirical objects in social science vary with changes in the values of social scientists, unlike the causal laws. For sociologists, in Weber's view, causal analysis is especially useful in their attempt to provide knowledge of regularities of human conduct (Weber, [1922] 1949:177). Weber himself used this particular method in his extensive analysis of the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. The confusion of many critics regarding Weber's causal analysis becomes evident

in their argument that "Weber's analysis of meaningful action seeks to explain it in terms of nomothetic causal relations" (Freund, 1969:90; Hempel, 1965:161-163) or that his causal analysis assumes that "all qualitative differences were ultimately reducible to purely quantitative differences" (Kapsis, 1977:355).

NATURAL RIGHT CRITIQUE

Leo Strauss, a well known political philosopher, argues that the crisis in modern social theory is a result of the rejection of classical political philosophy. The classical political philosophy developed since Plato and Socrates was a science of all human affairs. Today political philosophy, according to Strauss (1957:343-368) is in a state of decay, if it has not totally vanished. Not only is there complete disagreement regarding its subject matter, its methods and its functions, but its very possibility in form has become questionable. Moreover, a large segment of what formerly belonged to political philosophy has become emancipated under the names of economics, sociology and social psychology. The classical political philosophy, according to Strauss, has been rejected by positivists, evolutionists and the neo-Kantians as unscientific or unlogical. Since the late 19th century, the social science positivists have succeeded in establishing a demarcation between science and values. For them, social science is incompetent to pronounce value judgments, and must avoid value judgments altogether. Positivistic social science is "value free" or "ethically neutral", it is neutral in the conflict between good and evil. This means, according to Strauss (1957:348), the ground which is common to all social scientists, the ground on which they carry on their investigations, can only be reached through a process of emancipation from moral judgments. Thus, the refrain from moral judgments is essential for scientific analysis. This very effort to distinguish values from facts by the social scientists, Strauss argues, will lead to a state of nihilism.

Strauss (1953:36) begins his discussion on Max Weber by appreciating his contribution to the social sciences. "No one since Weber has devoted a comparable amount of

intelligence, assiduity, and almost fanatical devotion to the basic problem of the social sciences. Whatever, may have been his errors, he is the greatest social scientist of our century". Strauss argued that Weber was "the leading social science positivist". He believed, Weber and Heidegger are strong nihilists and their social scientific thought was a late nihilistic version of the rejection of "values". Weber's conception of social science, which is, according to Strauss, "a consideration of historicism", asserts all human thoughts or beliefs as historical and "hence deservedly destined to perish; but historicism itself is a human thought and, therefore, it can be of only temporary validity, or it cannot be simply true" (Strauss, 1953:25). The historicists do not accept that historicism is only of temporary validity--"it thrives on the fact that it inconsistently exempts itself from its own verdict about all human thought". According to Strauss, Weber tried to avoid this inconsistency by distinguishing "facts" from "values". Value ideas are historically relative, but the validity of propositions of the social sciences are objective and universal or transhistorical. Thus, the historicist interpretation of relativism delimits the validity of social scientific knowledge.

Strauss believes that Weber helped lead social science into the "morass of relativity". He maintains that science should not be understood positivistically, but ontologically as the search for prima principia. Whoever does not believe the oneness of truth cannot help but succumb to a chaos of random values. Without the acceptance of natural rights, relativism and its dialectical counterpart, totalitarian absolutism, appear inevitable (Roth, 1965:218). According to Strauss, Weber was a disciple of the historical school, and his reservations against historicism were half-hearted and inconsistent with the broad tendency of his thinking. Weber objected to the historical school "not because it had blurred the idea of natural right but because it had preserved the natural right in a historical guise, instead of rejecting it altogether" (Strauss, 1953:37). The historical school, had ascribed natural right a historical character by tracing all genuine right to unique folk minds, and by assuming that the history of mankind is a meaningful process. Weber rejected both assumptions, according to Strauss, as metaphysical, i.e., as based on the dogmatic premise that reality is rational. Since Weber

assumed that the real is always individual, he could state the premise of the historical school also in these terms: the individual is an emanation from the general or from the whole. According to Weber, individual phenomena can be understood only as effects of other individual phenomena, but not as effects of wholes.

Strauss emphasized that Weber never explained what he means by "values". Weber tried to distinguish values from facts, and he believed that there is a genuine scientific knowledge of the true ends of men. In such a social science, the arbitrary character of the first step, determining the object of inquiry to approach reality would be eliminated; science could proceed from a valid frame of reference as opposed to various invalid frames of reference. This would have obvious bearing on questions of theory and practice.

> Based on genuine knowledge of true ends, social science would search for the proper means to those ends; it would lead up to objective and specific value judgments regarding policies. Social science would be a truly policy-making, not to say architectonic, science rather than a mere supplier of data for the real policy makers (Strauss, 1953:41).

The central argument of Strauss's criticisms is based on Weber's effort to separate facts from values. The separation of values from facts, according to Strauss, means the denial of any genuine knowledge of the Ought. In other words, the value-free notion of knowledge is by its definition a denial of the validity of pre-scientific knowledge. Weber, of course, denied that man can have any knowledge of the true value system, on the grounds that there are various value systems whose conflict cannot be solved by human reason. Strauss (1953:42) argues that the social science proposed by Weber "necessarily leads to nihilism or to the view that every preference, however, evil, base or insane, has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference". Strauss believes that Weber could conceal the nihilistic character of his doctrine of values because he accepted the Kantian notion of science and "individual" ethics. Moreover, Weber advocated the idea that there is no possible social or cultural order which can be said to be the right or rational order:

> Weber was convinced that, on the basis of a strictly this worldly orientation, no objective norms are possible: there cannot be "absolutely valid" and, at the same time, specific norms except on the basis of revelation" (Strauss, 1953:70).

Weber strongly believed in the possibility of developing a rational and value-free social science. Therefore, according to Weber, social sciences attempt to understand social life from a this worldly point of view. Social science is human knowledge of human life. It tries to find rational or reasonable solutions to social problems. But for Weber, social science cannot fully realize this important task because the committment to science is, at root, unfounded or based on an act of faith, which is contrary to its very nature; it requires the "sacrifice of intellect", which is abhorred by science or philosophy (Strauss, 1953:71-72). In other words, social scientific knowledge is based on presuppositions. Hence, Strauss argued, Weber's whole conception of value-free knowledge supported the legitimacy of a break with pre-scientific knowledge. However, according to Strauss, Weber himself could not carry through this break consistently--nor have current sociologists. He points out that when a sociologist conducts a survey, he gives his interviewers all sorts of instructions; but he does not tell them to address their questions to human beings, and not to dogs, trees and so on. Nor does he tell them how to identify human beings. This knowledge is presupposed. It is a part of the pre-scientific understanding that is not replaced by science (Strauss, 1972:225). But social science is dependent on this knowledge; the scientific view rejects the pre-scientific understanding only to let it in through the back door. Strauss believes, scientific knowledge can only make sense on the basis of a coherent and comprehensive understanding of that which it attempts to modify. Science is based on a specific view of reality, and scientific understanding consists in a specific transformation of reality. He argues that the classical political philosophy maintained the idea that all knowledge or truth stems from opinions. For example, Plato, Socrates and Aristotle conceived of philosophy as a process from opinions to knowledge. This process originated in opinions about "what things contradict one another". A recognition of these contradictions forces one to go beyond opinions toward a consistent view of the nature of things involved. This consistent view makes visible the relative truth of the opinions. This conception is evident in the work of Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, Strauss, as a neo-Platonist, urge to re-establish the classical political philosophy and that the restoration

of the idea of proceeding from and perfecting the pre-scientific understanding of things (Turner, and Factor, 1984:211).

Strauss' criticisms seem to be well organized, and he has addressed very fundamental philosophical questions of Weber's writings. His criticisms raise a number of philosophical and epistemological questions concerning Weber's thesis of "value freedom" (Wertfreiheit). Strauss is certainly correct when he argued that scientific knowledge is, at the outset, based on pre-scientific understanding of reality, and without such a preliminary view of any given aspect of reality it is impossible to proceed in the investigation. Both Strauss and Weber agree that science needs presuppositions of reality, and such presuppositions are crucial for scientific inquiry. However, Weber's idea of value freedom, according to Strauss, is an attempt to distinguish pre-scientific understanding from scientific knowledge. This, for Strauss, implies a denial of the validity of pre-scientific knowledge. It seems, however, at this point Strauss has misunderstood Weber's position at least on philosophical grounds. Weber's argument for value-free science did not mean that pre-scientific understanding of reality is a non-science, or it has no significant value for the scientist. Weber believed that our experience of everyday life consists of a greater degree of invaluable knowledge that invariably contributes to our scientific investigations. But he opposed any attempt to advocate value judgments of the scientist along with facts which are being studied. Here it is important to remember Weber's definition of value judgment: "By valuation, we shall understand the practical rejection or approval of a phenomenon capable of being influenced by our actions"(Weber, [1922] 1951:475). In the Objectivity of Social Science, Weber clearly distinguished "value relevance" from "value judgments" (see, [1922] 1949:9-10). He believed that it is possible, and it is necessary, to make a clear distinction between "value judgments and letting the facts speak for themselves". Any such value judgments, any evaluations concerning practical obligations are neither verifiable nor falsifiable by observable facts. Thus, value judgments cannot be derived from scientific insights (see, Habermas, 1973). The assertion of social facts in terms of the theoretical interest of the observer and the evaluation

of "social facts" from the practical point of view of the observer are clearly two different tasks. The elimination of the investigator's own value judgments in the analysis does not mean that he can eliminate the relevance of values to his inquiry. Karl Popper has explained this basic relationship as follows:

> All scientific descriptions of facts are highly selective. It is not only impossible to avoid a selective point of view, but also wholly undesirable to attempt to do so; for if we could do so, we should get not a more "objective" description, but only a mere heap of entirely unconnected statements. But, of course, a point of view is inevitable; and the naive attempt to avoid it can only lead to self-deception, and to the uncritical application of an unconscious point of view (Popper, 1952:260-261).

Value-free social science in this sense is an intellectual enterprise, in which we must openly and consciously acknowledge our own choice of the matter, which is not a taboo, but the ethics of scientific research. Strauss argued that Weber himself could not fulfill his own demand of ethical neutrality in his own studies. To support his argument, Strauss has selected a number of value judgments made by Weber in his own works. Strauss' attacks cannot be justified on two grounds: First of all, as Arnold Brecht (1959:265) has pointed out, "no scientific relativist would condemn words like cruelty, civilization, etc..., whenever they are used within a clear frame of reference as descriptive in accordance with known standards, as long as these standards are not themselves at issue". Brecht's argument is invariably true for all the examples given in Strauss's criticisms. He has ignored Weber's ideal types, which are not normative ideals, but function as a frame of reference for hypothetical evaluations. As Karl Jaspers explained it:

> The scientific impulse to discover the truth and the practical impulse to defend one's own ideals are two different things. This does not mean that they can be acted on independently of each other. Weber is simply against confusing the two; only when they are clearly distinguished can they both be acted on differently. There is no relation between scientific objectivity and opportunism. The confusion of the two destroys objectivity as well as conviction (Jaspers, 1932:47).

Weber used a variety of evaluative models in his comparative historical sociology. But they are not value judgments as such; he never used them as his personal opinions regarding any particular issue. As Bendix (1965:11) has pointed out, Weber's appreciation of the unique character of historical events was developed by expressing positive value judgments

concerning, say 17th century Art; he would not in his own view, be laying any legitimate foundation for the contemporary formulations of practical directives for a cultural policy.

THE LEFT WING CRITIQUE

In the early Marxist criticisms of Weber, he is generally characterized as a leading proponent of bourgeois sociology. Weber is called a "bourgeois Marxist" (Salomon, 1926:144). As Salomon has pointed out, it is not just methodological questions, but ideological ones, which separated Weber from socialism and caused him to take the dialectics and ultimate goal of society out of the Marxist philosophy of history. Weber's neo-Kantian position, i.e., the methodological idealism has been criticised as "irrational", and the idea of value freedom was called mere imagination which cannot be implemented in any sense of practical purposes of the social sciences. Among the early Marxists, who were extremely critical of Weberian sociology, Georg Lukacs is more important in many respects. Lukacs's criticisms, on the one hand, attacked the major philosophical tenets of neo-Kantianism and Weber's sociology was treated within that broader framework. And on the other hand, Lukacs's criticisms of Weber have direct influence on the work of the Frankfurt School during the post-war period.

Lukacs criticised Weber and other neo-Kantian philosophers as "irrationalists" and showed the "limits of reason" in their philosophy. The political motives of this kind of thinking, according to Lukacs, are invariably anti-politarian and anti-revolutionary, or at least historically reactionary in the sense that this kind of thinking disturbs the understanding of historical reality (Lukacs, [1954] 1980:829).

> The struggle against materialism, that is in sociology against the priority of social being over social consciousness, and against the determinant role of the development of the productive forces continues to be conducted...The relativist methodology engendered on the basis of neo-Kantianism and Machism permits bourgeois sociology to allow for the interaction between base and super-structure in certain limited and abstract forms. This is clearly apparent in Simmel's sociology of Money and in Max Weber. Weber examines the reciprocal relations between religious and economic system but resolutely rejects the priority of the economy (Lukacs, 1972:387).

Lukacs argues that Weber's sociological starting point was the interaction between the material world and ideologies, but his struggle against historical materialism became evident in his attempt to establish the "unscientific" character of the primacy of the economy. Weber's sociological analyses always accorded ideological (religious) phenomena an immanent logical status, which is, according to Weber, the final cause of the total change. Weber's famous argument that "not ideas, but material ideal interest, directly govern men's conduct...", is characterized by Lukacs as the element of irrationalism of his sociology. Weber's sociology, Lukacs argues, "aspires to demonstrate that a necessary irrationalism was engendered on the very terrain of capitalist rationalization". Lukacs believes that Weber developed sociology in the direction of Geisteswissenschaft, the idealist interpretation of history. This was a part of the efforts made by the German sociologists to turn the worker's movement away from class struggle. A complete account of Lukacs's criticisms of Weber is to be found in The Destruction of Reason, completed in 1952, and in his essay originally published in 1955. These two pieces contain enormous philosophical references on German sociology before World War II. In his essay in 1955, Lukacs maintains that the central problem of German sociology before World War II was to find an alternative theory to historical materialism in order to explain the origin and essence of Capitalism.

However, Lukacs's criticisms of the neo-Kantian philosophy as "irrational" and "antiproletarian" are the most serious charges against the neo-Kantians. Lukacs's main problem is that Weber and other neo-Kantian philosophers did not accept historical materialism, and their whole effort was to develop a counter-theory of the development of capitalism. He believes that the only correct philosophy of history is historical materialism, and therefore, he has a rational basis for his own philosophy. Lukacs does not believe that he is attacking "Weberian idealism" as being irrational on the basis of similarly irrational theory. For Lukacs, to emphasize the ideal primacy over material development is irrational, as for Weber to emphasize the material economic factor over ideological development of the society is irrational. Hence, both theories, in that sense, are equally irrational because of their

one-sided emphasis which limits the empirical validity of their methods. However, as Kolakowski (quoted in Turner and Factor, 1984:206) argued, for Lukacs all philosophers who do not profess communism in its current orthodox form, i.e., Stalinism, are irrationalists and therefore, Nazists objectively, if not by actual conviction. He further argues:

> It would be hard indeed to find a more striking example of antirationalism than that afforded by Lukacs's own philosophy of blind faith, in which nothing is proved but everything asserted ex-cathedra, and whatever does not fit the Marxian schemata is dismissed as reactionary and rubbish (quoted from Turner and Factor, 1984).

Weber admitted that to explain the development of capitalism in terms of religious ethics is incomplete, and he repeatedly insisted that his theory of Protestant ethic is only one side of the history of capitalism. Therefore, it is an ideal typical interpretation of human conduct. Weber's effort was to develop a different interpretation of history, in which he argued that the ideals of worldviews govern men's actions directly. Lukacs failed to give any credit to Weber and the neo-Kantian philosophers for their contribution to the philosophy of social science because he did not consider them as academic philosophers. He rather treated them as opponents of historical materialism. Therefore, Lukacs's criticisms sound more political than academic. However, the influence of Lukacs's criticisms on the Frankfurt School is more important. The members of the Frankfurt School did not consider the philosophical difference between historical materialism and neo-Kantianism as simple as Lukacs characterized.

Until 1930, the early members of the Frankfurt School did not pay much attention to Weberian sociology. Among the early members, Karl Wittfogel and Franz Neumann (Wittfogel, 1924, 1931; Neumann, 1942, 1953) just mention Weber in their writings, and there was no any significant discussion on either the neo-Kantian philosophy as a whole or Max Weber's ideas in the philosophy of the social sciences in particular. After the 1930s, the trend changed; Max Horkheimer, at one time Weber's student, became interested in Weber's idea of value-freedom, and later Herbert Marcuse tried to explore the philosophical basis of Weber's theory of rationalization. In Eclipse of Reason, first published in 1947, Horkheimer characterized Weber as an opponent of objective reason. He argued that Weber vigorously

adhered to the subjectivistic trend of the social sciences, which was not rational at all--not even from a subjective point of view. Horkheimer's argument can be compared with Lukacs's view of the irrationality of value-freedom. This is, according to some critics (e.g. Turner and Factor, 1984; Kellner, 1985), evidence of a direct influence of Lukacs on the early members of the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer believed that even Weber's own arguments "were not always so value-free as they seemed to him". In 1965, at the Heidelberg centennial meeting of Weber's death, Horkheimer vigorously and more sympathetically reiterated that Weber "would have agreed with me that sociology cannot be completely divorced from philosophical obligations, and that sociologists must still make value judgments even after their research subjects are already decided upon" (Stammer, 1971:53). In general, Horkheimer argued, as in each detail part, any theoretical study consists of renewed value-judgments. Unlike Lukacs, Horkheimer was careful to take Weber's idea of value-freedom as a scientific term of the academic philosophy, and he seriously felt that Weber was genuinely interested in eliminating value judgments from sociology even though he could not fully control his own inner voice regarding more sensitive matters.

Among all the early members of the Frankfurt School, Herbert Marcuse was the most uncompromising critic of Weber. Marcuse has severely criticised Weber in a number of essays. He argued that there is a clear relationship between Weber's sociological works and the dominant socio-political theme in Germany during the early decades of this century. Marcuse believed that Weber has contributed to the emergence of Nazism and the imperialist politics in Germany. Hence, the primary task of the Frankfurt School is, according to Marcuse, to overcome this philosophy. This was the most common view of the early members of the Frankfurt School. In order to undertake this important task, they tried to achieve a theoretical synthesis of Hegelianism, Marxism and Freudianism. In an essay published in 1964, Marcuse tried to draw some parallel developments between Weber's political thinking and the rise of Nazism in Germany. He bases his argument on a distorted interpretation of Wolfgang Mommsen's book, Max Weber und Deutsche Politik. Marcuse (1971:133) argued that Weber

believed that it was the destiny of the German bourgeoisie to fight against the socialist revolution, and to expand the political power of Germany beyond its geographical boundaries. These kinds of ideas in Weber's political writings, according to Marcuse, are very common, and they were motivated by the strong nationalist sentiment and the self-preservation attitudes which prevailed in early 20th century Germany. Weber believed that "socialism contradicts the idea of Western reason and the idea of a national state; therefore, socialism is a universal mistake if not a universal crime" (Marcuse, 1971:133). Thus for Weber, whatever capitalism may do to man, it is to be understood, first and above all, essentially as reason, and it is the fate of western civilization itself.

For Marcuse, Weber's theory of industrial capitalism is essentially a mixture of philosophical, political and socio-historical interests characteristic of Weber's contemporary social background in Germany. The theory of value-free science is a part of the practical political program, in which Weber himself was actively involved. The idea of internal value freedom was imposed from the outside in order to accept the evaluations. In his inaugural speech at Freiburg, Weber openly subordinated value-free economics to the demands of imperial power politics, and this was evident throughout Weber's scientific research (Marcuse, 1971:133). Therefore, the political aim of this value-free sociological conceptualization, according to Marcuse, is to conceal its own valuations. Then it becomes a critique of the facts which influence man and his environment. In other words, such value-free concepts are abstractions which produce pseudo-empirical sociology hostile to the true definitions of reality. In this way, Marcuse argued, Weber was able to concretize the concept of industrial capitalism in the formal theory of rationalization. Technical rationality and the inner-rationalization of life were presented by Weber as the "absolutely inescapable condition of our entire existence" (Marcuse, 1968:204). Marcuse has so brilliantly summed up the dichotomy between capitalism, rationality and control in Weber's work. The ideal of reason is reified in a system of material and intellectual culture (economics, technology, way of life, science, art), which is fully developed in industrial capitalism, and this system tends towards a

specific type of domination, which has become the destiny of the present epoch--the totalitarian bureaucracy.

Marcuse's criticisms of Weber have produced many counter criticisms during the late 1960's. In this discussion, I will try to discuss some of those arguments to shape my own views of Marcuse's criticisms. At the outset, it must be mentioned that Marcuse was the most prominent critic of Weber, and his criticisms reflected the influence of Lukacs and even to some extent, Leo Strauss. Although, there is no clear evidence to argue that there is a relationship between Weber's political writings and the post World War I politics in Germany, as Marcuse tried to show, it may be true that Weber's nationalist ideals have indirectly influenced the political system in Germany during that period. It must be expected that any great thinker--whether he is a liberal or bourgeois ideologist--can use his powerful writings effectively to communicate with his own society. This is the whole purpose of scientific activity. Weber was not unaware of the possible outcomes of his arguments, and he was very eager to implement his ideas (see Mommsen, 1974). However, the purpose of Weber's scientific approach is "not to ignore everything human and historical" as Marcuse argues, but to define conceptually the phenomena he deals with, in order to analyse more clearly their pre-conditions and conditions (Bendix, 1965:156). The possibility of such scientific research depends on neither the social status nor the good will of the researcher. Weber's sociological ideas represented some of the social and political problems of Germany, and often Weber was more critical of European politics during that period. However, Marcuse has exaggerated when he argued that Weber's writings have contributed to the imperialist politics in Germany. Weber was not a member of the bourgeois class in the ordinary sense of the term, rather, as Mommsen (1985:235) has explained, "he is better located in the intelligentsia, a social group that cannot be assigned to any of the economic classes". Much of Weber's scholarly work was concerned with a variety of aspects of industrial capitalism from the point of view of liberal intellectuals. As a result, Weber's ideas appeared to many critics as anti-revolutionary and anti-working class. As Mommsen describes it:

> Weber's sociology can be viewed as an attempt to formulate an alternative position standing in harmony with his own bourgeois-liberal ideals, but one that does not simply dismiss the socialist critique of bourgeois society as being without foundation (Mommsen, 1985:234).

Weber's own criticisms of the inhuman consequences of the modern capitalist system and the bureaucratic domination of social affairs are not far removed from what Marx has said about the industrial capitalist society. Weber's concern for preserving human dignity under the condition of industrial capitalism is fully consistent with Marx's effort to find a way of overcoming the social alienation of workers under the capitalist system. Therefore, there is no doubt that Weber was a great humanist, who strongly believed that human values must be safeguarded at all cost. Marcuse criticised Weber's theory of value freedom as an attempt to make science free to accept obligatory evaluations introduced from the outside. This seems to be a misunderstanding of Weber's thesis. As Georg Weippert (1971:152) pointed out, for Weber, to accept rationalization and industrialization in the unique form of the Occident is not an evaluation, but an acceptance of a firm datum or a necessary fact. The nation-state, for Weber, is such a historically necessary fact, and he believed that one can study it without imposing his own evaluative statements. Similarly, Weber thought socialism historically possible, and he made a decisive contribution to the theory of complete socialization in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, under the heading of "Rational Planned Economy". Yet he was convinced that socialism cannot overcome man's control of man. According to him, the tendency to bureaucratization gains ground with socialization. For the sake of his own concept of freedom he tried to prevent socialism in the sense of complete socialization. Between 1916 and 1918, Weber's writings indicated more clearly that his political viewpoint was compatible with that of social democracy, which he defended vigorously against reactionary critics. As Weippert argues, Weber's hate-filled phrases, which Marcuse points out, were not directed against socialism or socialists, but the "dilettanti" in economic matters, particularly those in Berlin and Munich. Weber did that because he believed that they might, by thoughtless measures, completely destroy the German economy.

Weber's liberal humanistic attitude becomes evident in his report in 1892, on agricultural workers in Mecklenburg and the East Elbian province of Prussia, the region where the Junkers and the large estates were concentrated. Among the six German sociologists who produced six socio-economic reports on different regions in Germany, only Weber proposed reforms to benefit rural workers and explicitly assessed the situation of rural workers in terms of German national interest (Dibble, 1968:92-110). Moreover, as Salomon (1935:377) pointed out, Weber admired the proletarian movement so long as it possessed the strength to feel conscious of itself as a cultural movement. The way of radical opposition which it assumed, however, he considered dangerous and foolish. Weber considered the economic theories of Marxism outmoded, as a result of social developments, or else changing upon other presuppositions. He considered the class of peasants, petty bourgeoisie, officials and ever increasing numbers of administrative workers as a great obstacle to proletarian revolution in central Europe. All these arguments indicate that Weber did not advocate anti-proletarian political ideas in his work as Marcuse maintained. In political activities, Weber believed that he could contribute to the development of an independent and responsible nation, which he repeatedly mentioned in a number of reports. In 1894, Weber made it clear at the fifth Lutheran Social Congress: "We want to develop what seems to us valuable in man: self-responsibility and the deep desire for spiritual and ethical values. We do not want... to shape social conditions in such a manner as to make people feel 'happy'...but so as to allow 'the best' in them to develop under the pressure of the inevitable struggle for existence" (cited from Blum, 1959:1-20).

The theoretical perspective of the Frankfurt School has shifted ground since the late 1960's, when Jürgen Habermas became the leading member of the Frankfurt School. Against Marcuse and Horkheimer, Habermas adopted a different theoretical approach to modern industrial capitalist society. Habermas tried to bring together Marxian and Weberian approaches to society and history in order to reconstruct critical theory. The basis of Habermas's effort to reconstruct critical theory is, in one respect, consistent with Straussian

critiques of Weber. Habermas, in his Theory and Practice (1973:41), began his inquiry with the central Straussian view that classical political philosophy was conclusively broken off by the critique of historicism. With the establishment of political science on the model of the modern experimental sciences, the separation of practical philosophy from theoretical doctrines was completed. The classical political philosophy was a doctrine of praxis. Habermas argues that classical political philosophy differed from modern social theory in three respects: (1) Classical political philosophy was a doctrine of the good and just life; it was the continuation of ethics. The ethical character of action was not separable from custom and law. (2) Classical political philosophy referred exclusively to praxis. In the final instance, politics was always directed toward the formation and cultivation of character; it preceded pedagogically and not technically. (3) According to classical political philosophy, politics and practical philosophy in general, cannot be compared in its claim to knowledge with a rigorous science.

Habermas (1973:72) maintains that the purpose of theory is to inform practice as technical knowledge informs instrumental action. The separation of politics from morality, for instance, replaces instruction in leading a good and a just life with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order. This argument of Habermas basically contradicts the idea of value-free social science, the fundamental tenet of neo-Kantian philosophy. He argues, "since the clarification which Max Weber brought about, in the so-called value-judgment controversy...the social sciences have been separated completely from the normative elements that were the heritage of classical politics, a heritage now quite forgotten..." (Habermas, 1973:44). The strategy that Habermas adopted was to take the Marxist critique of knowledge as a point of departure for a new epistemological conception or self-understanding of social science. He argues that sociology cannot escape from the problem of its positivistic self-understanding. Sociology is itself a social phenomenon and is, therefore, a subject of sociological inquiry. According to Habermas, the dominant self-understanding of social science is positivism, which is an embodiment of certain interests. The scientific

enterprise, which is called technological control by Habermas, has profound implications in modern bourgeois society. The relationship between positivism and the scientific enterprise must be understood in terms of the dominant class interest of the bourgeois society, where political interests are transformed into a scientific or technical question. The domain of the cultural sciences is not constituted only by the epistemological problems, but also by the issues related to "power" (Habermas, 1971:193). Like Strauss, Habermas argued that there is a relevant pre-scientific understanding of the things studied by the cultural sciences. The scientific understanding that the technocrat uses is different from this pre-scientific understanding. But this difference is concealed or obscured by the refusal of positivism to reflect on the difference. Hence, the technical control of society exercised by the state is based on an unexamined transformation from practical needs understood pre-scientifically to goals that can be formulated in terms open to technical control. Thus positivism becomes key to obscuring ideology that prevents practice from being brought under rational valuative scrutiny.

Habermas (1971a:63) argues that Weber's positivistic account of method contradicts his hermeneutic intention of understanding the cultural significance of the present; his positivism limits the social sciences to a cognitive interest, which is valid for the production of knowledge which can be utilized technically. Moreover, Weber was positivistic enough not to allow himself to reflect upon the connection between his methodological perspectives and rules, and the results of his social analysis. The positivistic view of knowledge, as technical knowledge, is a particular ethical conception of "decisionism", the doctrine that evaluative and prescriptive assertions are distinguished from scientific claims because the basis for these assertions can be nothing other than a "decision" that cannot be further justified. Thus, for Habermas, the positivistic self-understanding of science implies a particular ethical theory, decisionism. This ethical theory is the basis of the fact-value distinction and, therefore, is the basis of the problem of theory and practice. Weber was the principle architect of this doctrine in the recent social sciences.

In Theory of Communicative Action, (1984) Habermas provides a systematic and comprehensive critical examination of Weber's theory of rationalization. This is the most complete work on Weber's rationalization so far available in English. In addition to this major work, Habermas discussed Weber's rationalization in a number of essays. In 1970, in an essay entitled "Technology and Science as Ideology", Habermas tried to reformulate the Weberian thesis of the relationship between rationalization and domination. He argues that the core of Weber's theory of capitalism is his concept of rationality, and his interpretation of rationalization justified the development and diffusion of the modern capitalist system. Habermas explains the establishment of an economic mechanism that renders permanent the expansion of subsystems of purposive rational action, and the creation of an economic legitimation by means of which the political system can be adapted to the new requisites of rationality brought about by these developing subsystems. It is this process of adaptation that Weber comprehends as "rationalization". The process of rationalization legitimizes the entire system of the capitalist mode of production including the political system, which in the traditional society had the power to legitimize all the other sub-systems in the society. This is the real meaning of rationalist natural law of the neo-Kantian philosophy. In the Protestant Ethic thesis, Weber interpreted the process of rationalization as a social ethic of the modern capitalist system.

Habermas believes that the reconstructed form of Weber's theory of rationalization provides "the most promising approach for explaining social pathologies which appear in the wake of capitalist rationalization" (cited from Kellner, 1985:110). These pathologies are due to the expansion of instrumental action into the life-world. He distinguishes instrumental and communicative actions from the life-world, and argues that the extension of instrumental action into the life-world creates disturbances which prohibit rational discussion of procedures and rules. The expansion of instrumental action into the life-world denies individuals the possibility of communicative action, that is, discussion that produces rational agreement, development of consciouness, and the capacity for insight and rational action. Thus,

Habermas argues, "in capitalist societies, the pattern of rationalization...is determined by the fact that instrumental rationality wins out at the expense of practical rationality by reifying communicative conditions of life" (cited from Kellner, 1985:110).

Habermas criticisms's seems very constructive and effective compared with those of his predecessors of the Frankfurt School. Habermas, like Strauss, has utilized Weber's own thesis to criticise Weber. Weber has argued that science has a significance which must somehow be accounted for. He said that it cannot be accounted for scientifically, but that the value of science is presupposed. The fact-value distinction is the source of this paradox which has figured in positivist as well as in Weberian writings (Turner and Factor, 1984:220). For Habermas, this kind of positivistic approach is an ideological problem in the bourgeois social sciences. Hence, he tried to reconstruct critical theory by amalgamating both Marxian and Weberian elements of sociology. This is an important theoretical achievement in the development of the social sciences. He believes, this approach to the modern industrial capitalist society provides an unprecedented explanation of the structural developments in the capitalist system. It explains why mere instrumental reason failed to explain the pathological situations produced by the rationalization process. Moreover, it enables us to understand why classical Marxism failed to distinguish properly between labour and interaction, the dilemma he recognized even in Weber's and Lukacs's interpretations of reality. Habermas has successfully synthesized Weberian sociology and critical theory, which subsume all spheres of social reality into one complex system.

IX. CONCLUSION

Throughout the last two decades, sociologists often talked about a "crisis". "Crisis in sociology", "crisis of western sociology", and "sociology in crisis", the list goes on (Gouldner, 1970; Kon, 1975; Ferrarotti, 1975). However, the question is what happened to this crisis? Have we solved it or is it still there? But, for sure, sociologists today are less concerned with this crisis, if they have not totally forgotten. Throughout the history of sociology we find various crises--crises over different issues. In fact, sociology was born out of a major historical crisis and it thrived out of crises. Therefore, crisis is nothing new to sociology. It is natural for sociology as a science of society to live through constant crises over its methods, its significance and its texts. The development of sociology as a profound discipline, to a large extent, depends on its response to new crises. The intellectual crises within sociology are one aspect of the general conditions in society; sociology, like any other social science discipline, is subject to all the influences that arise from the clashes of interest and the diversities of human society (Bottomore, 1975:6). Since the beginning, there have been competing theories, methods and viewpoints in sociology. As Margaret Masterman (1970:58-59) described this diversity, sociology is "a science with too many paradigms". Nevertheless, despite the differences of paradigms in theory, methods and approaches, there have been some occasions of relatively clear-cut transition from one dominant paradigm to another in sociology. This has been described as a "movement from one quasi paradigm to another" (Bottomore, 1975:6). For example, the rejection of positivism at the turn of the last century was one important step of the reorientation of European social thought, although it was far from complete and unanimous. Positivism was attacked by a wide range of philosophical traditions, and among them, however, there is still a considerable diversity of meta-theoretical approaches.

The reaction to positivism in a form of methodological crisis in the late 19th century was an important landmark of the development of sociology. Besides its direct impact on the post-war sociology in Europe, which has been described as a major transition of European

social thought by Stuart Hughes (1958), it had far reaching consequences in North American sociology. European social thought was introduced to North American sociology by Parsons in his effort to construct the basis for a coherent and systematic theory of society, a project which necessarily involved an attack on positivism and historical materialism. In doing so, he hoped to synthesize certain disparate traditions of social theorising, so rejecting what he regarded as one-sided or reductionist approaches to the specification and analysis of social structure (Johnson, Dandeker and Ashworth, 1984:45-46). To some degree, this appeared as an extension of the late 19th century methodological crisis in Europe because the basis of much of the discussions was European in origin. Particularly, Weberian sociology was at the center of this intellectual orientation led by Parsons. Many social scientists, for the first time, discovered Weber in the Parsonian project. His interest in Weber had two directions: first of all, he believed in Weberian social theory a non Marxian foundation in which he can develop a counter thesis to a Marxian interpretation of society. Parsons argued (1937:503) that Weber's anti-Marxian interpretation of the origins of capitalism stressed "ultimate values" and "value attitudes" and led directly to "an analytical sociological theory". The formal and substantive outlines of Parsons's action theory, an analytic framework stressing the centrality of norms can thus be found in Weber's writings (Zaret, 1980:1193). Second, more than any other classical sociologists that Parsons examined in his The Structure of Social Action, Weber worked within both idealist and positivist traditions. Weber's attempt to synthesize both idealism and positivism avoided becoming extremely negative of either tradition: the idealist disregard for "obstacles to the realization of norms" and the positivist dismissal of "normative aspects of action" (Parsons, 1937:486,638). For Parsons, Weber's seminal contribution to social theory combined idealism and positivism in a general theory that upheld, in opposition to historical materialism, the subjective point of view. In Parsons' The Structure of Social Action Weber was introduced to the English speaking world as a main rival of Marx, and his methodological writings were described as an attempt to synthesize idealism and positivism. This was followed by a series of translations of Weber's methodological writings into English

by Parsons himself and some others. Characteristically all of these translations and interpretations portrayed Weber as a "methodologist", the fallacy that dominated much of the secondary literature on Weber during the last few decades. His comparative historical sociology was not available in English until the late 1950s, and when the English translation of the Protestant Ethic was first published in 1958, the emphasis was still on the methodological side rather than sociological and historical categories of his study. One commentator (Kolko, 1959:25) described it, "Weber's causal theory--and for the period up to the Enlightenment it is the causal factor in Western history--is formulated as a reaction to the Marxist thesis of ideas ultimately being the reflection of economic and class needs".

Johannes Winckelman[31] (1980), the editor of Max Weber's Wissenschaftslehre, believes that the understanding of Weber in North America has been misguided since the beginning of this century. He recognized the origin of the problem in Parsons' interpretations of Weber's writings: "On the whole, since Parsons' The Structure of Social Action (1937), Max Weber has become completely 'Parsonified' in and for America, a fact that earned Parsons severe criticism and considerable unpleasantness toward the end of his life, even in the USA, when the situation was exposed by the experts. Even this is not the whole story. One must realise that when Max Weber's work became available in the USA it was only piecemeal and partial, and was always interpreted only in the context of the state of the discussion within America at that time: at one stage against pragmatism and behaviourism, and at the next for structural functionalism and symbolic interactionalism". Winckelman expresses a serious doubt about the accuracy of the existing interpretations of Weber's writings. As it was discussed in the preceding sections of this study, he believes that the current understanding of Weber's methodological writings is, to some degree, based on inaccurate interpretations. The assumption that Weber was a methodologist is the common

[31]In a letter to Detlef Kantowsky (1980.9.25) Winckelman explained major problems with Parsons' and many other's interpretations of Weber. The complete letter has been published in Kantowsky's, "Die Rezeption der Hinduismus/ Buddhismus--Studie Max Webers in Südasien--ein Missverstandnis?" Archives Europeennes de Sociologie. Vol.23. 1982.

mistake that has resulted in an inevitable underestimation of the relationship between Weber's methodological arguments and the neo-Kantian philosophy, the core of his interpretation of social facts and his theory of causal analysis. To understand Weber's views of the general theory that Parsons' attempted to construct in his writings, it is essential to understand Weber's concept of value relevance, an important tenet of the neo-Kantian philosophy. Parsons and many others, who simply assumed that Weber was a methodologist and who ignored examining carefully his neo-Kantian position, failed to understand Weber's antipathy toward general theory. For this same reason, they could not see the real reason of Weber's opposition to historical materialism. Parsons' interpretation of Weber is idiosyncratic and unduly stresses normative aspects of meaning for the following reason. Weber "refuted" historical materialism, but only at the expense of general theory per se. For Weber, the untenable features of historical materialism were merely specific instances of a more widespread fallacy: the attempt to go beyond ideal typical analysis to develop a general theory of society (Zaret, 1980:1193).

In this context it is evident that a great deal of discussion on Weber in the past are based on serious misinterpretations of his writings. They are simply out of focus; Weber, a sociologist who unveiled the methodological problems inherent in the social sciences and adopted methodological concepts of his contemporary philosophers, has been understood as a methodologist himself. His methodological writings were seen as a platform for the construction of a systematic meta-theoretical framework for the social sciences. Weber's methodological concepts have been used as a guiding thread, regardless of their epistemological premises, which Weber adopted from the neo-Kantian philosophy. For whatever did not become explicit in his scattered arguments, he was accused of being unsystematic and eclectic (Schutz, [1932] 1967; Winch, 1958). Some enthusiastic sociologists have even argued that Weber merely accepts, but not resolves, the duality between, on the one hand, an analysis of subjective meaning and, on the other, an "avowedly empirical" approach (Brittan, 1973:11). Whether or not such accusations are justifiable, one thing, for sure, is

perfectly clear in these criticisms: Weber was not a methodologist, and therefore, his methodological arguments cannot be fully understood without examining his contemporary philosophical background. Weber's methodological arguments are understandable when they are discussed in the light of neo-Kantian philosophy. As Tenbruck believes, Weber's sociological oeuvre grew up, cuckoo-like, in the philosophical nest that was built by the neo-Kantians. His writings on methodological issues are complex syntheses of a whole range of ideas taken over from others and presented with his own views. In order to derive proper meanings and interpretations from these complex statements one must, first of all, understand the philosophical foundation of these ideas and their development during the methodological crisis in Germany.

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